Hollister v. Stewart

The trustees to whom the first mortgage of the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company was given, and who by that instrument were charged with certain duties, and intrusted with important powers for the benefit and protection of the bondholders secured by its lien, have been adjudged unfaithful to their trust, and required to furnish indemnity for the past, and properly perform their duty in the future.

Both sides appeal. The trustees upon the ground that

That mortgage, given for something over eight millions of dollars, was executed by the company substantially for the purpose of obtaining the means with which to construct its road. The security covered not only the line with its rolling stock and stations, and other and usual property, but also a valuable land grant, given by the general government to aid in the completion of the enterprise, and conditioned upon its progress toward that completion. All this property, by article second of the mortgage, is pledged to the payment of the interest and principal of the bonds, and it is made the duty of the trustees to apply the saipe “ promptly to that purpose,” “ in case of default in any such payment ” by the mortgagor.

But this incumbrance, covering the land grant earned by the corporation, and intended to be utilized by sales as purchasers could be obtained, involved the necessity of an authority in the trustees to release the lands from the lien when the sales were effected. Accordingly, article third authorized the corporation, with the approval of the trustees, to contract for the sale of such lands for cash or on credit, and accept any of the bonds with their matured coupons at par in payment; but required that all the proceeds of every such sale, “ whether in cash, bonds, coupons or other securities,” should be deposited with the trustees, and proper releases be given by them to the purchasers. The proceeds of the lands thus became substituted for the lands themselves, and continued subject to the mortgage lien. Out of these proceeds a sinking fund was established for the payment and redemption of the bonds.

The trustees were directed to invest such proceeds in the first mortgage bonds of the company whenever they could be purchased at not exceeding par and accrued interest, but the trustees were not to hold the bonds and coupons which thus came into their hands as living obligations against the company, for, whether obtained by purchase with the proceeds of sales, or taken as cash in payment for the lands, the trustees were required to cancel them every three months and surrender them to the company as paid. In other words the authority was to pay the bonds out of pro-

By article fourth, additional strength and protection was given to the sinking fund through a provision relieving it from the payment of interest on the bonds during the progress of construction, except in one emergency. That interest was to be paid by the company, and none of the land proceeds were at any time to “be appropriated to the payment of interest on said bonds,” unless the treasury of the company should be first exhausted. In that event the sinking fund was permitted to pay accrued interest; not as we have said, to buy or secure coupons, but to pay and discharge them, and since in so doing, the land fund would be bearing the burden contracted to be borne by the company, such reinbursement as seemed reasonably possible was ordered to be made. For all such payments of interest made out of the sinking fund in the prescribed emergency the company was to give to the trustees income bonds to be first paid out of earnings before any dividend to stockholders. These bonds were to draw interest at seven per cent, and were to “be redeemed by other bonds of the company bearing the same rate of interest in gold .and secured by a second mortgage ” if the company should «determiné to issue such bonds.

The mortgage then regulated the duties of the trustees in «case of default. If such default in the payment of interest continued for six months the whole principal became due at the option of the trustees, and they were authorized to -enter upon and sell the granted lands at public auction; to -enter upon and take possession of the railroad and its rolling stock; to operate and manage the line and apply any surplus over expenses and necessary repairs and improvements to the payment of interest upon the first mortgage bonds, “ in the order in which such interest shall have become or shall become due, ratably to the persons entitled to such interest; ” but if the default should continue for a year then the trustees were authorized to sell the whole of the property or so much as might be necesssry and apply the net proceeds “to the payment of the principal of such of the aforesaid bonds as may be at that time unpaid, whether -or not the same shall have previously come due, and of the interest which shall at that time have accrued on the said principal and be unpaid without discrimination or preference,.but ratably to the aggregate amount of such unpaid principal and accrued and unpaid interest.”

