People v. American Bell Telephone Co.

The controversy submitted by the case presents the point of the liability of the American Bell Telephone Company, a corporation formed under the laws of the state of Massachusetts to carry on the business of manufacturing, owning, selling, using and licensing others to use, electric speaking telephones, and other apparatus and appliance pertaining to the transmission of intelligence by electricity, to taxation under the laws of this state. This liability is asserted to have been created by chapter 542 of the Laws of 1880, as that was amended by chapter 361 of the Laws of 1881. In the argument of the case, which was very ably and searchingly conducted, the liability of the •company for taxation under the laws of this state has been claimed, and as confinently denied, for the years 1882 to and including the year 1886. And by sections 3 and 6 of the act of 1881, this liability is made to depend upon the fact of the business of the corporation having been wholly •or partially carried on within this state during these years. The taxes are not claimed by the state as taxes upon the corporate franchises of the defendant, but upon its business, as that has been mentioned and made the basis of taxation in these sections of the act. They have been made expressly applicable to corporations organized by or under the laws of any other state, or country, doing busines in this state, subject to certain exceptions not affecting the question of the defendant’s liability. And by section 6 of the act of 1881, the language employed evinces the intention to

To render the company liable to taxation under the statute, no proportionate amount of its business has been required to be transacted within this state. But the fact that it has systematically done, or carried on, business in this state, is what the law has placed the liability to taxation upon.

By its own officers, or immediate agents, it has not engaged in, or carried on business within this state, but what has been done by it has been through the agency and intervention of local corporations, formed under the laws of this state, and in a large degree pursuant to the authority of the-defendant. These corporations have been authorized by it chiefly to carry on what is described and mentioned as an exchange business in a circumscribed locality not exceeding the radius of fifteen miles in extent. And with the exception of the Metropolitan Company, whose contract embraces all the attributes of those made with other companies,'three different forms of agreement have been prescribed by the defendant and executed or accepted by the local companies, for the carrying on and transaction of the telephone business. One of these contracts, when separately made, as they usually have been, provides for a business known as the exchange system, by which a central office is established and communication is carried on through it, between the subscribers or lessees of the company. In the course of the business of the New York Company, it is supplied at the city of Boston with telephones, including what is called a transmitter and receiver, the former being the means or apparatus of communicating, and. the latter the apparatus for receiving intelligence. These telephones by the agreement for this purpose made, as well as by the other agreements, remain the property of the defendant. And they are authorized to be leased by the New 'York Company to its patrons, but for the use of which a rental or royalty is required to be reserved for the benefit of the defendant. This rental, or royalty, is fixed by the agreement itself. And

By the mode in which the business is carried on the New York or local companies make the leases to its customers and collect the rentals, not only for the defendant but for itself, for the use of its own apparatus, and the additional rental required to be paid for the use of the telephone. When contracts are made by the Local company for the use of a telephone, it has been required by the contract with that company and the defendant that such contract shall express “in such form as the lessor shall from time to time approve, that the telephone is the property of the licensor; that it is leased and licensed by it only as herein expressed, and that all use of it otherwise is an injury to and invasion of the rights of the licensor as owner thereof, ” etc. And it has been further stipulated and provided in the contract between the defendant and the Local Company that the former may intervene and “collect from any sub-lessee or subscriber, all sums then or thereafter due to it, or due to the second party, for the use of any instrument, circuits and appliances, or under any subscription contract. Or it may, so long as it shall see fit, leave in the enjoyment and use of the telephones any subscriber or other person in actual possession, and collect from him such sums as may then and thereafter be or become due for the use. of the telephone and exchange lines, appliances and services, and for that purpose shall be entitled to and may take possession of all the lines, fixtures, apparatus, appliances and premises of the second party, used for carrying on its business, and occupy and operate the same in connection with said telephones and those of additional customers as exchange systems, or connect such lines with offices of its own for that purpose.”

The local companies incorporated and carrying on the •exchange system of business are not permitted, without special authority, to connect wires and telephones and carry on business between different exchange systems in the state. That authority has been provided for in another form of contract made by the defendant with the local com-, paiiies, and it has been placed more especially under its

