Wetmore v. New York Institution for the Blind

The action is brought to obtain a construction of the will and codicil of Mary Hopeton Drake, late of the city of New York, deceased, the plaintiff being the executor named in said will and codicil and the defendants various charitable institutions in the city of New York and persons who are legatees thereunder.

By the second clause of the will the testatrix, exercising a power of appointment given to her by the last will and testament of James Drake, deceased, devised certain houses and lots to grandchildren of the sisters of the said James

By the third clause of her will she directs her executor to sell certain houses and lots therein named, and out of the proceeds to pay to one Evans the sum of $37,000 in full-payment of her bond held by him, conditioned for the payment of a monthly amount during his life, and to cancel the same, and in case said Evans refused to accept such payment, the whole of the proceeds arising from the sale of said houses are to be given by the executor to the United States Trust Company, in trust, to invest and keep the same invested, etc., and out of the interest therefrom- to pay to said Evans the monthly sums called for by said bond and to apply the residue to his use during his natural life, and upon his death she directs that the principal be given to his then lawful issue, and if he shall die leaving none, ‘ ‘ the principal of said trust fund shall form a part of my residuary estate,” and be disposed of as the same is hereinafter disposed of. The fourth clause devises a house and lot for the benefit of Mary E. Bedford and her family. The fifth gives control of the bed in St. Luke’s Hospital, then owned by the testatrix, to Mary Hopeton Smith, a grand niece of her father, etc. The sixth gives her laces, shawls, jewelry, etc., to Mary Hopeton Drake and Mary Hopeton Smith, granddaughters of her father’s sisters. The seventh clause directs that all the rest, residue and remainder of her estate, both real and personal, be sold by her executor and converted into cash, and that the proceeds be paid over to the persons and parties therein named. Then follow the names of several charitable institutions and indidividuals who are specified as legatees.

By said seventh clause, the testatrix gives to St. -Luke’s Hospital, the sum of $5,000, to endow a bed to be called the Hopeton bed, and she gives the right of disposing the same to Mary Hopeton Drake. To Sarah A. Lawrence, sister of her deceased father, she bequeaths the sum of $10,000; she also bequeaths to the Theological Seminary, in Alexandria, State of Virginia, the sum of $10,000, to be invested by said corporation, and the income applied forever thereafter to the education of two poor young men, one for the foreign and the other for the domestic missionary field. There are, also, legacies to Mrs. Clary, Miss Whittemore, Mr. Wetmore, to Henry Bradley her coachman, if in her service at the time of her death, of her pew in Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, to Emily L. Smith, of $10,000 to Mrs. Wright, and one of $5,000 in trust to the United States Trust Company, for the benefit of Mrs. Caroline M. Smith and her daughters. Another, in a like sum, to said Trust Company, for the benefit of Mrs. Foster and her daughters, and another, in a like

The will then continues: “All the rest and residue of my said residuary estate, not herein otherwise disposed of, I order and direct my said executor to pay over, and I give and bequeath the same to the above mentioned James Drake Black, Mary Hopeton Drake, and Mary Hopeton Smith, absolutely, share and share alike.” Provision is also made for the disposition of the shares of the said residuary legatees, in case either of them shall die before the testatrix with or without issue.

Subsequently the testatrix executed a codicil to said will, in and by which she revoked certain devises contained in the second clause of her will to James Drake Black, Mary Hopeton Smith and Mary Hopeton Drake, and, by the second clause of said codicil, she readjusted the devises of said property so as to make Hopeton Drake Atterbury, a grandchild of Mrs. Lawrence, who had been born subsequent to the execution of the will, an equal beneficiary with James Drake Black, Mary Hopeton Smith and Mary Hopeton Drake. By the third clause of' said codicil she revoked the bequest of her personal effects contained in the sixth clause of the will, and instead thereof gave and be

She revoked, by the fourth (should be the fifth) clause of said codicil, the bequests in the eighth clause of her will, “of all the rest and residue of my said residuary estate, not herein otherwise disposed of, to James Drake Black, Mary Hopeton Drake and Mary Hopeton Smith,” and instead thereof she directed her executor to pay over, and gave and bequeathed the said “rest and residue of my said residuary estate to said James Drake Black, Mary Hopeton Drake, Mary Hopeton Smith and Hopeton Drake Atterbury, share and share alike, absolutely and forever,” the same provisions and bequests over to apply to each of the said four legatees in the event of the death of either of them.

