The executors assigned all the certificates but the American Express and the Bock Island stock.
As to the American Express stock the plaintiff has the written declaration of deceased, that this stock was held as trustee for some one. It was with other stocks wherein the plaintiff was. named as beneficiary, and the deceased gave directions to his executors to transfer the same to plaintiff.
The American Express stock was bought in large part with the plaintiff’s money on deposit with Williams & Guión.
The original certificate had on it a power with the name of deceased in the wrong place, but with.the full declaration that it was “foi Martha A. Guión.”
This was subsequently changed to B. L. Guión, trustee. The usage of the express company is proven to be that it will not issue a certificate to a trustee for a specific person without the deed of trust, but that it will issue one to a person as trustee with no named beneficiary.
The interest drawn on this stock was deposited to plaintiff’s account
Some are actually proven to have been so deposited by deceased.
Some are fairly inferable from the tank look accounts.
As to American express stock there is supporting evidence to supply the actual name of the beneficiary with the certificate standing in the name of deceased as trustee for some one.
The Chicago & Bock Island certificate belongs to plaintiff. It was bought in blank and filled in by the clerk of John J. Cisco & Son as sold to B. L. Guión, in trust for M. A. Guión. This was the order for the purchase made by deceased.
This company also had a rule not to issue certificates at all to a trustee, unless the declaration of trust was produced; when the certificate bought by deceased for his wife reached the railroad office, a certificate was refused; Cisco’s clerk thereupon erased the words, “ as trustee for M. A. Guión,” following the name of B. L. Guión. • Nó authority is proven for this, either by deceased or by plaintiff.
The title of the plaintiff was complete when the certificate was-purchased, and the plaintiff’s title was not divested by the act of Cisco’s clerk, in accordance with an arbitrary rule of the American Company.
. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to recover both certificates.
Charles N. Judson, for resp’t; Woodward & Buckley, for applts.
This is an action in equity to procure a judgment declaring certain stock to be the property of the plaintiff.
The testimony was taken before a referee, appointed for that pupose, with power to take the same' and report it to the court with his opinion. Besides taking the testimony and reporting' the same to the court with. his opinion, the referee undertook., to -make findings of fact and law and to decide the case against the plaintiff. That was beyond the scope of his authority, and hia findings have neither place nor influence in the case.