People ex rel. Peck v. Connelly

The relator is a minister of the gospel, in good standing, of the religious denomination and organization known as the Methodist Episcopal Church. The appellants are the trustees of the First Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church of the town of Cohocton, organized in the year 1829, under the general law of 1813, permitting the creation of religious corporations.

This corporation is located within the territorial limits of the Genesee conference of the said denomination, over which Bishop Hurst presided at the annual conference held in the year 1885. In the year 1831, the local society received a conveyance of a parcel of land, upon which a meeting-house has since been erected, and the grantees therein are mentioned and described as “Paul C. Cook, and four others, trustees of the First Methodist Episcopal Society of the town of Cohocton and their successors in office of the second part.” No conditions are inserted in this conveyance upon which the title vested in the trustees is made to depend, nor is any reference made therein as to the religious organization to which the said corporation belongs, other than is found in the clause describing, the official character of the trustees. By the custom, regulations and discipline of the Methodist Episcopal church, the bishop presiding at an annual conference possesses full authority and is charged with the duty to make appointments of preachers for the several local districts within his conference. At the conference held in 1885, Bishop Hurst in due form appointed the relator as the preacher to be located in the Cohocton district and to occupy the meetinghouse for religious purposes owned by the corporation of which the appellants are the trustees. They refuse to receive the relator in his capacity as preacher, and refuse to

As.a legal justification, and for the purpose of defeating the relator’s application, they claim that the corporation of which they are the trustees is a civil one independent of all ecclesiastical judicatories and that the civil courts are without jurisdiction to guide or control their action in the management of the temporalities of the church over which they have the same control that the trustees or directors of business corporations have and possess by the general law of the state. In this contention they would have been supported by the construction which the courts have placed upon the general act of 1813 prior to its amendment by chapter 79 of •the Laws of 1875 and chapter 176 of the Laws of 1876. Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N. Y., 243 ; Petty v. Tooker, 21 id., 267 .

In those cases it was held that the members of the society or corporation form the corporate body, such members being the corporators and the trustees the mere officers of the corporation; that the body or entity thus brought into existence is a civil corporation with such functions and powers as the statute confers upon it and its officers, and that in no sense was it an ecclesiastical corporation. That it was wholly independent in its existence and in the control and managements of its affairs of all religious judicatories; that it is a creature of the state and subject to such control as its own laws may impose; that none of the provisions of the act of 1813 were intended to disturb, interfere with or regulate the actions and powers of the numerous voluntary religious organizations existing in this state, and that such bodies were recognized and considered entirely spiritual associations, distinct and separate from the body politic.

Since those decisions were made giving a construction to the original act, supplemental provisions have been enacted which provide that the rectors, wardens, and vestrymen, or the trustees, consistory or sessions of any church, congregabion or religious society, incorporated under any of the

The legislature had previously enacted (chapter 70, Laws of 1875), that the jurisdiction of the courts of "equity was extended over religious corporations so far as it may be necessary to enforce the provisions of that act which provided that the trustees of any church congregation or religious society, incorporated under section 3, of the Act of 1813. shall administer the temporalities thereof, and hold •and apply the estate and property belonging thereto, and the revenues of the same, for the benefit of such corporation, according to the discipline, rules and usages of the denomination to which the church members of the corporation belong; nor shall it be lawful for the trustees to divert such estate, property or revenues to any other purpose -except towards the support and maintenance of any religious, benevolent or other institution connected with such church, ■congregation or religious Society.

This court has by its previous decisions .placed a construction upon these amendments or supplementary provisions to the original act, and held that the courts, by force of their provisions, have the jurisdiction to supervise the .action of the trustees of religious corporations and to require them to use and manage the property of the corporation according to the rules and usages of the church or denomination to which the corporation belonged, and when they attempt to divert the property of which they have the "title as trustees, or to use the revenues which may come to their hands, except for the support and maintenance of the -church, or denomination to which it is attached, to restrain their action by appropriate orders and decrees in action or proceedings properly instituted for that purpose by interested parties.

In Isham v. Fullager (14: Abb. N. C., 363), it was held at -special term, that the trustees could be properly restrained under the amendatory clauses from opening the church building to the ministration of a minister who had been deposed from his office by the action of an ecclesiastical judicatory to which he and the society belong. This case was affirmed at general term on the opinion of the justice

In the examination of the case at bar we have reexamined the questions involved in the discussion, and are-confirmed in our views as previously expressed, and upon the authority of the cases cited we hold that it was the-duty of the trustees to receive the relator as the minister assigned to the district of the First Methodist Episcopal Church of Cohocton, and to open the meeting-house to him for the purpose of conducting divine worship therein, in conformity of the tenets and discipline of the religious-denomination to which he belongs, and to which the corporation is attached. In refusing to open the meetinghouse the trustees violated a plain duty, and the writ of mandamus is a proper remedy to put the relator in possession of the pulpit to which he is entitled. People v. Steele, 2 Barb., 397 .

As to the personal property described in the writ the-trustees deny that the corporation has 'itle to the same, and state in their affidavits that they have no control over the same, naming the persons in whose possession the same is. The relator failed to establish in the face of these-denials that the trustees held the property for the use of the-resident minister, ‘and so far as they are required to deliver the same to the custody of the relator, and for his use, the writ should be amended by striking out that requirement.

As no point was made by the appellants that the record book mentioned in the writ was not intended to be used by the minister for the purpose of keeping the records of the church, we allow the writ to stand in that particular,, although we find no canon in the book of discipline handed up to us giving him charge of the records of the society or corporation.

The order and the writ as amended are affirmed without, costs of this appeal to either party.

Haight, J., not sitting; Smith and Bradley. JJ., concur.