“The lessee will also allow the lessor to conzzect the wires-of any such lines with its said lizies, in order to constitute thereby a through line, of which the lessee’s lines, or any, or either of them, or aziy part of either of them cazz forzxz a portion, or link, in order to forward through messages, will make or permit to be made, conveziient switch boards or other connections for that purpose.” It then provides-for a division of the toll for the service performed after deducting expenses, between the paities to the agreement, amounting, to the defendant to orze-fourth of the gross receipts of subscriptions and tolls. As to these telephones it has also in like manner been provided that the sub-leases and licenses shall in such form as the lessor shall fz’om time-to time approve, express the title of the lessor to the telephone and the patents, the extent of the license thereby granted, the puz-pose for which the telephone may be used, and that any other use of any telephone by any person, ór non-payment of the rental azzd royalty of the licensor, is. an injury to and invasion of its rights as owner thereof, and of the patent rights used therein azzd thereby; It is-further agreed that the defendant “may also enforce-against such sub-licensee all rights, and pursue all remedies-given by and under such sub-license, and znay use the name-of the lessee for such purpose, or may z-equire the lessee at its own expense to enforce the terms of such contracts.”' And “the lessor may also use the name of the lessee to-protect its interests and enforce its rights hereunder, and. the lessee shall execute assignments in accordance herewith.”

The third form of contract made and entered into by the defendant is for supplying private lines and other purposes These consist of one single circuit, neither permanently nor

Another species of business has also been provided for in the way of connecting the exchange systems with the-offices of the Western Union Telegraph Company. This is no part of the business of the local companies, but is that of the defendant itself. It has been authorized by the contract providing for the exchange system to connect wires with the wires of the exchange system and the offices of' the telegraph company, and to receive as its compensation for the business transmitted in this manner a certain proportion of the income or earnings of that business. And as a matter of fact it is agreed, in the case, that from this source it received, in 1882, $782.43; in 1883, $968.57; in 1884, $817.69; in 1885, $975.25 ; and in 1886, $1,009.47.

The wires used in this business are very short and of' little value, costing for the whole state, so far, only the sum of $136.26.

From these facts, as they have been extracted from the-case, it appears to follow that the local companies in the state are not taxable for the rentals payable to the defendant, by its customers, for the telephones. Those rentals are the earnings and property of the defendant, entering to-the extent of the advantages reserved to the defendant in no manner into the corporate capital or earnings of the

But in letting and leasing the telephones, so far as the rental is reserved for the benefit of the defendant, they are rented by the local companies as its agent, the telephones remaining its property, and subject To its control, direction and disposition at all times. This is more especially the case in the extra territorial lines connecting different exchange systems, and in private and club lines. They form no part of the exchange system^, but are substantially the lines, and under the management, direction and control of the defendant. And they are no less in this condition, because that management, control and direction, has been and may be exercised through the local companies. In what they do in this respect, they do it under the authority and for the defendant.

And where one party; acts in this manner for another, it acts for that other as his, or its agent. And the businessin which it acts is to the extent that it is under the management, control and direction of the other, the business of the party exercising, or having the right to exercise this authority over it. And its rights are neither reduced nor qualified in this respect, because it has committed the management, control and direction, to a great extent, to the judgment and discretion of the local company. That is a power frequently delegated to agents, and in its exercise the party having the delegated authority is acting for the party from whom the authority is acquired. Still, more emphatically, is this the case, as to the private lines, club lines, social lines, and speaking tubes, for as. to these, the leases are made directly between the defendant and the person or persons having the authority to use the telephones and establish such lines. And the rentals, so far as they are reserved by such leases, are the property of the defendant. And what the local companies have been authorized to do is to countersign the leases, and receive such rentals, as long as the defendant does not elect to intervene and collect them for itself. And its duty is to account for them and to transmit such rentals to the defendant. In this class of cases the business seems to be exclusively, that of the defendant, performed through the intervention of the local companies Tor its, own use, advantage and benefit.

And in an equal degree, is that true of the messages trans

The right to tax property and business within the limits of the state beyond controversy, appertains to the powers, confided and vested in the state government. Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Peters, 514; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters, 420; Case of State Tax, 15 Wallace, 300.

And this power of taxation, essential as it is for the support and maintenance of the government, is not to be impaired or reduced in its authority, because of artificial and refined distinctions, having no real foundation for their support. Taxation is imposed as an equivalent, or by way of compensation, for the security and protection afforded to property and persons by the state. And the facts of this case bring it within this legal principle upon which the enactment of these statutes has proceeded. For not only the telephones themselves remaining at all times the property of the defendant, but these contracts through which its rentals are reserved, and in the case of the private lines and others made directly with itself, and the business carried on between the exchange systems and the Western Union Telegraph Company, are protected and secured in all the advantages issuing therefrom to the defendant, by the laws of this state. And for that protection and security it should bear its share of the public burdens. And that it may be so held liable, results from what was decided in the case of People v. Equitable Trust Co., 96 N. Y., 387 .

