Mutual Life Insurance v. Shipman

The action was to foreclose a mortgage of $2,500, made by Elizabeth L. Campbell (wife of Joseph Campbell, and formerly widow of Parson G. Shipman), individually, and as executrix of Shipman, in which Campbell joined. By the will of Shipman, the widow and executrix was empowered to mortgage, lease or sell any or all of the real estate of the deceased, for purposes specified in the will. The defendants here are the children of Shipman, who became vested with the entire estate on the re-marriage of their mother. The court of appeals has held, on an appeal from a former judgment in this action, that the power above mentioned was operative at the time of the execution of the mortgage in suit. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shipman, 108 N. Y., 19 ; 12 N. Y. State Rep., 802; and the only issues presented on the new trial, which followed that decision, were whether the mortgage was made for purposes other than those specified in the will, and whether the plaintiff was chargeable with notice that such was the case.

At the time of the mortgage in suit, a prior mortgage of $1,500, in favor of the Rochester Savings Bank, existed on the same property, and had been duly recorded. It was executed in the individual name of Elizabeth L. Campbell, described in the mortgage only as ‘ ‘ Elizabeth L. Campbell, formerly Shipman.” It did not recite nor refer 'to the power, nor to the will in which it was contained. At the time of the execution of that mortgage, Mrs. Campbell had unassigned dower in the mortgaged premises. That mortgage being disclosed by the search exhibited to the agents

The mortgage to the Rochester Savings Bank, was in fact given for money loaned, or furnished, to Campbell, the second - husband, and not for any of the purposes specified in the will.

■ The facts, so far stated, are substantially found by the court below on undisputed evidence. It remained only to find that the plaintiff was chargeable with notice of the purpose for which the savings bank mortgage was given, in order to defeat the plaintiff’s mortgage to the extent of the money, principal and interest, paid by the plaintiff to discharge the former mortgage; and such was the result of the trial now under review. The trial judge held that the unassigned dower of Mrs. Campbell, was such an estate or interest in the land as to give to the dowress a right to create -a charge on the land, by mortgage, irrespective of the power granted by the will; and therefore, that the savings bank mortgage was not within the provision of the statute (1 Rev. Stat., 737, § 124), which is relied upon by the plaintiff as giving to that mortgage the effect of a valid execution of the power held by the mortgagor.

. The language of the statute is as follows: “Every instrument executed by the grantee of a power, conveying an estate or creating a charge which such grantee would have no right to convey or create unless by virtue of the power, shall be deemed a valid execution of the power, although such power be not recited or referred to therein.” It must be conceded that without the benefit of this statute the mortgage to the savings bank was not to be deemed a valid -execution of the power, but was, - of itself, notice to the plaintiff of the misappropriation of so much of the moneys advanced by it, as was applied to the discharge of the former mortgage.

The question in this case is, therefore, narrowed to the enquiry whether the un assigned dower of the mortgagor was such an estate or interest in the land as gave to her the right to create a charge thereon by way of mortgage. This question the learned judge at special term decided adversely to the plaintiff on the authority of Payne v. Becker ( 87 N. Y, 153 ), Pope v. Mead ( 99 N. Y., 201 ), and Bostwick v. Beach ( 103 N. Y., 414 ; 8 N. Y. State Rep., 63).

We do not regard these cases as sustaining the proposition in support of which they are cited. As we apprehend their force they go no further than to hold that the unassigned dower of a widow is subject to sale and transfer, as

There seems to be no conflict of authority on this question, the principal discussion, which has arisen in this connection being whether the chose in action was so assignable as to enable the assignee to bring an action in his own name.

The necessary conclusion from the authorities is that while a dowress, with unassigned dower, may release or transfer her right in action by any form of conveyance or assignment which is appropriate for that purpose, she cannot by any form of instrument, convey an estate in or create a charge upon the land to which her right attaches, because she has no estate in the land upon which such instrument could have effect.

This being the case it follows that the mortgage to the Rochester Savings Bank was to be deemed executed by the mortgagor by virtue of the power of which she was the donee; that it was on its face a valid execution of that power, and that it did not affect the subsequent morgagee with notice that its payment was a misappropriation of the funds advanced in consideration of the subsequent mortgage

There is no evidence in the case before us of other facts to charge the plaintiff with such notice, or to put it upon enquiry as to the purpose for which the former mortgage was given; and the conclusion of law to the effect that the plaintiff is chargeable with such notice cannot be upheld.

For this reason the judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted.

Judgment reversed and new trial granted, with costs of this appeal to abide the final award of costs.

All concur.