Article sixteenth, about which there is serious dispute over its scope and meaning, deals again with the emergency of a default, and makes ft the duty of the trustees to exercise their power of entry or power of sale, or both, or take appropriate legal proceedings to enforce the mortgage in manner following: If the default is in the payment of interest or principal of the bonds, then upon the requisition of the “holders of not less than twenty-five per cent of the aggregate amount of said bonds,” accompanied by a proper indemnification by the persons making the same against the costs and expenses to be incurred; but, the instrument proceeds, “if the default be in the omission of any act or thing required by article twelfth of these presents for the further assuring of the title of the trustees to any property or franchises now possessed or hereafter acquired, or in any provisions therein contained to be performed or kept by said company, then, and in either of such cases, the requisitions shall be as aforesaid; but it shall be within the discretion of the trustees to enforce or waive the rights of the bondholders by reason of such default, subject to the power hereby declared of a majority in interest of the holders of said bonds, by requisition in writing or by a vote at a meeting duly held, to instruct the said trustees to waive such default, or to enforce their rights by reason thereof, provided that no action of the said trustees or bondholders, or both, in waiving such default or otherwise, shall extend to or be taken to effect any subsequent default or to impair the rights resulting therefrom.” It is substantially conceded, as, indeed, is quite apparent, that the word “effect” should read “ affect,” and that the reference to article 12 should be to article 13, which contains the provisions for further assurance, which are referred to and which identify the article intended.

It is now said on behalf of the trustees that this provision gave them a discretion to waive a default in the payment of interest or principal of the bonds, subject only to be controlled by the requisition or vote of a majority in interest of the bondholders. We do not accede to that construction. Provision had just been made in a preceding paragraph for the emergency of a default in principal or interest, which imposed the duty of proceeding upon the default on the requisition of twenty-five per cent in interest of the bondholders. That gives no discretion to the trustees, but imposes an imperative duty. The following subdivision,

We are confident that the language of the subdivisión, taken exactly as it stands in the record, does not refer to a default in principal or interest, but relates wholly to the other covenants to be kept and performed by the .mortgagor.

The mortgage contained a further provision, important to be considered in reaching a determination of the appeal, that neither of the trustees “ shall be answerable except for his own willful default or misconduct.”

Having thus ascertained the authority. and duty of the trustees it becomes necessary to get as clear and definite a view of what they did as can be gathered from the record. And this can only be done by taking also into1 view the precedent and concurrent action of the railroad corporation itself.

The mortgage was executed on the first day of July, 1871. The company seems at once to have abdicated all its functions beyond merely retaining its corporate existence, for it agreed with contractors who engaged to build the road to give them the whole issue of bonds not exceeding $25,000 a mile, which was the maximum limit of issue, and the whole of the stock and all the earnings of the road during the period of construction as a consideration for such construction. The contractors were to procure the necessary money by sale of these securities and were to advance funds and buy up the coupons as they matured and possibly retain them as against the company. (A.)

They proceeded with their work; they sold the bonds

' In this condition of affairs and while the road was incomplete, and in December, 1874, it became apparent that the contractors were about to fail of performance, and could not continue to furnish funds for the purchase of coupons. Interest amounting to something over $150,000 was about to mature, and the company’s treasury was exhausted.