It appears further by the case that the defendant has secured a dividend upon its capital employed in this state of ten per cent for the year 1882, increasing to sixteen per cent in 1885 and 1886. And it is accordingly hable on this capital to pay the percentage imposed for the privilege of doing its business in this state, prescribed and designated by section 3 of the act of 1881. In addition to that, it has also, by section 6 of the same act, been rendered liable to pay a tax of five-tenths of one per cent upon its gross earnings in this state for the business here carried on by it; and that amount, in addition to the percentage fixed by the sixth section of the act, the people are entitled to recover, together with this penalty of ten per cent.

It might very well be under the case of the Equitable Trust Company that the tax upon its capital might be calculated upon the entire capital of the company, but that has not been claimed by the people. They have gone no further than to insist upon the payment of the same percentage now in terms sanctioned and prescribed by chapter 501 of the Laws of 1885. And having limited by the case the claim in this manner, it cannot now exceed what it has been insisted the defendant should pay, by way of taxation, because of its dividends. The amounts stated in the case under each section of the statute appear to be just, and the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the defendant for the aggregate sum of $34,478.90.

Brady, J., concurs.

This controversy has been submitted for the purpose of determining whether the defendant is hable to taxation in the state of New York as a foreign corporation doing business therein.

The statutes under which the plaintiff claims the right to collect the tax in question, are those which were passed in the years 1880 and 1881, whereby foreign capital employed in business in the state of New York, and which received the same protection that is extended to domestic capital, is compelled to contribute in the same manner to governmental support.

The provisions of section 3 of the Laws of 1880, as amended by the Laws of 1881, are that every corporation, joint stock company or association whatever, now or hereafter incorporated or organized under any law of this state, or now or hereafter incorporated or organized by or under the laws of any other state or country, and doing business within this state, shall be subject to and pay as a tax upon its corporate franchise into the treasury of this state an

Section 6 of the act provides that “In addition to the taxes above provided for, every corporation formed for railroad, canal, steamboat, ferry, express, navigation or transportation purposes, and every elevated railway company, and_every other corporation, joint stock company or association now or hereafter incorporated or organized by or under any law of this state, or now or hereafter incorporated or organized by or under the laws of any other state or country, and doing business in this state, and owning, operating or leasing to or from any other corporation, joint stock company or association, any railroad, canal, steamboat, ferry, express, navigation, pipe-line or transportation route or line, or elevated railway, or other device for the transportation of freight or passengers, or in any way engaged in the transportation of freight or passengers, and every telegraph company or telephone company incorporated under the laws of this or any other state, and doing business in this state, and every express company or association, palace car or sleeping car- company or association, incorporated or unincorporated, doing business in this state, shall pay to the state treasurer, for the use of the state, as a tax upon its corporate franchise or business in this state, a tax, at the rate of five-tenths of one percentum upon the gross earnings in this state of said corporation or company or association.

It will be seen, therefore, that as far as the defendant is concerned, the question which determines this liability under the provisions of this act to taxation is entirely one of fact, namely: Does the corporation do business within this state within the meaning of the act ?

It is urged, upon the part of the plaintiff, that because the defendant has property within this state which is being used by the lessees thereof within this state, therefore, in some way the territory enterprise and prosperity of the people of the state are used by the defendant, and that the case comes within the spirit of the enactments hereinbefore cited.

That a tax, such as is contemplated by section 3 of the act in question, is within the powers of the legislature, seems to have been admitted in the case of the People v. Equitable Trust Co. ( 96 N. Y., 387 ), which company was a Connecticut corporation, claimed to be doing business within this state, and which has been taxed upon its business in the manner provided by the said third section. It was held in that case “that the tax on the business of foreign corporations done in this state is a sacrifice tax, and hence no apportionment or appraisal was required.

On the same principle it can impose an arbitrary tax upon any avocation or business without estimating its volume or value. It may impose a specific tax upon any saloon keeper, or hotel keeper or banker or broker or trader, and for these views sustained by the history of all governments if any authority is needed it is found in the case of People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn ( 4 N. Y., 419 ). Such taxes are generally arbitrary unjust and unequal^ and have been resorted to by governments in great financial straits. While they are free from constitutional objections unless imposed pro bono publico to restrain, suppress or regulate some obnoxious trade or business they must generally receive the condemnation of wise and enlightened statesmanship.” The legislature, therefore, has the power to impose an arbitrary sum as a tax upon the business of all corporations done within the state and no harm is done because this act apportions the tax at least according to the ability of the corporation to pay.”

