Majority
Headnote
Water course—Diversion or.Pursuant to the Laws of 1881, chapter 101, entitled “ an act to provide for a supply of water in the village of Amsterdam, etc,” as amended by the Laws of 1882, chapter 197, commissioners of assessment were appointed by the supreme court in the above matter. Such commissioners heard the matter committed to them, and made their report, which was presented to the supreme court at a special term thereof, and after a hearing upon notice, such report was confirmed. And this appeal is from the order of confirmation.
Fourth. That said Lansing W. Sweet became the owner
Fifth. That the waters of said Fort Johnson creek were diverted from the channel of said creek into and upon the premises now owned by the petitioner, James hi. Clark, into and through a ditch, or canal and trench to a saw and shingle mill formerly situate where the said petitioner’s saw mill now stands, on his lands, by a dam built across said Fort Johnson creek, from the west bank of said creek on petitioner’s lands, easterly across said creek to the east bank thereof on the said lands of said Lansing W. Sweet, from 1832 and prior thereto, down to the time of the death of said Lansing W. Sweet in 1884 or 1885.
Sixth. That such diversion of the waters of said Fort Johnson creek, and the use thereof by said petitioner, James IST. Clark, to operate his saw mill, and of his predecessors and grantors in title to operate a saw mill and shingle mill, was continuous, public, uninterrupted and adverse for a period of sixty years and over, prior to October 31, 1882. We are convinced that the evidence sustains such findings, and that James X. Clark has acquired the right to maintain such dam, and to use the water of the creek in the manner, to the extent, and for the purposes claimed and enjoyed by him. The following, among other conclusions of law, were also found:
“ Second. That the waters of said Fort Johnson creek having been diverted therefrom into and upon the premises now owned by the petitioner, James X. Clark, and there having been continuously, openly, peacefully and uninterruptedly used in operating a saw and shingle mill, and a saw mill, for more than twenty years before any question was raised or made as to the right to make such diversion and to use the water on the premises now owned by the petitioners, that such right to divert and use said water matured by prescription in favor of the predecessors in title, being owners in fee of the said premises now owned by said James IST. Clark, the petitioner.
Third. That when said Lansing W. Sweet purchased his said lands in April, 1841, said diversion and use of such water then existing in open, visible view of all persons, and having so existed for more than twenty years before his purchase and coming into possession of the adjoining lands, he was chargeable with full notice and knowledge of such diversion and use, and he, said Sweet, having made no claim hostile to the right so to divert and use said waters of said creek until 1863, the right to divert
Such conclusions of law are supported by the evidence and the facts found therefrom, by such commissioners. We are convinced that the petitioners have succeeded in establishing their right to use the water of the creek, and to maintain the dam in the manner, and to the extent claimed by them, and as found and reported by the commissioners of assessment. The rights of the petitioners were properly recognized and enforced by the commissioners and by the court at special term. Townsend v. McDonald, 12 N. Y., 382 , 391; Corning v. Gould, 16 Wend., 531 ; Kent’s Com. (5th ed.), vol. 3, p. 441, 448. Easements acquired and lost by prescription.
The appellant’s counsel, in answer to the claim of the petitioners based upon adverse possession, seems to place considerable reliance upon a conversation which occurred between William S. Van Brocklin and Lansing W. Sweet, and testified to by Van Brocklin, and which is found upon page 221 of the case, and which is as follows: “A. I had a conversation with Mr. Sweet in regard to the dam; he asked me if we had a title to the dam; I told him that we had a title to the center of the creek, as I supposed; and he said: ‘You have no title to the other bank;’ and I said no, sir; and I asked him if he would sell the title, and he said he would not; that there would be no trouble, he would never interfere with us while we were there.”
Such conversation would seem to refer to the title to the land beyond the center of the stream, and in the adjacent bank, and not to the right to use the water or to maintain the dam, which did not seem to have been under discussion. It may well be that Van Brocklin supposed that by actual survey that his title to the land, strictly speaking, only extended to the center of the creek, yet it would not necessarily follow that he intended to concede that the right did not exist to maintain the dam, and to use the water of the creek, in the manner and to the extent which it was then enjoyed by him. It is quite clear, we think, that what occurred between them did not amount to a license accepted by Van Brocklin as the basis of his right to maintain the dam and to use the water. The interview between them, as testified to, was too indefinite and inconclusive to overcome the evidence which was adduced in support of an adverse possession as claimed by the petitioners.
The real question in controversy before the commissioners óf assessment was not as to where an actual survey of the premises would locate the line between the lands of
_ We have examined the various exceptions taken and insisted upon by the counsel for the appellants, and discover no error which could have materially prejudiced the case of the appellants.
The order of the special term should therefore be affirmed, with costs.
Learned, P. J., and Landon, J., concur.