The complaint alleges that various difficult and important questions, relating to the powers and duties of the plaintiff nnder the said will and codicil, and the construction of certain bequests, provisions and directions therein contained have arisen, with regard to which the plaintiff desires the direction and judgment of the court.

It is further alleged that as to the bequest contained in the eighth division of said will, to the Hew York Blind Asylum, the plaintiff has no knowledge of the existence of any body under that name, but that the same is claimed by the defendant, “The Society for the Belief of the Destitute Blind of the City of Hew York and Vicinity,” having its Home at Tenth avenue and One Hundred and Fourth street in said city, and is also claimed by “The Héw York Institution for the Blind,” having a school or college at Hinth avenue and Thirty-third street in said city.

It is further averred, that the estate of the testatrix is insufficient to pay in full, the various legacies given in and by the eight division of said will, and that said legacies will have to abate, but to what extent the plaintiff cannot yet determine; that Sarah A. Lawrence, to whom was bequeathed the sum of $10,000, died before the testatrix, and the said legacy to her thereby lapsed; that the question has

The complaint further avers that a similar question also arises, as to the disposition to be made on the respective deaths, of Mrs. Behin, and Mrs. Hancock, of the two trust funds directed by the seventh division of said will to be invested for their benefit during their respective lives.

It is also averred that the plaintiff has no knowledge of the existence of any body corporate or association, under the name of The Ladies Home Society of the Baptist Church in the City of New York, and that no claim has been made therefor, and that the question arises whether the plaintiff is justified in treating such legacies as void, inasmuch as upon the trial of the action, the society appeared and was permitted to intervene and answer, no questions can arise with respect to that legacy differing from those which relate to the other societies.

It is also averred that as to the bequest of $5,000 in the fourth division of the codicil, to St. Luke’s Hospital the question arises whether said bequest, like the legacies contained in the seventh division of said will, is to be paid in full, or whether said bequest is to be paid pro rata with the legacies contained in the eighth division. It is averred with respect to the sum of - $10,000 directed to be paid over to the United States Trust Company, to be held in trust and invested and the income paid to the defendant Annie E. Foster during her natural life, and the principal to be divided upon her death between her two daughters, that all the parties are of full age, and have united in a request that said sum be paid over to said three defendants, upon their joint receipt, and the judgment of the court is asked, whether the plaintiff would be justified in doing so, and also, in case such payment should be made what interest if any upon said sum should be paid. The court is finally asked by its judgment to determine and decide the several questions referred to in the complaint, as well as any other questions which may be raised touching the construction of the said will and codicil.

On the other hand it is claimed on the part of said residuary legatees, that when the testatrix in paragraph three of her will mentions her residuary estate, she clearly refers to the general residuary clause of her will, and also, when in paragraph seven she directs that certain trust funds shall each after the death of the respective beneficiaries become a part of her residuary estate, she refers again to this general residuary clause; also that the charitable legacies are to be paid only out of the residue of the proceeds of sale of “ My residuary estate,” directed to be sold in the paragraph seventh of the will after the legacies mentioned in said paragraph are paid, that such residue is a limited, and not a general residue, and that the legatees to be paid out of it, cannot enlarge their fund by lapsed legacies. It is further argued upon the part of said infants, that the fact that such residue is the proceeds of sale of the entire remainder of her estate, after previous devises and bequests have been paid, does not give to this clause the full force of a general residuary clause, “ in a case like this, where there is also a broader and general residuary clause, especially when this broad and general residuary clause is referred to in paragraphs, three and seven of the will preceding it,” that there cannot be, “two affective, unlike, general residuary clauses,” that the will should be construed to harmonize and give effect to both clauses, and that a construction which permits the charitable legacies to gather in lapsed legacies, would in effect be an obliteration of the general residuary clause.

