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In re the Judicial Settlement of Accounts of Snyder

2 N.Y. St. Rep. 758 Court N.Y. Decision date 1886-10-05 English

Delivered by Danforth, J.

Contents

Majority

p. 758
Matter of the Judicial Settlement of Accounts of William H. Snyder, Ex’r.
(Court of Appeals,
Filed October 5, 1886.)

Headnote

1. Executors and Administrators—Contempt—Code Civ. Pro. § 2555.
The receipt of money by an executor, a judicial accounting showing a balance against him, service of a decree requiring payment and an ineffectual effort to enforce the decree by execution, and the non-payment by the executor of the balance so found were conceded facts. Held, to be a case within Code Civ. Pro., § 2555, and the surrogate had authority to punish the executor for contempt.
2. Same—Surrogate, discretionary tower.
As the surrogate was not necessarily concluded by the executor’s assertion of his inability to pay, the evidence being conflicting and the matter resting in his discretion, the order will not be reviewed by the court of appeals where the discretion has not been unfairly exercised.
Appeal from an order of the supreme, court, general term, Third department, affirming an order of the surrogate’s court of Rensselaer county adjudging an executor guilty of contempt. Snyder was the executor of J. Olmstead, deceased Upon a settlement of his accounts as such executor, a sum of money being found due from him, he was directed by the decree to pay it over; for neglecting so to do, he was adjudged guilty of contempt, and a fine imposed
p. 759
equal to the amount due, the order committing him until the payment of the same.
James Lansing, for app’lt; J. A. Cipperly, for resp’ts.

The receipt of money by the executor in his official capacity; a judicial accounting, showing a balance against him of $2,975.70; followed by a decree requiring payment to those entitled to it; and an ineffectual attempt to enforce the decree by execution, are conceded facts. 'Upon a petition stating these things and alleging that, after demand made, the executor neglected and refused, “and now willfully neglects to obey the decree,” he was, by order of the surrogate court of Eensselaer county, required to show cause why he should not be punished for his alleged offense and contempt. In answer thereto he made two affidavits, the averments of .which the surrogate held insufficient, and, imposing a fine to the extent of moneys unpaid by him, ordered that the executor be imprisoned in the common jail of the county until the fine and the costs of the proceeding were paid.

The general term have affirmed the order in face of the dissent of one of its number. I do not understand that any member of the court doubted the jurisdiction or power of the surrogate to make the order appealed from, but in view of the alleged insolvency of the executor, and his declaration of inability to pay, thought he ought not to. be punished for not paying. The contempt charged was in violating the decree or order which directed payment, and the investigation before the surrogate might properly have been limited to the matter contained in it, i. e., the service of the decree, and the facts of the neglect constituting its violation. To those matters there was no answer. The truth óf them was admitted, and the case clearly brought within the provision of section 2555 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which the surrogate made the order in question.

The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is placed upon the particular words of the affidavits of the executor. In effect, they' assert an early conversion of the trust funds to the exigency of his private and individual business; next, the transfer of his business and his stock in trade and real estate to his wife, upon no present consideration, but in application upon an old debt, and followed by no apparent change in possession or management; then, in consequence of this transaction, insolvency and inability to comply with the decree. The learned judge, at general term, has sufficiently pointed out that the surrogate was not necessarily concluded by these bald and uncorroborated assertions of the- defaulting executor, and, as the question is not only one to be determined upon evidence, at least con

p. 760
flicting, but also rests in discretion which has not been unfairly exercised, we find no ground on which we can review his decision. Code Crim. Pro., § 1337; Cochrane’s Ex’r v. Ingersoll, 73 N. Y., 613 .

The appeal should, therefore, be dismissed.

All concur, except Miller, J., absent.