Indeed, there had never been either treasury or treasure. To meet this emergency the land fund was the sole resource, and was called upon, as by the terms of the mortgage was permitted. What then occurred is involved in so much of confusion and uncertainty from want of details that, to avoid mistakes, we take the facts from defendants’ brief. It declares that “the contractors, prior to January 1, 1875, had bought up and held as unpaid as against the company $534,869.25 of coupons. To induce and enable the contractors to buy up the coupons maturing January 1, 1875, the land proceeds to the amount of $534,869.25 were assigned and paid to the contractors.” If that be true the over-due coupons were paid and extinguished and the transfer canceled the debt. So far there is no hint that the assignment was collateral, and the trustees got no power from the mortgage to do anything but pay. Yet the brief of the learned counsel adds, “and then "all the land proceeds and over-due coupons were delivered by the contractors over to Henry F. Spencer, trustee, as collateral for the sums advanced for January, 1875, interest.” That would seem to indicate that the coupons were not paid and the assignment was collateral. This is confirmed by the testimony of Hr. Abbot, who, when speaking of the overdue coupons held by the contractors, said, the assignment to Spencer was “for the gradual redemption and payment of these over-due coupons,” and adds, “the whole mass of the over-due coupons and of these proceeds of land sales was then declared by Spencer, trustee, to be held by him as collateral security for the sums of money advanced in the purchase of the January 1, 1875, coupons.” If that be true the contractors’ coupons were not paid. • They were simply secured, and the debt and its collateral were used to procure a loan with which not to pay but to buy'the maturing interest coupons. The transfer by the trustees was probably in substance an advance to the railroad company,

That instrument was drawn in a penalty of one million of dollars, and was conditioned to pay back the advance on or before the first day of January, 1901, with interest at seven" per cent out of the earnings of the road; to -pay the accrued interest on advances after the completion of the road from the net income remaining after payment of interest on the first mortgage bonds; and to give a second mortgage for-the debt if should so determine. The company, or the contractors, then borrowed the sum needed to buy or pay the maturing interest, the company giving as security what are termed its “land income notes.” These drew interest at twelve per cent, were to be countersigned by Spencer, as “trustee of the series,” were payable in six years, and pledged as-collateral the whole fund in the hands of Spencer.

I assume that with this loan the coupons immediately maturing were either bought by the contractors or paid by the company. But the road was still incomplete and more-money was needed for that, and one of the consequences of the disregard by the trustees of the mortgage conditions was soon manifested. The company, to obtain such money,, increased the amount of their land income notes to $300,000, using the increase to complete the road, which the contractors were bound to finish (B). I discover no other charge beyond these notes imposed on the Spencer trust. But these-measures did not avail. In' July, 1875, there was another default in the payment of interest, and in December of that year the trustees began a suit in foreclosure.

We must assume that they were requested so to do by twenty-five per cent in interest of the bondholders, and that the proper indemnity was given or waived. Thereafter the trustees, under the authority of the mortgage solely, and without judicial intervention, took possession of the railroad and began to operate it, and eventually joined with the bondholders outside of the plaintiff and a few others in a plan of re-organization. That contemplated the-substitution of three mortgages for the first mortgage and some other obligations of the company. One of these mortgages for $400,000 was made a first lien on all the property of the company. The other two were framed for a reduced rate of interest.

To this plan the plaintiff never assented, hut the trustees adopted it, assumed to waive all existing defaults under the first mortgage, and agreed to waive them in the future; applied some part of the proceeds of the land fund to payments of interest and principal of the new preferred mortgage, and notified the plaintiff that they should pay such

The special terna prohibited that action, and declared the new bonds utterly void as against the plaintiff. The general term concurred in that result, and, on defendant’s appeal; we are to determine whether that decision is right.

It is first met on the part of the defendants by a protest against any exercise of the jurisdiction of the court founded upon the alleged fact of the pendency of the foreclosure suit with its supplemental bill in the federal court in Wisconsin.

Ho such defense was pleaded. The plaintiff came to trial without warning or preparation, to meet any such issue. We have held at the present term of the court that a defense in equity that the court ought to refrain from the exercise of its conceded jurisdiction is never available unless pleaded, and where the answer is silent, amounts to a submission of the issues to the judgment of the court and a consent that upon those issues its judgment may be exercised. Town of Mentz v. Cook, 13 N. Y. State R., 845. The defense asserted is, in substance, that another action is pending for the same cause. That is new matter required to be pleaded in the answer. The defense was not only not pleaded, but was not raised upon the trial at special term. There is no finding by the referee of any such fact, and no request even that he make such finding, and no trace of the submission of that question to his judgment. There is a finding of the pendency of a foreclosure suit, but remaining unprosecuted. Ho argument is needed to show that such suit is not for the cause of action here alleged.