It will thus be seen that the power of the government of the state of New York to levy á tax upon the business of any foreign corporation engaged in business within the state has been expressly recognized and is not now open for discussion.. In the case to which attention has been called the question arose as to whether in the case of a foreign corporation there was any method of apportioning the tax and upon this question the court say: “ We find no authority in this act for apportioning the tax upon such a corporation as this according to the amount of dividends earned in this state, or according to the amount of capital employed in this state, and hence the defendant if liable for any of this tax cannot complain of the amount thereof.”

But in the case then under consideration the court was precluded from discussing the question as to whether the corporation within the meaning of the act did business within this state because it appeared from the record that it was admitted that the corporation in question did business within this state within the meaning of the act. The court refrained from discussing that question and only determined the liability of the corporation to taxation under these circumstances. It follows from the principles and rules laid down in that case that if the defendant in this action did business within this state within the meaning of this act, it is liable for the full tax provided for by the third section thereof.

After the decision of this case the legislature, appreciating_ the justice, of the construction and of the criticism which had been passed by the court of appeals upon the act then under consideration, in 1885 amended the act so as to meet the suggestions contained in the decision of the appeals, and provided that instead of a corporation being taxed upon the whole amount of its dividends earned, or the entire cash value of its capital stock, if it did any business within the state, that the amount of the capital stock which should be the basis for taxation under the provisions of section 3 of the act in question should be the amount of capital stock employed within this state.

It is clear that under the act, as it originally stood, the whole or the main corporate business of the defendant was not transacted within this state, and therefore it was not liable to taxation upon its business as provided by section 3 of the act.

The defendant is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Massachusetts. It has its office in the state of Massachusetts, and it rents certain property which is manufactured in Massachusetts and owned in Massachusetts, namely, telephone receivers and transmitters, to corporations organized under the laws of the state of New York for use by such corporations in the state of New York in the conduct of their business. The rents reserved for the - use of this property are to be paid in Massachusetts, the property itself is delivered in Massachusetts and the property is used within the state of New York entirely by the servants, agents and employees of the New York corporations.

There is one branch of this business, however, which is' to be distinguished from this, in that the lessors of the property are the American Bell Telephone Company and the lessees are the persons using the instruments, and the

The defendant, therefore, is the owner of property within the state of New York, from which it derives rental, and which is rented for the purpose of being used in the state of New York. It is certainly, therefore, doing some business within the state of New York under their lease with the subordinate corporations. It has the most minute supervision of the instruments leased, it regulates the conduct of the business in very minute particulars, and provides for" the efficient service by those instruments whereby the use of the same máy be extended and the demand therefor increased.

It is urged that because the defendant has no agent, servant or employee within this state, except as has been mentioned, that therefore it is transacting no business within the state. As far as the instruments leased by the defendant to the individual users are concerned, it certainly is directly carrying on business within this state. But all this does not bring the business of the defendant within the rule suggested in the case cited, because it is by no means the whole or the main corporate business which the defendant was chartered to transact.

It is, therefore, apparent that under the rule laid down in the case cited, the defendant was not taxable prior to the amendment of the act of 1885. We think, however, from that time it was. A change was manifestly made by the amendment in question in reference to the taxation of foreign corporations. The judicial interpretation enunciated in the decision in question had evidently been called to the attention of the legislature, and the injustice of taxing a foreign corporation upon the whole of its dividends earned, or the entire cash value of its capital stock, even if it did but a small portion of. its business within this state recognized, and, therefore,- the amendment of the act passed in 1885 (being chapter 501 of the Laws of that year) was adopted.

This legislation clearly shows that it was the intention of the legislature to impose the tax provided for by section 3 of the original act upon all foreign corporations who did any business within this state, no matter whether such business formed the whole or the main corporate business of such corporation or a small or infinitesimal part thereof.

To the extent that the corporation did business within this state, to that extent should its capital stock be taxed.

We are of opinion, therefore, that since the passage of the act of 1885 the defendant has been doing business within this state within the meaning of the statute as amended, and is liable for the tax upon “its business to be assessed upon the amount of its capital stock employed within this state, and is also liable to taxation upon its gross earnings in this state. These earnings are the rentals, which are received by the defendant from the leasing of its property situate within this state.

The apportionment of the tax upon the capital stock is necessarily more difficult and uncertain, but a fair and reasonable rule for guidance would be to ascertain the ratio which the number of telephones used within this state bears to the whole number of the telephones used in the country, the entire capital of the defendant being engaged in the telephone business throughout the Union, and the value of such- capital depending largely upon patents which, secure the right to use the apparatus owned by the defendant. It is impossible to apportion precisely the proportions of these patents, which are used in the telephone business in the state otherwise than by measuring the same according to the ratio, just mentioned. .

Judgment ordered accordingly.