There is no doubt that the legacy to Mrs. Lawrence lapsed by reason of her death before the testatrix, and that that to Henry Bradley never took effect, for the reason that he was not in the service of the testatrix at the time of her decease.

In the Matter of Benson ( 96 N. Y., 509 ), the court, in referring to such legacies, said: “The rule is universal, to which there is no exception to be found in any of the books, that lapsed legacies under such a residuary clause as this fall into the residue and pass to the residuary legatees.”

In that case the will contained a general residuary clause disposing of all the rest, residue and remainder of the testator’s estate, both real and personal. Four-fifths thereof were given to the beneficiaries named. One-fifth was given in trust for the benefit of his wife during her life. It was

In Reynolds v. Kortright (18 Beav., 417, 427), the learned judge writing the opinion said, the result is, that everything which is ill given falls into the residue. To the same effect are the following authorities in this state: James v. James, 4 Paige, 115; King v. Strong, 9 id., 94; King v. Woodhull, 3 Edw. Ch., 79 ; Banks v. Phelan, 4 Barb., 80 . But the testator may, by the terms of the bequest, narrow the title of the residuary legatees as where it appears to be his intention that the residuary legatees shall have only what remains after the payment of legacies, and he may so circumscribe and confine the residue as that the residuary legatee will be a specific legatee, and then he will not be entitled to any benefit accruing from lapses, unless what shall have lapsed constitute a part of the particular residue. But as said by Lord Elden in Bland v. Lamb, 2 Jacobs and Walker, 406, “ Very special words are required to take a bequest of the residue out of the general rule.” In Banks v. Phelan, a learned judge said, that the only exception to the general rule is, when the words used in the will expressly show an intention on the part of the testator, to exclude such portions of his estate as are mentioned in any of the previous clauses of the will, from falling into the' general residue.”

I have quoted thus largely from the elaborate opinion of Judge Earl in that case, because it seems to me to contain in a succinct form, all the rules which appertain to the construction of the will under consideration, and to epito

In construing this will, as in all other cases, we must-endeavor to discover the intention of the testatrix. It is plain to me that her intention was, that the charitable-societies mentioned in the eighth division of the will should receive nothing until after the payment of the specific legacies mentioned in the seventh division of the will. The-fund from which each of the legacies and bequests referred to in both of those divisions of the will was to be derived was the proceeds of the sale of all the rest, residue and. remainder of the testatrix’s estate, both real and personal, not specified or referred to in the preceding divisions of the' will.

When, therefore, under the seventh division of the will, the testatrix sets apart from those proceeds certain bequests- or legacies, and provides by the eighth division of the will,, “that after the payment of the above mentioned legacies, and the provisions made, as above directed, for the-annuities,” the executor is to pay out of the residue of such proceeds the various legacies therein enumerated, it is plain to my mind that she could not have intended that any of such legacies or bequests should be paid out of any portion of such proceeds which had been previously disposed of by the seventh division of the will. If, therefore, for any reason, any part of the proceeds bequeathed by said seventh division of the will did not, in fact, go to the legatee, or legatees, therein named, it fell into and became a part of the general residuary estate, as contra-distinguished from the residuary estate arising from such proceeds not referred to, or attempted to be disposed of by the seventh division of the will. I am strengthened in this view, as already in

It can hardly be supposed that the testatrix contemplated that in case of a deficiency in her estate, and an inability to pay the legacies mentioned in the eighth division of the will in full, that the principal of said two trust funds should go after the decease of the beneficiaries to the legatees therein mentioned.