Indeed, one of the issues now presented is whether the trustees should be required to proceed with the foreclosure suit, or may abandon it as they seek to do. There was a request to find, which was refused, that a supplemental bill had been filed, setting up the proposed plan of reorganization and asking judgment upon it, but no request to find that such supplemental bill involved the cause of action here asserted, and no request to find as a conclusion of law that the jurisdiction of the court should not for such reason be exercised.

In Dewey v. Moyer ( 72 N. Y., 70 , 77), we decided that it

But beyond the pleadings, there was no proof to warrant even the request which was' made. No supplemental bill or copy thereof was produced. We do not know its contents; we cannot tell what issues it raises; we do not even know that it has been followed by any process or proceeding bringing the railroad company into court to answer it. All we know is the hearsay statement of Mr. Abbot, who was not even trustee when the bill was filed, that there is such a bill; that it sets out the scheme of re-organization and asks some judgment of some character upon it. For all that appeal’s to the contrary, it may not touch the rights of non-assenting bondholders in the least degree, or contain a single allegation which brings those rights before the court.. The defense not only was neither pleaded, nor proved, nor found by the referee, but it is no defense to this action at all. Both at law and in equity the pendency of another action for the same cause in a court of the United States or a sister state is no defense to an action in our courts. Oneida Co. Bank v. Bonney, 101 N. Y., 173 ; Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige, 606, 612.

The cases relied upon by the learned counsel of the defendants were those in which the proceedings were in rem, and the court first seizing the res was adjudged entitled to hold it against any other proceeding in rem. Thus, in Taylor v. Carryl (20 How. U. S., 583), the sheriff, under process of attachment in the state court, had seized the ship, and thereafter the sailors undertook to proceed in admiralty by process also in rem, and the marshall sought to -seize the vessel. It was held that he could not do so, and that where jurisdiction depended upon the possession of the res, the court first seizing it had exclusive jurisdiction. The present is not an action in rem, nor does the action in Wisconsin appear to be of that character. Neither court, by the appointment of a receiver, has taken possession of the res, "or needs to do so for the purposes of its jurisdiction. The case at bar is purely an action in personam, and the doctrine invoked has no application. In Smith v. McIver (9 Wheaton, 532) the cases had all gone to judgment in the courts of law, and the equity court respected those judgments and refused to try the cases over at its

The court said that the trustee represented the bondholders 1 ‘ within the scope of his powers, ” and in matters “consistent with his trust,” and held that “to avoid what the trustee has done ’ ’ the bondholder ‘ ‘ must proceed in some other way than by bill of review.” That is true. He must sue the trustee, as this plaintiff has done, and bring both sides before the court as the adverse parties they in fact are. It was said to us on the argument that the court in Wisconsin might disregard our judgment... We shall not assume that such court will do anything except what it believes to be its duty, and have no occasion to anticipate emergencies which would not change our own .responsibility, even if they existed. We deemit, thus, entirely clear that we ought not to deny to the plaintiff the relief he asks, for the reason suggested.

The principal relief granted to him, and which the trustees on their appeal ask us to reverse, is a decree compelling them to pay the proceeds of the land sales in their hands, and such as they have misapplied, in due and ratable proportion upon the plaintiff’s bonds, and adjudging to be void as against him the new preferred mortgage and the two added securities. That is simply holding the parties to the conditions of the mortgage, and compelling the trustees to act in accordance with the terms of their trust. The scheme of reorganization could only be made effective in one of two ways; by the consent of all the bondholders, or by a foreclosure cutting off their lien, and so enabling a new

In that case the scheme of reorganization which modified and changed the contract rights of the bondholders was authorized and legalized by a special enactment of the dominion parliament, and the federal court said of it that since no constitutional obligation prevented in that jurisdiction a destruction of the contract, and the substitution of a new one, such legislation must prevail and govern the rights of the parties. But the court said also: “In the absence of statutory authority, or some provision in the instrument which establishes the .trust, nothing can be done by a majority, however large, which will bind a minority without their consent.”

