Valentine v. Lunt

The questions presented are those which arise on the pleadings. It appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is an infant, the son and only child and heir at law of one Catharine A. Valentine; that on and prior to the 22d of November, 1883, she was seized in fee of, and resided upon certain premises consisting of a house and lot known as No. 19 Cranberry street, in the city of Brooklyn; that in 1881 one Bichardt was recommended to, and employed by, her as a competent physician; that .she owned considerable property, and supported her father, mother and brother; that Bichardt, soon after his employment, entered upon illicit relations with her, and obtained control over her mind and property; “that thereupon a great change came over her; she compelled her relations to leave her home and refused to see them or her former friends, and remained completely excluded to every one except Bichardt; ” that on or about January 7, 1886, she “ being of unsound mind and incompetent to manage herself or her affairs, in consequence of the influence exerted over her by Bichardt,” he fraudulently taking advantage thereof, obtained from her a deed dated that day, reciting a consideration of $15,000, and conveying to him the above-described premises, but he, in fact, paying no consideration therefor; that the deed was recorded on the 17th of June, 1886, and on the 27th of October, 1886, by deed of that date, and recorded October 29th, Bichardt conveyed the premises to Susan A. Austin for the sum of $12,000, which she paid; that Mrs. Valentine, until that time, continued to reside on the premises, but then left and “moved to the city of New York; ” that Austin, by mortgage dated October 1,1887, recorded October 3, 1887, conveyed the premises to the defendant Lunt, “ to secure the payment of $9,000 advanced by her to Austin; that Bichardt continued to maintain complete dominion over the mind and property of Mrs. Valentine until her death, which ■occurred January 9, 1888. .

The judgment demanded is that the deed to Richardt of June

The defendant Lunt by answer admitted the original title .of' Mrs. Valentine, the several conveyances and the mortgage to herself, but denied all the allegations which tended to show the invalidity, of either, or which, if admitted, would form any basis for the relief sought. Slie then for a further and separate defense-alleged that on the 3d of October she loaned Mrs. Austin $9,000, and took therefor her bond secured by a mortgage on the premises-in question; that Mrs. Austin was then the owner of the premises- and in actual possession thereof, and had been in such possession since the 29th of October, 1886, under the deed from Richardt; that the money was loaned relying upon this ownership and possession, in good faith and without any knowledge or notice whatever of the mental condition of Mrs. Valentine or the fraud or undue influence claimed by the plaintiff to have been practiced or exerted by Richardt upon her.

The plaintiff demurred to this last defense on the ground that it did not show facts sufficient to constitute a defense. At special term the demurrer was sustained upon the ground that undue influence by Richardt in procuring the deed rendered it void, and took away all support to the defendant’s mortgage, and the general term affirmed the special term decision upon the ground that the deed to Richardt was void because of the unsound mind of Mrs.. Valentine. We are of opinion that the special term has given the right interpretation to the complaint, and that the learned counsel for the defendant is justified in his contention that in framing it. the pleader did not intend to, and does not charge that Mrs. Valentine was insane. Being insane is a'general statement or conclusion dependent upon other allegations, and is qualified not-only by the averments which precede, but by those which follow it. They do not justify the conclusion.

The plaintiff nowhere alleges that Mrs. Valentine “was insane,” or “a lunatic,” or “a person of unsound mind,” but states an. opinion formed by himself from certain circumstances. To say that a person, “being insane,” does an act, cannot be considered as an allegation as to the condition of that person or regarded as presenting an issuable fact or ground for relief. The pleading is-no doubt to have a reasonable intendment, and is to be construed liberally, but still “ with a view of substantial justice between the parties,” and that will be promoted by requiring the pleader to-present, without ambiguity, the facts on which he relies for judgment. That has been done in the case before us; it is the influence exerted on Mrs. Valentine by Richardt, and the fraudulent, advantage taken of it to obtain from her a conveyance of the-premises without payment of any consideration, although the conveyance recited it to be $15,000. The fact alleged is that she was coerced and imposed upon, and not that she was of .“ unsound mind.” Her mental condition is referred to as rendering her susceptible to influence, and not as a fact to be met and answered It is, we think, not put in issue by the pleadings, and it is im

