Groll v. Prospect Park & Coney Island Railroad — 22 N.Y. St. Rep. 656

Majority

p. 656

Joseph Groll, Resp’t, v. Prospect Park and Coney Island Railroad Co., App’lt.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,

Filed February 11, 1889.)

Headnote

Railboads—Dangebous pbemises—Damages.

Where, in an action for damages for personal injuries sustained by the-plaintiff, caused by his tripping and falling upon the railroad platform of" the defendant, while approaching the station in the night-time, it appeared that the only question in dispute was whether the platform and its approaches was so lighted as to enable passengers to move along in safety, which question was properly submitted to the jury, who found for the plaintiff, and this finding was sustained by the testimony. Held, that this-verdict will not be disturbed.

Appeal from a judgment of the Kings county circuit, entered _oh the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff.

_ Morris & Pearsall, for app’lt; M. A. Smith (Carpenter & Roderick, of counsel), for resp’t.

—This is an action for the recovery of damages resulting from an injury sustained by the plaintiff in. going on to. one of the trains of cars running upon the defendant’s road. ' . . '

The defendant owns and operates a railroad from Brooklyn to Coney Island, over Gravesend avenue, one of the-public thoroughfares of the county of Kings, and there are-stations along the avenue where the trains running on the-road are stopped to discharge and receive passengers.

At those stations the company has erected narrow platforms for the convenience of its passéngers. The platform where the accident to the plaintiff happened was twelve-inches high, twenty-seven inches wide and ninety-seven, feet long.

On the night of December 2, 1885, about eight o’clock in the evening, the plaintiff desired to take a train on the defendant’s road to go to his home at Coney Island, and for that purpose walked along the highway until he came to-the platform, and as he was about to step upon it, his toe,, or foot, caught, and he fell over the platform and struck the rail, and injured his knee-cap and fractured the bone of his leg below his knee. There was no dispute about the injuries, and they were severe and permanent.

There was nothing improper or faulty in the location or construction of the platform, and so the trial judge decided, and refused to submit any question on that subject to the-jury, but he submitted another question to the jury upon which a verdict was found for the plaintiff. It was nightfall when the plaintiff received his injuries, and it was his-

p. 657

claim on the trial that it was dark, and that the platform and the approaches to the same and to the trains which were to take up passengers at that station was insufficiently lighted to enable passengers to move along and upon them with safety, and much of the testimony on both sides was directed to that question.

The plaintiff undertook to show the absence of lights,, and the defendant made an effort to show the place weÉ lighted in the usual manner.

There was nothing about the platform itself subject to-criticism or upon which negligence could be charged against the company, and so was the charge of the trial judge, and he instructed the jury that the real question, was whether the defendant furnished sufficient light to make the platform reasonably safe and secure for persons desiring to enter the cars, and. further that it was the duty of the company to make the entrance to its trains reasonably safe for persons whom it invited to become passengers,, and that as far as the character of the platform was concerned there was no criticism, and no negligence could be-predicated thereon.

The charge was in all respects faultless and favorable to-the defendant, and we find no errors in the conduct of the trial.

The jury found against the defendant upon the question of light, and the finding is sustained by the testimony, and', the law will sustain it when- based upon such facts. Thompson on Carriers, 108; Hulbert v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 40 N. Y., 145 .

The judgment and order denying new trial should be-affirmed, with costs.

All concur.