Here the trustees are not a legislature, and if they were, would be checked by the constitution, which permits no arbitrary tampering with contracts, and protects the rights thereby secured. The cases cited to show that this plaintiff was not entitled to any greater rights, because of the reorganization scheme, show also that he was fully entitled to his original contract rights.

In Stevens v. Mid-Hants R'y Co. (L. R., 8, Ch. Ap., 1064) the substance of the court’s doctrine was embraced in the pithy sentence: “We ought to take care that his interests are not prejudiced by the scheme, but, on the other hand, it would be very wrong to hold that he has acquired by it a priority over every one else.”

The trustees defendant had no right in the present case to waive and condone defaults of principal and interest upon plaintiff's bonds; they had no right as against him to assent to and recognize a new mortgage given priority over his; they had no right to divert to that new security money applicable by the existing contract to the payment of his bonds. Theoretically, all this the trustees admitted. In their letter of March. 4, 1882, they explicitly promise not to

They sought to justify this in various ways. It was argued that since the scheme óf reorganization was tantamount to and took the place of a distribution after foreclosure, and on such distribution a court of equity would prefer certain debts and obligations over the mortgage bonds, the trustees were justified in giving a similar preference, and the $100,000 mortgage covered such claims and no others. To this there are several answers.

The trustees are not a court of equity, and- have no right to award preferences; least of all to anticipate what such a court, with the facts all before it, would or would not do.

But there is no preferred mortgage which has actually taken effect, or superseded the original mortgage. The whole scheme of reorganization is in nubibus, and simply proposed and inchoate. The new mortgages are held in escrow and never yet have taken effect by delivery. On the contrary, the bondholders who ha-ye exchanged, preserve their old bonds as unpaid and uncanceled and living obligations of the company, and upon them thus existing, the land proceeds must be applied, and not upon a preferred mortgage held in escrow and which never may become operative through failure of the-conditions of delivery.

Nevertheless, let us discover, if we can, what indebtedness the preferred mortgage was intended to secure. The facts are in a state of unusual doubt and confusion. In a supplementary brief, the plaintiff’s counsel points out five different statements or claims made in the record as the basis of that mortgage. The whole record is meager and confused, and makes our steps perilous, but as I have once already taken the facts from the defendant’s brief, I shall assume now that the debts secured by the' preferred mortgage are those stated in the formal scheme of reorganization which the trustees approved. It has been suggested that we ought to take it from the referee’s report. But the defendants’ answers are conclusive admissions. They in terms aver that the scheme the trustees approved and seek to carry out, is that, a copy of which is attached to their answer, and the referee himself finds and identifies that precise “ plan.” His description of it is very general, but not at all contradictory of its precise terms, as admitted in the

The next item is for holders of land income notes, $280, - 000. So'far as these represent an expenditure for completing the road, which is about one-half of the total, it is not at all certain that any court would award a preference. In Dunham v. Railway Co. ( 1 Wall., 254 ), a mortgage on the road built and to be built was given its priority of lien upon a part thereafter constructed at the cost of the contractor and under an agreement that he should retain possession until paid. Our own views of such preferences have been recently expressed Raht v. Attrill ( 106 N. Y., 423 ; 11 N. Y. State Rep., 9), and we decided that the lien of a mortgage attaches not only to the land in the condition in which it was at the time of the execution, but as changed or improved by accretions or by labor expended upon it, while the mortgage was in existence; and creditors whose debts were created for money, labor or materials used in the improvement acquired no legal or equitable claim to displace or subordinate the lien of the mortgage for their protection.

