Muller v. Ryan — 19 N.Y. St. Rep. 109

Majority

p. 109

Louis Muller, Resp’t, v. Michael Ryan, App’lt.

(City Court of New York, General Term,

Filed November 30, 1888.)

Headnote

1. Evidence—Expebt testimony—Juey not bound by.

The value of an article or a service, if in dispute, is not to be determined exclusively upon the expert evidence given; the jury are still called upon to exercise their judgment in reference thereto upon all the evidence in the case, considered in the light of their own experience.

'2. Convebsion—What constitutes.

The delivery of a watch by a party, with whom it was left for repairs, to the wrong person, constitutes a conversion of it, and makes the party so delivering liable for the value.

The plaintiff, on August 12, 1887, left a gold watch with "the defendant (a watchmaker) for repairs. About the twentieth of that month he called for it and the watch could not be found. On the twenty-seventh the plaintiff again called and the defendant told him the watch had, by mistake, been given to some other person. The plaintiff thereupon brought this action in trover to recover the value of the lost watch.

The jury awarded the plaintiff fifty-five dollars, and the defendant appeals.

Thomas O'Callaghan, Jr., for app’lt; J. G. Flammer, for resp’t.

The delivery of the watch to the wrong person constituted a conversion of it, and made the defendant liable to the plaintiff for the value. Edwards on Bailments, §§ 72, 99, 162.

Upon the question of value, the expert, Welsh, testified “that he would duplicate the watch for sixty dollars, and that the defendant ought to get fifty dollars to make .his loss good.

The expert, Benedict, testified that he sold the watch to John Muller October 9, 1876, for seventy-eight dollars, and, upon cross-examination, testified that the watch, at the

p. 110

time of the_ loss, was worth twenty-eight dollars, having depreciated in value fifty dollars since the time of the purchase.

Expert evidence is, at most, the mere opinion of witnesses versed in the technics of a particular art, science or mechanism. It is admitted because knowledge on the subject is not common to all, but comes from the personal observation and experience of those only who have given the particular subject special attention.

The value of the different opinions, and the weight to be attached to each is for the jury (Case v. Pexew, 10 St. R. at p. 815), yet the value of an article or a service if in dispute, is not to be determined exclusively upon the expert evidence, for the jury are still called upon to exercise their own judgment in respect thereto upon all the facts m the case considered in the light of their own experience. Reeves v. Hyde, 14 St. R., 689.

The jury heard the expert evidence, weighed it, and in the exercise of their best judgment and experience, fixed the value of the lost watch at fifty-five dollars. They had before them the fact that the watch originally cost seventy-eight dollars, with proof of its age and condition, likewise the character of its use from the time of purchase, and from these circumstances, aided by the expert evidence and their own experience, they arrived at a conclusion as to value that the evidence in its entirety authorized. We cannot say that it was either arbitrary, unjust or at variance with truth. The fact that the plaintiff’s experts differed as to value makes no difference in the result. It is. but natural for men to differ in opinion, and is not unusual for experts to disagree.

Indeed, as a rule, they do. We have failed to discover any substantial reason for impugning the verdict and tho judgment entered upon it must be affirmed with costs.

Brown and Ehrlich, JJ., concur.