Majority
Headnote
1. Co-partnership—When aid of court op "equity may be invoked.Upon the evidence produced before the trial court, it is very evident that the case was one for equitable cognizance. Whiton v. Spring, 74 N. Y., 169 ,
Defendant, owning 15,225 acres of land in the county of
The plaintiff Wilcox and the defendant entered upon the execution of the business contemplated by their agreement, and carried it forward until in January, 1888, the plaintiff giving “ his services and attention to the detail thereof, and it was so conducted and carried on by the parties jointly.”
On the twelfth of January the defendant served upon Wilcox a notice “that the copartnership heretofore existing between Harriet Pratt and Joseph H. Wilcox has been -dissolved, and the business will hereafter be carried on by her ”
It is found, as a fact, that the defendant “has had the exclusive possession and control of all the personal property and assets of said firm of Pratt and Wilcox down to the commencement of this action, * * * and has excluded the plaintiff from all connection with, or control ■over, said partnership property or business, and absolutely refused to allow him to participate in said business or in conducting and carrying on the same in any manner what - ever.”
It appears that about one-half of the timber growing on the lands at the time the contract was entered into has been cut off, and the remainder is standing thereon.
We are of the opinion that the conduct of the defendant ■warranted the plaintiff in seeking relief from a court of equity, and we think the language used by Roger, Ch. J., in King v. Barnes ( 109 N. Y., 285 , 15 N. Y. State Rep., 52), is pertinent to the case in hand. He said: “ It is
We think a proper case was made for the appointment of a receiver, and the proper directions were given to him. in the premises. Heatherton v. Hastings, 5 Hun, 460 .
In Hubbell v. Buhler ( 43 Hun, 84 ; 6 N Y State Rep., 578), it was said that where there was an agreement for a joint adventure, “it must necessarily be implied that the understanding was that the partnership or joint adventure, was not determinable at the will of any one of the partners, but that it was to continue until the single enterprise undertaken should be concluded.” That case differs very essentially from the one before us.
Second. We are of the opinion that the transfer by Wilcox of a part of his interest to the plaintiff Miller, and the pledging of the other part thereof to him as collateral security, did not warrant the defendant in excluding the plaintiff Wilcox “from all connection with, or control over, said partnership property or business,” as found In the fourteenth finding of the trial court. In partnership cases, a disagreement among partners has often been the occasion for the appointment Of a receiver, with directions to carry on the business, or to close it out according to the best interests of the parties concerned. Marten v. Van Schaick, 4 Paige, 479; Jackson v. De Forest, 14 How. Pr. Rep., 81 ; Smith, v. N. Y. Stage Co., 18 Abb., 433 .
Third. We are of the opinion that the facts appearing upon the trial warranted the exercise of the judicial discretion of the court, in the direction which it took in awarding the costs of the action to the plaintiffs.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Martin and Merwin, JJ., concur.