So far as the income notes represented the $150,000 of interest coupons which matured in 1875, and which the contractors bought, several suggestions occur to us. While it may be that the overdue coupons bought by the contractors before 1875 were purchases and not payments, because the then owner of plaintiff’s bonds assented to the arrangement, no such fact is proven as to the purchase of 1875. As to those coupons there is not a word of evidence that those who accepted their money made or intended a sale. Union Trust Co. v. Monticello and P. J. R. R., 63 N. Y., 311 . Those coupons as against the bondholders must be regarded as paid. In Ketcham v. Duncan (supra), where modifying circumstances were shown and the transaction was regarded as a sale, there was yet a very formidable dissent.

But conceding that there was a sale, yet these coupons in the hands of the contractors were not entitled to any preference. Dunham v. Railway Co., supra. They were bound by their contract to buy them, and as holders stood simply like the others. On the basis that the reorganization

The final item going to make up the preferred mortgage is an estimate of interest likely to accrue before settlement on the previous items.

We discover, therefore, no ground, legal or equitable, upon which the preferred mortgage can stand as against the plaintiff, and the judgment as modified by the general term was right, unless those modifications, upon the plaintiff’s appeal therefrom, should be deemed erroneous.

Our consideration of that subject has led us to the conclusion that those modifications should be sustained.

There is an express finding that the trustees, though acting erroneously, proceeded in good faith. It would be difficult to sustain that finding were it not for the fact that their omission to make payments upon plaintiff’s bonds until after he had sued has a reasonable explanation. He claimed more than was his right. He sought not only to defeat the effect of the reorganization upon his bonds, but to make that scheme the means of acquiring an undue preference for himself. He claimed to stand as if the whole assenting first mortgage bonds had been extinguished and the proceeds of the land grant and income from earnings were devoted to the few non-assenting bonds alone, and so sought payment in full by reason of the sacrifices of others. He failed in that effort deservedly, and the omission to pay had some excuse in his exorbitant claims and his hostile attitude. We are disposed, therefore, upon the finding of the referee, and the explicit provisions of the mortgage to approve of the ruling of the general term that judgment should go against the trustees as such and not personally.

More doubt has attended our reflection upon the question of an order to continue the foreclosure, but the complaint is scarcely framed for such relief, and the proofs indicate that it might merely work mischief to one party without producing benefit to the other, and so we concur in the modification made m that respect.

The ¡judgment of the general term and the order denying the motion to correct and re-settle the judgment should be affirmed, without costs in this court to éither party as against the other.

Andrews, J., dissents on the ground that the point that the contractors were bound by their contract to pay the interest coupons as their own debt, is contrary to the specific finding, which is supported by evidence. It is manifestly improper to affirm the judgment on a question of fact contrary to the finding.

In this case, which is for the second time presented to the court, upon re-argument, I agree with Judge Finch’s opinion in holding that the general term were right in modifying the judgment so that it should be against the trustees as such and not personally.

As to the point raised by the defendant’s . counsel that there was an absence of necessary parties, I do not think it is tenable and I agree with the views in that respect, which were expressed in the opinion at general term. The new preferred bonds represent the land income notes and the trustees being made defendants, with the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company, all the parties are before the court, who are necessary to an adjudication upon the plaintiff’s cause of action.

As to the objection raised by the defendant’s counsel to the jurisdiction of the court below, I fully agree in the views expressed in Judge Finch’s opinion. To be available as a defense, it should have been alleged in the answer, or suggested upon the trial. Neither course being taken, the parties must be deemed to have waived it and to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. The cause of action was one cognizable in itself by the court, for it was based on an alleged violation by the trustees of their duty towards the plaintiff, as defined by the terms of the trust deed and the issue formed was, in fact, as to what were the plaintiff’s rights under a construction of the provisions of that instrument. Nor do I think that it is for this court to say on appeal, the objection not being taken by pleading, or motion in the trial court, that the trial court should, ex proprio motu, have dismissed the complaint.