As the case is now presented, we do not regard that question as before us. It is not suggested in any way that the defendant. Austin has been guilty of any fraud or unfair practice, or want of care leading to the commission of fraud by Eichardt; on the contrary, both Mrs. Austin and Mrs. Lunt are declared to be wholly innocent in the matter, yet the general claim of the respondent is, that inasmuch as the deed to Eichardt should be declared invalid because of the advantage taken by him, as if it concerned himself alone, the subsequent conveyance to Austin and her mortgage to Lunt must be cancelled. All this seems contrary to natural justice and reason, and it is opposed, we think, to those rules and principles of established equity by which courts, are governed in cases of this nature. It certainly is not a matter of course fór a court of equity to set aside and declare a conveyance so obtained to be void, and transactions depending upon it-invalid When its jurisdiction is invoked for that purpose, it applies the maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity. In the case before us, the money was loaned by Mrs. Lunt on the faith and credit of a title, ownership and possession which the grantor had conferred upon the mortgagor. As against the defendant, therefore, an innocent and Iona fide mortgagee, she is estopped from denying that the apparent title was not the real and true title.

The mortgage is good upon its face; the records and the possession of the property by the mortgagor show that she had a right to execute it, and that is enough, in the first instance, to-sustain its validity. To show its invalidity, the plaintiff sets up collateral matter nowhere appearing of record or to have been brought to the attention of the mortgagee. It is unavailing.

The deed from the plaintiff’s ancestor conveyed an estate in fee-simple to her grantee, and when recorded it was, as to all persons, acquiring rights under it, clothed with all the guaranties which the law can bestow. It was transferable by deed and the purchaser acquired all the rights of an owner. He might again sell or mortgage it, and to one receiving it as purchaser, or as security, without knowledge of any secret fraud, it was free from any taint, which as between the original parties might have infected their transaction. Whatever might be their guilt or condition, a court of equity will not visit its consequences upon him. “ The law,” says Chief Justice Kent, “has always had a regard to derivative titles when fairly procured, and though it may be true as an ab stract principle that a derivative title cannot be better than that from which it was derived, yet there are many necessary exceptions to the operation of this principle.” Jackson v. Henry, 10 Johns., 184 .

In Miller v. Zeimer, 111 N. Y., 441 ; 19 N. Y. State Rep., 120, cited by the respondent, the purchaser of a mortgage was allowed to recover the amount actually paid by him, although the mortgage was as between the parties usurious, and therefore by the statute absolutely void. But the purchaser had taken the security on the representations of the mortgagor as to its validity, and he was held to be estopped from setting up the defense. So far as this case has any application, it favors the defendant, for it shows that one acting in good faith will be protected, although the mortgage is, by the literal terms of the statute, invalid.

The other cases cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff do not require a different judgment in this case. So far as they are from the courts of this state, and are at all pertinent, they are Riggs v. Am. Tract Soc., 84 N. Y., 330 ; 95 id., 503; Fisher v. Bishop, 108 N. Y., 25 ; 13 N. Y. State Rep.,466; Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y., 382 . In Riggs v. Am. Tract Soc., upon each presentation it was brought before the court by the defendant, who had induced a gift or contract from one known to be under a delusion; in Fisher v. Bishop the action was in equity, to cancel a bond and mortgage procured by fraud and undue influence practiced by the defendant, who had induced the plaintiff by its execution to secure a debt due from another person, but for which the mortgagor was in no sense responsible. The plaintiff succeeded at special term, 36 Hun, 112 , but upon appeal the judgment was modified, by requhing the plaintiff to repay to the defendant the sum of one dollar, which it appeared had been actually paid by him as a consideration. Van Deusen v. Sweet was an action to recover possession of real property, both parties claiming under "a common source of title — the plaintiff under his father’s will, the defendant as tenant of the plaintiff’s brother, who claimed under a deed from the same father. Ho equitable relief was sought, and the terms on which such relief might, if at all, be given, was not the subject of consideration. Some other cases have been cited involving the rights of an assignee of a non-negotiable chose in action, as Barry v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 59 N. Y., 587 ; Loomis v. Ruck, 56 id., 462. They have no application. Such an assignee stands in the place of his assignor, and is in no better position; he is put upon inquiry and is affected by all the rights and equities of the original owner, and indeed he must always abide the case of the person from whom he buys.

In the case before us, if it be assumed that as between Richardt and the plaintiff the deed of Mrs. Valentine was void because

All concur.