People v. Cook

The defendant’s counsel moved at the trial to quash the indictment, on the ground that it did not contain the requisite allegations to constitute an offense, in that it did not allege that any one was wronged, harmed or injured by the pretenses and representations charged to have been made, although false, as it did not charge that the one .Pike was responsible and the other irresponsible. And such is the contention on the part of the defendant here. The offense is given by statute, which provides that “ every person who, with intent to cheat or defraud another, shall designedly, by color of any false token or writing, or by any other false pretense, obtain the signature of any person to any written instrument, or obtain from any person any money, personal property or valuable thing, upon conviction thereof shall be punished,” etc. 2 R. S., 677, § 53.

The requisites prescribed by the terms of the statute do not embrace injurious consequences as an element of the crime, further than may be implied by the fact of obtaining money or property by means of false pretenses, used with intent to cheat and defraud.

The matters alleged in the indictment would not constitute a criminal offense at common law. That required that an indictable fraud was only such as affected the public, such as resulted from the use of false weights, measures, tokens, etc. People v. Babcock, 7 Johns., 201 ; People v. Miller, 14 id., 371. But more than one hundred years ago the crime was extended in England, so as to embrace private frauds by statute, of which that of this state is substantially a transcript. And in the early adjudications under that of this state, the cases arising upon the English statute were frequently cited as authority. Young v. The King, 3 Durn. & E., 98 ; People v. Johnson, 12 Johns., 292 .

And the cases in that country and this have been quite uniformly to the effect that the provisions of the statute contain all the requisites for the substantial allegations of an indictment for an offence created by it. People v. Genning, 11 Wendell, 18; People v. Crissie 4 Denio, 525 ; People v. Higbie, 66 Barb., 131 ; Thomas v. People, 34 N. Y., 351 ; Young v. The King (supra); The Queen v. Kenrick, 5 A. & E. (N. S.) 49; Reg v. Jennison, L. & C., 157, 9 Cox C. C., 158.

But the false pretenses alleged must be such that they may operate prejudicially. And if it appear that they cannot prejudice the person to whom they are applied, no offense is charged.

In People v. Galloway (17 Wendell, 540), the deed to which the signature of a married woman was thus obtained

And in People v. Thomas ( 3 Hill, 169 ), the false pretenses induced the performance of a legal duty, and for that reason constituted no criminal offence.

In the case at bar, the representations alleged to have been made with the intent to cheat and defraud the party who was thereby induced to part with his money, were that the note presented was made by a particular person, when in fact it was not; but was made by another bearing the same name. The obtaining money by such means was clearly within the statute. The indictment contains all the elements of crime required by its provisions. And although there is no allegation that the maker of the note was less responsible than the person represented as the maker, yet they charge that the person to whom they were made was induced by the false pretences to part with his money, and that they were made with intent to cheat and defraud him. And it may be that he was prejudiced.

The purpose of the statute is to protect against imposition and not permit guilt to depend upon the uncertainty of the determination of the question whether any pecuniary injury necessarily resulted in some view which might be taken of the situation. The indictment alleges that the person applied to by the defendant was induced to take the note on the credit of the party who was represented to him as the maker. It cannot be inferred that he would have done so on the credit of the person who had, in fact, executed the note. The question of their relative responsibility was not necessarily a substantial element in the constituents of the statutory crime, and therefore it was not necessary to allege it. The motion to quash the indictment was properly denied.

The prosecution gave evidence in respect to the responsibility of the person so represented as the maker of the note, and of the person who did make it, to which objection and exceptions were taken by the defense. And it is contended that the reception of this evidence was error because those facts were not the subject of allegation in the indictment.

The responsibility of the one represented as the maker, and the want of means of the person who was the maker of the note, if known to the defendant, went to characterize his purpose and intent in making use of the false pretenses to get the money. And it was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish by evidence the criminal intent of the defendant. Clark v. People, 2 Lans., 331 ; Wood v. People, 53 N. Y., 511 .

It was not error to permit the maker of the note in question to testify to the transaction of the giving it to the defendant, and the circumstances under-which it was made ; and that, as part of the transaction, he also then signed and delivered to the defendant two other notes. It appears by this evidence that this person then made three notes, amounting in .all to $1,000, to do which he was supplied by the defendant with pen and ink at the saw-mill where the maker was at work; that the notes were given for mowing machine stock which he never received from the defendant; and that at the time the notes were made by him and taken by the defendant, the latter said he would take care of them, but did not state the purpose for which he intended to use the notes. The fact that the defendant obtained the two other notes was not important, but it was part of the transaction, which was a proper subject of inquiry as bearing upon the conduct and alleged intent of the defendant.

We have examined all the exceptions taken to the reception and rejection of evidence, and to the charge as made, and to the refusals to charge as requested, and think no error was presented by any of them. The charge made to the jury presented fully and fairly the propositions for their considerations, and what was required to constitute the offense. And the proposition of the request to charge made by the defendant’s counsel had been substantially covered by the charge as made.

Upon the merits the evidence was sufficient to_ justify the conclusion and verdict of the jury ; and no occasion appears for granting a new trial.