Majority
Headnote
1. Railroads—Assessments—Review of—Manner of determining valueThe referee to whom the matters were referred to take the proofs, and report them with his opinion thereon for the aid of the court in the determination of the issues, by his conclusion, and opinion expressed the view that the prayer of the relator’s petition should be denied.
The court adopted the views of the referee in the main but concluded that he had erroneously omitted to deduct certain sums from the earnings of the relator, and by such deduction the court produced the modification reducing the assessments of the main track of the relator’s roads in the respective towns. This modification of the assessments was founded wholly upon the net earnings of the relator’s road, and based upon the average of such earnings for the five years ending with the 30th of September, 1883. The method of computation was to deduct from the gross earnings.
Second. The value of the use of its freight cars on its. own road at the same rate.
Third. The amount received from rentals of its real property not used in its business.
Fourth. Interest at the rate of five per cent, upon the value of its side tracks.
Fifth. Interest at the rate of five per cent, upon the value of its coaches' and cars other than freight cars.
Sixth. Interest at the rate of five per cent, upon the value of its locomotives.
Seventh. Interest at the rate of five per cent, upon the value of its depots, docks, sheds, and land outside of the main track not rented, but used in its business.
And the residue, after making such deductions, are treated as the net earnings of the main track of the road. ' This is capitalized at five per cent., and that sum divided by the number of miles in length of such track—and thus is obtained its value per mile.
This system of estimate and deduction was based upon the annual average of the five years before mentioned, and is in accordance with the method contended for by the relator, to ascertain the value of its main fine; but its objection to the computation as made is, that the net earnings should be capitalized at six instead of five per cent., and that the interest to produce the several items' of reduction should also be at the rate of six instead of five per cent. The method and means adopted to ascertain the value by which the assessments were reduced are challenged by the defendants.
The same rule- applies to this as to other property, and the assessors were required to assess the property “ at its full and true value, as they would appraise the same in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor.” 1 R. S., 393, § 17, as amended by Laws 1851, chap. 176.
There evidently is difficulty in reaching a correct conclusion as to the value of such property as that in question; and it may be equally difficult to demonstrate in many cases that assessments made of property of that character are, or are not, proper estimates of its value. The assessors have access to the annual reports of the companies, and aided by them, and such other information. as is accessible, they make their assessments, and as appears in these cases they do not in the several towns correspond.
The estimate of value of any portion of the road cannot be intelligently made without some knowledge or informa
This question arose in People ex rel. v. O. and L. C. R. R. Co. ( 13 Abb. N. C., 1 ) and received consideration of the special and general terms. The method of making the proofs as adopted in these cases on the question of value of the section on the main line of a railroad was held competent. And the court of appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize the court below to exercise its discretionary power, and dismissed the appeal. 92 N. Y., 643 .
And a like question was again considered in People ex rel. Wallkill Valley R. R. Co. v. Keator ( 67 How., 277 ; affirmed, 36 Hun, 593 ); People ex rel. A. and G. Bridge Co. v. Weaver ( 67 How., 477 ; affirmed, 34 Hun, ); People ex rel. D. and H. C. Co. v. Roosa (9 How. [N. S.], 454).
In treating the earning capacity of this road as the proper basis of estimation of its value, and its average net annual earnings during the previous five years as the evidence of
These and all other considerations derivable from the evidence, it may be assumed, were taken into account and properly weighed by the trial court, and led to the theory and method there adopted. The degree of evidence was a matter for the judgment of the trial court, and if it had determined that the proof on the part of the relator was insufficient to establish the facts requisite to cause any deduction, we might not have felt justified in disturbing the conclusion, but the evidence was such as to present for the consideration of the court the question of fact there determined.
Not only the .theory and method, but the computations of the court and their results, are criticised by a very thorough and skillful argument of the counsel for the defendants.
The length of the relator’s road, including its branches and leased lines, is 417 8-100 miles, of which that of the leased fines is 36 58-100 and that of its branches 96 37-100 miles.
To ascertain the value per mile, the court divided the sum of the capitalized average of net earnings per annum for the five years by 380.5, the whole number of miles of road less the leased fines. The rent paid for those leased fines evidently exceeded largely their net earnings. The view of the trial court was that, the net earnings of the two leased branches should be credited to the other portions of the road, and the reduced divisor be adopted to ascertain their value per mile.
This is one of the objections taken by the relator to the action of the court, and it is insisted that divisor should have been 417; but we think this view of the court was justified by the circumstances, and that the percentage of five, instead of six per cent as before mentioned, was a proper exercise of judgment.
The defendant’s counsel contends that the fine of road of which the portion in question is a part should be distinguished from the other branches, on the assumption that the main fine is more productive, and therefore more valu
We have carefully examined and considered all the evidence and the arguments of counsel, and deem it unnecessary to refer in detail to the many points of criticism on the merits. And while it may be somewhat difficult to clearly demonstrate that the special term was entirely correct in the conclusion reached, we fail to find that the result was reached by any violation of law or without the support of evidence, and therefore adopt such conclusion on the merits. People ex rel. Railroad Company v. Keator, 36 Hun, 592 .
The question whether the other lands in the towns were assessed on the same roll proportionately less than that of the relator, was a question of fact arising out of a conflict of evidence, upon which it is deemed to have been properly-disposed of by the decision of the trial court.
The issues seem to have been presented by the petitions and returns whether the relator properly presented proofs before the assessors on the third Tuesday of August, and sought a review and reduction of the assessments. It is now urged that such application and proofs is a necessary pre-requisite to a proceeding to review by certiorari, and in support of that contention is cited People v. Commissioners ( 99 N. Y., 254 ). We deem it umiecessary to, and do not determine that question, because it does not appear by the record that it was raised at special term. While it might properly be considered in support of a decision of the trial court, it is otherwise when for the first time it is sought to be raised on review for predication of error.
There is no support for the contention in behalf of the town of Webster, that the court had no jurisdiction to grant the writ. It was granted on the 10th of September, upon a petition of date September 3. The time within which application might be made for it was fifteen days after the assessment roll was completed, and delivered, and. notice thereof given by the assessors. Laws of 1880, chap. 269, § 2.
The statute requires that the roll be completed and delivered to the town clerk on, or before the 1st of September, and that public notice thereof be forthwith given, etc.—id.) § 9. There is no evidence other than the allegation in the
The order should be affirmed.
Smith, P. J.; Barker and Haight, JJ., concur.