Those beneficiaries may live for years, and it seems unreasonable, therefore, to hold that the testatrix intended in any event that such portion of her estate as might under the provisions of her will go to the societies, should await the expiration of two life interests in said fund. It may be urged that the testatrix not having contemplated that a deficiency would exist, did not consider this question, and that, therefore, those bequests and the language thereof do not aid us in the construction of said will, but on the other hand we must bear in mind that the court is to endeavor to get at the true construction of the will, and at the intent of the testatrix by placing itself in the position in which she stood, and from the language which she has employed. Bearing in mind this principle, I am entirely satisfied that the “residuary estate” to which the testatrix referred in the bequest above mentioned in the seventh division of her will is the “general residuary estate” mentioned at the end of the eighth division of her will at folio forty-five of the complaint. See Matter of Benson, 96 N. Y., 509 and 510; Given v. Hilton, 95 U. S., 591 , 599; Theobold Law of Wills (3d ed.), 180; Re Denton, 102 N. Y,, 200 , 203.

By what has been above said, I do not intend to deny that where the testator has by the terms of the bequest narrowed the title of the residuary legatee so that it appears to be his intention that the residuary legatee shall have only what remains after the payment of the legacies, the general residuary legatee takes nothing until after such payment; but such does not seem to be the effect of the language employed in this case.

The language of the general residuary clause at folio forty-five of the complaint is “all the restand residue of my said residuary estate not herein otherwise disposed of, I order and direct, etc.”

At the time of the execution of the will the testatrix sup

In Jarman on Wills, Vol. 1, page 763, (Bigelows 5th Am. Ed.), the general rule is stated as it is laid down in the Matter of Benson, 96 N. Y., 510 . The author then-proceeds to state an exception to that rule as follows, “however if the words of the will show that the testator intended a residuary bequest to have a limited effect, the presumption in favor of the residuary legatee will of course be effectually rebutted: the difficulty in these, as in most other cases being not in discovering the principle but in applying it to particular wills.”

I am of the opinion that the learned counsel who appears for one of the residuary legatees is right, when he states that this case illustrates, both the general rule and the exceptional case referred to by Jarman. The bequests given to the charitable societies at folio 41, of the complaint, and also the bequest to the residuary legatees at folio 45, of said complaint are both in form residuary bequests. But as the rule is that it is only an unqualified absolute general residuary clause, which will take in lapsed void and ineffectual legacies, and as the first residuary clause seems only intended to have a limited effect, to wit, after the payment of all the legacies mentioned in the seventh. division of the will, whether lapsed or otherwise, it seems clear that that clause does not embrace such lapsed or ineffectual legacies. (See Matter of Benson, 96 N. Y., 510 and authorities cited). The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the various charitable societies who claim that the lapsed and ineffectual legacies should go into and form a portion of the fund out of which the bequests contained in the eight division of the will should be paid, were all cases I think in which the general residuary clauses of the will were circumscribed and confined, so that the general principle in reference to

I think it quite clear that in this case it is the residuary bequest at folio 41 of the complaint, which is limited, and not the bequest at folio 45. If I am right in this construction, it follows that the lapsed, void and ineffectual legacies or bequests contained in the seventh division of the will, fall into and form a part of the general residue mentioned at folio 45 of the complaint, and not of the limited partiticular residuary estate mentioned at folio 41 of said complaint. It, therefore, follows that such portions of the legacies intended for Mrs. Lawrence and Henry Bradley, as may remain after the abatement to which they are subject in consequence of the deficiency in the estate will fall into and become a part of the general residuary estate, bequeathed by the will and codicil to the four infant defendants.

I think, too, that upon the decease of Mrs. Behin and Mrs. Hancock, the legacies given to them respectively go to said infants as a part of the general residuary estate of the testatrix.

