Majority
Headnote
Taxes and assessments—Joint occupancy—Lands divided by town line—Town assessed—Laws 1886, chap. 815.Chapter 315 of the Laws of 1886, amended the Revised Statutes, and provided as follows:
“ Section 4. When the line between two towns, wards or counties' divides a farm or lot, the same shall be taxed, if occupied, in the town, ward or county where the occupant resides; if unoccupied, each part shall be assessed in the town, ward, village or county where the same shall lie. All acts, or parts of acts, inconsistent with this act, are hereby repealed.”
By virtue of the provisions of law just quoted, the relator was properly assessed in the town of Harpersfield, in the year 1888, if the farm of 200 acres in question was an occupied “ farm or lot.” It was conceded upon the hearing and established by evidence that the relator resided in the town of Harpersfield. It was also manifest upon the evidence that the line between the towns of Harpersfield and Kortright divided the farm in question. There was no per
In 1888, when the assessors were engaged in making up the list for their roll, they had an interview with David P. Dixon in respect to the assessment of the farm, and he insisted that it should be assessed 125 acres in the town of Kortright, and seventy-five acres only in Harpersfield. The assessors differed with him, and placed the farm of 200 acres upon the roll, extending the same against the name of the relator. The 200 acres are inclosed with a substantial fence. The work done upon the farm was with the teams and tools of the father. The father’s dairy was kept and pastured on the farm, although milked on his own farm. There were various crops raised on the farm in 1887; hay was cut, and after the buildings on the farm were full, the balance of the crop of hay, grain and corn were stored and fed out of the father’s barn near the residence. The team was kept near the residence that did the work upon the 200-acre tract. The hay was drawn to the home farm when needed for fodder. The father and- the son worked on the 200-acre farm in digging potatoes and doing the haying, with the tools belonging partly to the father and partly to the son, and some of them were stored on the 200-acre parcel. The manner of managing the 200-acre farm apparently was like that which obtained in the management of the 298 acres. The cows were pastured on the 200 acres, passing from one farm to the other. The hay that was cut on the 200-acre farm was fed out to the cattle, and the
’We think the evidence and circumstances mentioned, together with the things found in the evidence, notwithstanding some conflict in regard thereto, warranted tlie findings made at the special term, that the farm was jointly occupied in 1888 by the “relator and his father, David P. Dixon, and has been occupied lands within the meaning of the statute regulating the assessment of lands divided by a town line.”
We are not unobservant of the facts and circumstances testified to by the relator and his father David P. Dixon to the contrary of such finding made by the special term, but it must be borne in mind that where there was a conflict in the evidence, it was for the trial court to determine what credence should be given to the testimony of the relator and his father who were largely interested in the issue to which their testimony was addressed.
After a careful perusal of the facts, we are are of the opinion that the conclusion, upon the evidence, of the trial court is in accordance with the weight of the evidence, and* should be sustained.
We are of the opinion therefore, that under the statute which we have quoted, the relator was properly assessed by the assessors in the town of Harpersfield.
We think the evidence to establish the occupation is quite as satisfactory as that which was given in Smith v. Sanger ( 3 Barb,, 360 ), where the question of occupation was involved. A like observation may be made in respect to the facts and conclusions stated in Dorn v. Backer et. al. ( 61 N. Y., 262 ), which case supports the contention of the respondents.
So far as Fellows v. Denniston ( 23 N. Y., 420 ), is applicable, it supports the position of the respondents.
In Stewart v. Crysler ( 100 N. Y., 382 ,) the lands in question were occupied for storage of lumber; although owned by a non-resident of the state, it was held that they were to be regarded as occupied lands. Hampton v. Hamsher ( 46 Hun, 144 ; 10 N. Y., State Rep., 769), contains nothing inconsistent with the views already expressed. The controversy arose prior to the passage of the act of 1886, already quoted, and in referring to section 4 of the Revised Statutes, the judge observes that the lands mentioned “mean other lands in a town owned by an individual, which he occupies for the purpose of cultivation or improvement either in person or by his servant or agent, but upon which he does not live,”
The history of the provisions of the act of 1886 are re
The appellant takes exception to the findings of the trial judge, but as there was some evidence to sustain the findings, the exceptions to the same are unavailable. Porter et al. v. Smith et al., 7 Civ. Pro. Rep., 195.
The appellant proposed several requests for the trial judge to find certain facts mentioned in the requests, but as we are of the opinion that there was a conflict in the evidence in respect to the facts mentioned in the requests, the refusal to find them does not furnish a basis for a reversal of the judgment. We have looked at the other exceptions urged in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, and we are of the opinion they furnish no ground for a reversal of the judgment, and are sufficiently answered by the views already expressed, and we are of the opinion that the judgment ought to be sustained.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.
Martin and Merwin, JJ., concur.