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In re the Estate of Stern

29 N.Y. St. Rep. 216 Court N.Y. Sur. Ct. Decision date 1890-02-12 English

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p. 216
In the Matter of the Estate of Joseph Stern, Deceased.
(Surrogate’s Court, New York County,
Filed February 12, 1890.)

Headnote

Executors and administrators—Revocation op letters — Who may APPLY POB.
One who has sold goods to a firm composed of a surviving partner and the executors of the deceased partner, who were authorized by the will to continue the business, is not a creditor within the meaning of § 2685 of the Code, and has no standing to apply for revocation of ■ letters testamentary.
Application to revoke letters testamentary.
Franklin Bien, for petitioner; M. Warley Plaizek, for executrix; Daniel Q. Rollins, of counsel

This is an application under § 2685 of the Code, for the revocation of letters testamentary. Ño answering affidavits are filed. The counsel for the respondents interposed an elaborate brief, however, which must be considered in the nature of a demurrer.

The petitioner applies as a creditor. The nature of his claim-will appear by the following facts: By the provisions of the will the executors were authorized to continue the business in which decedent had been engaged during his life-time. Subsequent to the death of the testator, and while the business was being conducted by the firm, composed of the surviving partner and the executor and executrix, as such, the petitioner sold goods, to the said firm.

Under the decisions a debt accruing under such circumstances-can only be collected, so far as the estate of deceased is concerned, from the assets which were in the business. Under the terms of the will the executors could only devote to the purposes of the-business so much of the estate as was already at testator’s death invested therein. The creditor could not collect his claim from assets not properly embarked in the business. Willis v. Sharp, 113 N. Y., 586 ; 23 N. Y. State Rep., 670; Same v. Same, 115 N. Y., 396 ; 26 N. Y. State Rep., 125..

A point is made by the respondents that the petitioner has no standing to make the application. In this contention I think they are correct The only persons under the section who can apply are creditors or persons interested in the estate of decedent.

The petitioner is not a person “ interested in the estate of decedent,” as creditors are expressly excepted by the language of' subdivision 11, § 2514, which defines the term “persons interested” where used in the act.

To sustain his right to petition, therefore, he must be a creditor. The term “ creditor ” is defined by subdivision 3 of § 2514, which, when paraphrased, will read as follows: A creditor is a

p. 217
person having a claim or demand upon which a judgment for a sum of money could be recovered in an action.

Now, as theré can be no doubt that the present petitioner could not recover upon his demand as against any assets of the estate not properly employed by the executors in the business continued subsequent to the death of the testator, but would be confined as to his recovery to such assets, it is clear that he is not a creditor of the estate, for the estate would properly include both. He is simply a creditor as to the fund against which he might recover judgment, which is simply an asset or investment of the estate. This view is emphasized by the consideration that, apart from the authority to continue the business, the debt having accrued subsequent to the death of the decedent, the petitioner would not have been a creditor either of the estate or of the decedent ; he would have had a claim only against the executor personally. This is true, notwithstanding a court of equity will sometimes, where the executor is shown to be insolvent, permit such a creditor to have the assets of the estate applied to the payment of his claim.

Apply the test suggested by subdivision 3 of § 2514. Gould the petitioner recover a judgment for a sum of money against the respondents on its claim ? Unless it could, it would not be included in the term “ creditor.” While it might have recourse to so much of the estate as was properly embarked in the business, it isgclear the suit of the petitioner could not be maintained against the executors as such.

Motion denied.