The case of Kerr v. Dougherty ( 79 N. Y., 327 ), which was so much relied upon by counsel in this case, is not adverse to this conclusion. In referring to that case, the court of appeals, in the Matter of Benson (supra), say: “But that case was misconceived.” It was there held that there was no “general residuary clause; that the testator there meant to limit and circumscribe the residuary clause, and used such language as to show that it could not be increased by the lapsed legacies. The general rule, as we have laid it down, was recognized in the prevailing opinion, but it was held that the language of the will then under consideration and the facts took that case out of the rule.”

It is contended, on the part of the infant defendants, and of some of the others, that the bequest, contained in the eighth division of the will, to the Hew York Blind Asylum, is void, because that name does not accurately describe either of the two institutions which claim the legacy, and that the court has nothing before it from which it can determine that the testatrix meant either one of said institutions.

It was held in Lefevre v. Lefevre ( 59 N. Y., 434 ), that a misnomer or misdescription of a legatee or devisee, whether a natural person or corporation, will not invalidate the provision, if either from the will itself or evidence aliunde, the object of the testator’s bounty can be ascertained, and that to identify a particular corporation as the one intended, where a name other' than the corporate name is used, the identity may be proved by paroi evidence.

Prior to these decisions, the court of appeals had held in the case of The New York Institution for the Blind v. How’s Executors (6 Seld., 84) that the plaintiffs (who are one of the defendants here) were sufficiently described under the name of the Trustees of the Institution for the Maintenance and Instruction of the Indigent Blind in the City of New York to entitle them to a legacy under the will of the defendants’ testator. The court there stated, in substance, that although the plaintiffs were not correctly named in the will, it appearing that there was no other institution for the blind in the city of New York, although the plaintiffs were chartered for the purpose of instructing blind children, without regard to their indigence, and without provision for their maintenance, as the state had for several years placed certain indigent blind persons in that institution, to be maintained and instructed at the expense of the state, they were sufficiently described to entitle them to the legacy.

In this case it appears that there is now and was at the time of the death of the testatrix another society in existence, which is one of the claimants for the legacy in question, whose corporate title is “The Society for the Belief of the Destitute Blind in the City of New York and vicinity.” It is claimed by the latter that it has proved by its certificate of incorporation, its annual report, and by the testimony of witness, that it is in every sense an asylum and purely an asylum, while the co-defendant “The Institution for the Blind ” is a school, and in no sense an asylum, and that the legacy in question in terms describes the society and not the institution. The latter shows by the testimony that it was incorporated over fifty years ago, and has for a long time occupied a conspicuous building upon a large

The proof, I think, establishes that the older institution was well, and generally known to persons residing in the city of New York, as the blind asylum.

Witnesses were also called to show that the society has been spoken of in common parlance as the “ Blind Asylum.” It is contended by the society that as before 1869, there was only one possible beneficiary, that all bequests for the blind, were naturally received by the institution. But it is contended that as since 1869, there has been a real society for the indigent and destitute blind, since then for the first time, New York has had a blind asylum, the institution being merely a school. Mrs. Benjamin, the wife of the founder of the society, was called as witness and testified, that she had mailed reports to the testatrix showing the working of the society, and had also mailed tickets to her for annual fairs, and it is claimed as a fair inference that the testatrix intended the defendant society, when she made the bequest to the New York Blind Asylum. Evidence was also given tending to show that the society was founded by the Episcopalians, and that the testatrix was an Episcopalian; that when consulting the witness Wright, as to the disposition of her property by will, as she ran along the schedule of charities, she said “I must leave something to the blind.” That she was particularly interested in the poor blind, and that she said “It is bad enough to be blind, but it is too bad to be poor and blind.”

The society therefore claims that it is entitled to the legacy».

First. Because it is an asylum, and the other claimant is not an asylum.

Second. Because the attention of the testatrix was called to the defendant by the annual report and tickets to its fair about the time she made her will.

Third. Because she expressed her intention of aiding the poor blind, which is the sole object of the defendant society.

They also claim that there is not a word of extrinsic evidence in aid of the New York Institution for the Blind, and that the latter simply proves that it is a common error to speak of the school as a blind asylum. The word “Asylum” it will be perceived is not a part of the name of either of the institutions which claim this legacy. The New York Institution for the Blind was incorporated by chapter 214 of the Laws of 1881, and it was declared to be a body politic and

In 1836 a similar provision was made, and it was directed that the beneficiaries should be between the ages of eight and twenty-five years.

An appropriation of $12,000 was made by said act from the state treasury on condition that the managers of the institution should raise an additional sum of $8,000.

Further acts of the legislature were passed in 1839 and in 1845 appropriating moneys from the state treasury for the support and objects of the institution. The original act of incorporation was amended in 1848 by chapter 193 of the Laws thereof as follows, by inserting in the first section of said act after the words: “By disease or accident,” the fol- ' lowing words, viz.: “And, also for the purpose of affording an asylum and employment for other blind persons.”

It will thus be seen after the year 1848, the New York Institution for the Blind by legislative designation became an asylum, so that one of the objects of that institution answered to the name by which the institution is shown to have been very generally known in the city of New York. It is stated in the testimony and in the brief of counsel, that “The Society for the Relief of the Destitute Blind of ■ the City of New York and its Vicinity,” was incorporated in 1869.

We have, therefore, in this case two institutions which it may be admitted are designated in common parlance as “Blind asylums,” but the older and more widely known defendant is by the act amending its incorporation described as an asylum. Furthermore the name of the society apparently restricts relief to the indigent blind, while on the other hand the words, “The New York Institution for the Blind,” are of a very general character, and embrace all blind who may need the assistance or relief afforded by the institution, particularly in the absence of evidence of an institution, having the precise name used by her. See St. Luke’s Home v. Association for Indigent Females, 52 N. Y., 196 .

I think too that the evidence shows that the Society for the Relief of the Destitute Blind, was but little known to the public at large at the time of the execution of the will. Nor do I regard the evidence that the annual report of the society and tickets for its fairs, had been mailed to the testatrix by its officers, as sufficient to overcome the presumption arising from the evidence that the older institution is described in its amended act of incorporation as well as in

Upon the trial I admitted certain evidence subject to objection, in respect to other bequests contained in other wills under which payments had been made to the Yew York Institution for the Blind. I am of the opinion that that evidence should not be received, and it is accordingly stricken out and disregarded by me in the decision of this case.

The observations above made dispose of the two principal questions presented by this case, but some others remain to be considered. It is contended that the legacy given to Mr. Wetmore, under the eighth clause of the will, to be by him applied to such charitable uses, as he may see fit, is void, because there are no beneficiaries named, and because the trust is too vague to be capable of execution by a court of equity. I agree with the learned counsel for the defendant, the Domestic Foreign Missionary Society, that it is plain that that legacy was given in trust, and that the legatee was to take no beneficial interest thereunder. This seems to be plain, not only from the terms of the bequest itself, but from the fact that he had received a personal bequest of $5,000, under the seventh clause of the will, in addition to his commissions, and from the fact that the terms of this bequest are mandatory, See folios 30, 42 and 44 of the complaint. The cases of Prichard v. Thompson, 95 N. Y, 76 , and Beckman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y., 298 , and other cases in the court of appeals, seem conclusive upon this point. With regard to the second bequest, given by the fourth clause of the codicil, I deem it sufficient to say that I see no reason why it should be entitled to any preference over the legacies given in the eighth division of the will. In reference to the claim of the defendant, Foster, that the trust fund should be paid to them on their joint receipt, it is only necessary to observe that I do not consider it within my power to grant their request.

The testimony taken subject to objection at pages 9, 10,

A decree will be entered in accordance with these views and the findings settled upon notice.