As to the main question in this case, which turns upon the transactions underlying the creation of the new mortgage and the issues of preferred and serial bonds secured thereby, and their effect upon the plaintiff’s rights as an original first mortgage bondholder, I take a view somewhat different from that expressed in Judge Finch’s opinion as rendered upon the prior hearing, while concurring in the result that the judgment must be affirmed. The first mortgage, which was executed in 1871 by the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company, covered all of the company’s land grant, among other things, and some of its clauses pro? vided for the application of the proceeds of the sales of

A contract was made by the company for the construction of its road, under which the contractors were to receive all the bonds and stock of the company and all the earnings of constructed road during construction. The company retained only its franchise, and the contractors assumed the entire responsibility of raising moneys by sale of these securities. The company never received any money during the period of construction and never paid out any. The contractors sold the bonds they received, and as coupons matured on them, took them up. These facts appear in the testimony of the defendant Abbott, and are undisputed. Matters proceeded in this wise until December, 1874, when it appears that the contractors claimed to hold against the company upwards of half a million of dollars represented by these coupons. At this juncture, they professed inability to advance further moneys, and the January interest was unprovided for; so the sinking fund was resorted to for relief. Such resort as was then had, in my view of the case, was improper, if it was not illegal. The conditions did not exist which permitted it, and in fact it was done for the relief of the contractors. By their contract they had the possession of the road and were to operate it for* their own benefit; that is, they were to receive all of its earnings during the period of construct

The proceeds of the sales of the bonds and the earnings of the road were the stipulated sources for the payment of the accruing interest during the construction of the road, and those sources, by the contract of the parties, were made over to and conducted into the hands of the contractors. They had agreed to pay the interest during their possession, and they were to reimburse themselves for that item of outlay, as they had to do for any other expenditures in their undertaking. Nor is the suggestion that they paid these coupons as agents for the company sound in principle ; for it would not be in accord with the legal or fair meaning of the contract between the parties. It would also seem that if agents yet having the possession of all the principal’s estate, a payment of an obligation of the principal of such a nature would be presumed to ■ have been made from the property in the agent’s hands, and would extinguish the obligation. But I cannot agree to the suggestion. The "contractors in legal contemplation, as I think in fact, assumed the payment of the coupons during construction. The" bonds which they received, by reference to the mortgage, carried notice to them of the provisions of the mortgage, which, in its fourth article, provided that “ during the construction of the said railroad hereby mortgaged, the interest on the bonds intended to be secured hereby shall be paid out of the earnings of the said road and the proceeds of the sales of the first mortgage bonds; and no part of the proceeds of the sale of land

The arrangement, therefore, which trustees and company united in making, with the object of securing this claim of the contractors for coupons paid by them, by the assignment of the contents of the sinking fund from the possession of the trustees to a third party, was illegal; for they were as absolutely dead in law as though paid directly by the company over its counter, and the assignment was a direct violation of the agreement in the mortgage. Coming to the consideration of the payment of the $150,000 of in-' terest, about maturing in January, 1875, on the bonds, the situation, as between company and contractors, was that it was a liability which the contractors were still bound to provide for and which the company could not be supposed to be obligated for.

Of course, as between the company and third parties holding the bonds, the company was bound for the January interest. But if such had been enforced against the company, and the trustees had simply aided the company by advancing from the land sales proceeds, constituting the sinking fund, the company would have had an offset against the contractors, and the sinking fund would have been protected by the obligation of the company in its income bond, as contemplated in the article of the mortgage referred to. But what was actually done was to help the contractors by assigning over the whole sinking fund, to be held as a security for the payment of their claim for paid coupons, and for the advance by one or more bondholders of moneys to meet the coupons to fall due. This was clearly without warrant in the law, and'of this illegality the bondholders, who advanced the lunds to pay future coupons, had notice through their bonds and the provisions of the mortgage, and their knowledge of the facts as to the contractor’s claim. It is true the trustees received from the company an income bond and a second mortgage for this assignment by them of the sinking fund, and hereafter, I shall advert to the fact in connection with the facts of the so-called reorganization.

