Kilpatrick v. Burrow

The defendant, as the executrix of the estate of Thomas H. Geraty, deceased, entered into a contract with the plaintiff, for the sale and conveyance to him of premises known as 54 East Seventy-ninth street, in the city of New York. And by her agreement, for the consideration therein mentioned, she .agreed to deliver to the plaintiff an executor’s deed, containing the usual full covenants for the conveying and assuring to him the fee simple of the premises free from all incumbrance. The plaintiff paid upon the contract the sum of $1,000, and afterwards deeming the defendant unable to convey the title as that was .agreed upon by the contract, brought his action to recover back the amount that had been paid, together with the expenses incurred in the examination of the title.

To perform the agreement on her part she presented herself at the place agreed upon for that purpose with the deed subscribed and acknowledged by herself as the sole executrix of the estate, in form complying with the language of the contract. Added to this was a further deed executed also by herself and all the living ■children of the testator for the conveyance of the same property, and a third deed executed by her, the sole executrix and trustee under the will of the testator’s deceased daughter, Margaret A. Fagan, for the conveyance of any interest which the testatrix had in the premises at the time of her decease or which had been vested in her surviving infant son under her will. And no question is made in the case but that she possessed the authority to execute and deliver the last of these three conveyances. But her power-to convey this land as sole surviving executrix and trustee and the power both of herself and her living children to make that conveyance has been denied by the plaintiff. And in support of that ■denial reference is made to the provisions of the will of the testator, who was the owner of this land at the time of his decease. By these provisions he devised and bequeathed to his executrices .all the rest, residue and remainder of his estate, both real and personal, except that previously disposed of. This devise and bequest was generally to sell and dispose of the property and turn it into money; and after paying the debts of the testator and his funeral ■expenses to invest the residue in bonds and mortgages on improved and unincumbered real estate in the city of New York or in public stocks of the state of New York or the United States; and -then to divide said rest and residue, or the proceeds thereof, into as many portions as he should leave children or descendants of -children at the time of his decease; and then to pay one equal

This power of disposition was no otherwise qualified than that the improved property of the testator should only be sold when it clearly appeared to be necessary for the benefit of his estate. From these general directions for the sale and investment and disposition of his estate • he excepted the premises now in controversy, together with the furniture and other things in and about the dwelling. And after making this exception, the executors were-directed “ to suffer and permit my unmarried daughters, during-the life or lives of my two daughters, Agnes K. Geraty and Ada H. Geraty, or so long as any of my said daughters shall remain unmarried, to occupy as a home, free of rent, my said house,, known and designated as number fifty-four (54) Fast Seventy-ninth (79th) street, in the city of New York, together with all the-furniture, plate, linen, china, glass, books, prints, pictures, fuel and other household effects that may be in said house at the time-of my death.

“ Should any of my daughters at any time marry, then I direct that she shall not occupy said house as a home except by the consent of all her unmarried sisters.” And added to this direction was a power of sale given to the executrices, or the survivor of' them, empowering her or them as follows: “ Upon the deaths of' my two children, Agnes K. Geraty and Ada H. Geraty, or the marriage of all my children, as either of said events may respectively occur, I order and direct that my said house, known as No. 54 Bast Seventy-ninth street, New York city, shall be sold, and the proceeds arising therefrom be paid and divided to and among; my said children and their descendants * * * .”

The testator, at the time of his decease, left surviving him six daughters, neither of whom were married, except Margaret A.. Fagan, deceased. Josephine, one of the remaining daughters, became an inmate of a convent, and the other four are still entitled to the use, possession and occupancy of these premises. And under the will they are entitled to continue in that use and occupancy until the death of the testator’s two children, Agnes K and Ada H. Geraty, or the marriage of all his children, as either of' such events may first occur. No estate in the premises has been-given by the will to these daughters. But as the executrices were-vested with no more than a power of sale over the property, the-testator’s daughters became seized of the title to the land subject,

They were the decease of the testator’s two children, Agnes K. and Ada H., or the marriage of all his children. And neither of these events had occurred at the time when the conveyances were presented for the plaintiff at the place mentioned in the contract for its final performance. These two daughters were still living, and neither of the five surviving daughters of the testator was married. And for that reason the period prescribed for the sale of the property had not arrived. In this respect the case is entirely different from that of Murray v. Murray, 7 N. Y. State Rep., 391, where a complete power of sale existed at the time when it was proposed to be, and was, in fact, executed. While here the power of sale was contingent, and dependent upon the occurrence of one or two events, neither of which had occurred at the time when the deeds were proposed to be delivered. The surviving executrix, therefore, was not in a condition to execute this power. For it has been held that the extent of a power, like the extent of an agency created by a written power of attorney, must be sought for in the instrument conferring the power, and authority not found there does not exist. Hetzel v. Barber, 69 N. Y., 1 , 13.

But in behalf of the surviving executrix, the position has been taken that the children of the testator, for whose benefit this power was primarily created, were entitled to make their election that the power should not be resorted to, but that they should at once secure the advantage of the sale of the property by a conveyance made and executed by them for that object. And that, position, under the authorities, might probably be sustained if these children were absolutely vested with the title to this land, or to the proceeds arising from its sale. But as that has been directed by the will, they were not so entitled. For whatever interest vested in them by descent was liable to be defeated by the exercise of this power of sale given to the surviving executrix, as well for their descendants as themselves. The children were not absolutely entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the property, for those proceeds were to be distributed among them and their descendants.

Under this direction if either of the testator’s remaining daughters should marry and have issue living, and die leaving surviving children prior to the decease of the daughters, Agnes K. and Ada H., these children would be entitled to participate in the division of the proceeds of the sale of the land. And their title to such proceeds would not be derived from the deceased parent, but from the directions contained in the will of the testator. The-event is not improbable that two, or even three, of the testator’s daughters may marry and each die leaving children prior to the decease of Agnes K. or Ada H., remaining unmarried. In that, event the deceased daughter would be entitled to no part of the

By the language which has been employed in this part of the will, the sale of the land was not to be made until one or the other of the events mentioned had transpired. And when the .sale should in that manner be made, its proceeds were to be distributed among the testator’s children who were living, and the •descendants of those who were deceased. It was at the occurence •of one of these events only that this sale and distribution were -directed to take place. And the reasonable import of the language used by the testator is, that the persons answering the description contained in the reference made to them in the will were those, and only those, who were to share in the proceeds of the •sale of this property. The legal rule is conformable to the language of the will. For “ Legacies given to a class of persons vest in those who answer the description and are capable of taking at •the time of distribution. They are deemed to be the objects of "the gifts.” Teed v. Morton, 60 N. Y., 502 , 506 ; Delaney v. McCor mack, 88 id., 174, 183.

Neither the testator’s children, nor the infant son of the •daughter who died, had, at the time when these deeds were •offered for delivery, the title to this land. What they had in the property was a right of possession, with a defeasible title, subject to the execution of the power when either event occurred upon which it could be exercised, and to share in the proceeds •of the sale so far as they might be living at that time. So far as the daughters should then be deceased, both the right and the title would vest under the will in her surviving children. And those children, after either event happened upon which the power was dependent, would be entitled to insist upon the execution of the power, the sale of the property, and the distribution of its proceeds, receiving for themselves the shares which they would then be entitled to under the will. And if a sale should now take place, and the proceeds of the property be divided among the testator’s daughters, and the child of the daughter deceased, .another sale and division of the proceeds would become necessary .and legal after the decease of the daughters, if they left descend■ants, or children, surviving them. It follows, therefore, that the title proposed to be given by these deeds to the plaintiff was not ■such a title as he was authorized to demand under the language -of the contract. And where that is the fact, or the title may be •the subject of serious doubt, the law will not compel the purchaser to accept or receive it. Methodist Church Home v. Thomp son,, 108 N. Y., 618 ; 13 N. Y. State Rep., 127.

The judgment adjudging the title to be such as the plaintiff was bound to receive, and directing a specific performance of the contract, was therefore erroneous, and it should be reversed, and .a new trial ordered, with costs to the plaintiff to abide the event-

Brady, J, concurs.

Without concurring in or dissenting from the construction placed by Mr. Justice Daniels upon the will of Thomas H. G-eraty, deceased, I concur in the conclusion arrived nt by him.

A purchaser of land is entitled to a marketable title, a title •open to a reasonable doubt is not a marketable one, and where such title depends upon a will the construction of which is open to discussion, even ü the court is of opinion that the true construction will give the purchaser a good title he should not be required to run the risk of a subsequent different construction being put upon the will. The heirs and next of kin of the testator are not bound by the construction put upon the will in an action between seller and purchaser, and consequently no binding construction can be given to the will.