The defendants admit that the contractors were vitally" interested in preventing a default and its consequences, and they say that they themselves set about raising the necessary funds to care for the January coupons; but they could not, as counsel claim, use the coupons in their possession; for they were in fact paid as to the company. However, the moneys were raised by the concert of action between contractors, company and trustees, and matters went on un

Under this plan a new mortgage was executed on the property and preferred bonds were issued and given in exchange for $400,000 of claims' against the company, variously described as consisting in land income notes, in payments to equalize interest on funded and unfunded coupons, under some scheme designated as the scheme of July 1, 1875, and in a sum to cover future accruing interest on .these items. The other bonds secured by this new mortgage were subsequent obligations to these preferred bonds, .and were issued to take up the prior first mortgage bonds, the details of that scheme not being necessary to describe, in •view of Judge Finch’s fuller opinion. I utterly fail to find .any warrant in Jaw, under the mortgage which defined the duties and powers of these trustees, for their consent to and participation in such a scheme, as by their answer is admitted. These claims were not entitled to precedence, or to priority of payment over the first mortgage bonds.

For reasons I have stated the $280,000 of land income notes, issued against the trust created by the sinking fund proceeds, to aid the contractors, w*ere not preferred debts of the company, and for reasons stated in Judge Finch’s opinion, which I shall not repeat here, the-balance of the $400,000 was equally not. At most, and overlooking the questionable legality of the transactions out of which they arose as claims against the company, they were entitled to the security of the fund pledged as collateral.

How could they deserve protection to the extent of being secured by a prior lien on the mortgaged property ? The very term's of the mortgage contemplate no such possibility and expressly provide that the trustees shall receive for their advances from the sinking fund to pay interest, which the company has not the means to pay, and to secure the first mortgage bondholders, whose security is thus impaired, an income bond, to be redeemed by other bonds-secured by a second mortgage of the premises.

The assignment by the trustees of the sinking fund recognizes this distinctly. Nor did the holders of the land

The trustees should have proceeded with the foreclosure action, and they had no power to waive subsequent defaults and to release the company from its obligations to their cestuis que trustent and from causes of action, as they did in 1879. In changing the contract, by releasing the company and in consenting to a new mortgage, under which the claims of their cestuis que trustent were deferred in order of payment, the trustees violated their duty to these plaintiffs and rendered themselves amenable to this action. They were vested with no such discretion as would authorize them to change or impair any legal right of the plaintiff. The mortgage did not confer any such authority, and the consent of every bondholder could not do so. Their duty to the bondholders was to them severally, and they were not at liberty to follow the advice or wishes of the- majority, being still liable to the minority for a faithful administration of their trust. Sturges v. Knapp, 31 Vt., 1 . With the motives of the plaintiff we are not concerned, if he has legal rights which have been disregarded and which his trustees’ action threatens to disregard.

The argument that these preferred bonds worked no harm to the original bondholders, I do not regard as sound. They do not equitably represent debts which are entitled to priority of payment. Their issue and payments upon them of interest and of principal are not within the terms of the original first mortgage, which represents the contract between company, trustees and the holders of bonds, and are distinct departures from that contract. All that instrument contemplated, in the event of the application of the proceeds of land grant sales to the payment of interest when needed by the company, was that an income bond should be given by the com pony to the trustees, ultimately to be redeemed by the issuing of bonds of the company, secured by a second mortgage. It is plain that the possession by the

I have discussed these questions more at length than I had intended, and perhaps more, in view of the elaborate opinion of Judge Finch, than was absolutely necessary, and I shall add no more.

I concur in Judge Finch’s opinion upon all matters which I have not touched upon here, and I agree in his conclusion that the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed.