Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co.

The plaintiff’s cause of action is based upon the charge that the defendants have combined and confederated together for the purpose and in the maimer set forth in the complaint; of mining the plaintiff’s business and driving it out of the market as a competitor with the defendant, which is also engaged in manufacturing and selling the same kind of products. The single legal proposition presented by the demurrer is, whether the complaint set forth facts showing that the defendant has been guilty of a wrong which has resulted in an injury to the plaintiff. If so, a perfect cause of action is stated, and the demurrer was properly overruled. It is wholly immaterial to examine the complaint for the purpose of ascertaining whether a good cause of action is stated against the other defendants or not, for the reason, that in actions of tort judgment may be entered against either of the defendants, when more than one is joined, if the proofs establish a cause of action against any of the defendants. It is not questioned but what the complaint sets forth a good cause of action in tort, against the four persons named as defendants, and a joint judgment may be entered against them if the facts charged be sustained upon the trial. They are charged with having so conspired together to injure the plaintiff in its business, and having done certain overt acts in carrying out their purpose, which have resulted in a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended on the argument, that the complaint charged in proper and sufficient terms, that the defendant, the Standard Oil Company of New York, had joined the conspiracy after it had been formed by the other defendants, and since that time all the defendants have done certain overt acts in furtherance of such common design and purpose, and that it was jointly hable with the other defendants, for all the damages resulting to the plaintiff growing out of the unlawful combination as it was originally formed.

It is clear, as it seems to me, that it is unnecessary to determine whether the complaint will bear that construction or not in view of the rule that in actions of tort judgment may be entered against such of the defendants against whom a cause of action is made out. The single inquiry now before us is, whether upon the facts as stated a judgment may be rendered against this defendant if the plaintiff fails to prove a like cause of action against all or either of the other defendants. On the trial it is not neces

That a perfect cause of action against this defendant is set forth in the complaint is clear and indisputable. It is a business corporation organized under the laws of this state in the year 1882, and since then has been engaged in extensive operations in the same towns and cities where the plaintiff is engaged in a like business. The complaint charges the other defendants with having formed a conspiracy to injure the plaintiff, and done certain acts injurious to the plaintiff. In pursuance therewith prior to the time this defendant was organized and went into existence as a corporation. The complaint then charges that after the defendant came into existence it joined and became a party to the conspiracy and ratified its previous action. It is then further charged as of a time after the defendant was organized that the conspirators, that is, all the defendants, by letters and other means requested various customers of the plaintiff not to purchase oil from it, and represented that the plaintiff’s oil was of inferior quality and that the plaintiff had no right to make such oils and vend the, same on the market; and threatens the defendant’s customers with lawsuits and expenses if they continued to patronize the plaintiff and purchase its commodities; and employed one Steam, to make such statements, and that he did make the same at the city of Boston and in other places in the state of Massachusetts, and in various parts of New England to certain customers of the plaintiff, and by reason thereof, the plaintiff lost many of its said customers and much of its trade and business, and suffered great loss and damage in consequence thereof. That the said conspirators, by their agents and servants, did falsely represent to the customers of plaintiff, that said conspirators or some of them had patents that covered the entire product of plaintiff’s manufacture, and that the plaintiff had no right to make the oil it was-then manufacturing, and that all who bought oil of the plaintiff were infringing the patents of some one of or all of the said conspirators, and that one or more of said conspirators would bring actions for such infringements against each and every one of the customers of the plaintiff who bought oils or dealt with the plaintiff for such infringement of the said patents, and that by reason thereof, the said conspirators did prevent many of the customers of the plaintiff from purchasing oils of or from dealing with it, and did take from the plaintiff many of its customers to the great damage of the plaintiff. The com

In that part of the complaint of which the substance has just been stated it is manifest that by the use of the term conspirator the pleader intended to charge all of the defendants, including the Standard Oil Company of New York, with being actors in the performance of the illegal acts charged. If the facts thus charged to have been done are proved upon the trial to have been done by this defendant through its officers or agents, it has slandered the plaintiff’s business and committed an inexcusable wrong, condemned by the laws of the land as well as by honorable merchants. It is charged that this defendant, together with the other defendants, employed a particular person to repeat the slanders to and among the plaintiff’s customers, and his acts in the eyes of the law are the acts of the defendant, and it becomes liable for all the damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason thereof.

The general rule upon that subject is, as established by the recent cases, “that the acts of the servant, within the general scope of his employment, while engaged in his master’s business, and done with a view to the furtherance of that business and the master’s interest, the master will be responsible, whether the act be done negligently, wantonly or even wilfully.” In general terms, if the servant misconducts himself in the course of his employment his acts are the acts of his master, who must answer for them. Mott v. Consumers Ice Company, 73 N. Y., 543 .

In Reed v. The Home Savings Bank ( 136 Mass., 445 ), the court said that: “By the great weight of modern authority a corporation may be hable, even when a fraudulent or malicious intent in fact is necessary to be proved, the fraud or malice of its authorized agents being imputed to the corporation, as in actions for fraudulent representations.” See also 2 Addison on Torts, 73.

There is great justice and fairness in this rule, otherwise injustice might be done to individuals, if their remedy for wrongs authorized by corporations were to be confined to actions against the agents employed by the corporation. Since in these times a vast portion of the business of the country is carried on by corporations, guided and stimulated in their action by the advice and under the direction of shareholders who desire to make their investment profitable, this rule should not be narrowed or limited in any degree by the decision of the court.

If the views already expressed are sound, then it becomes

The plaintiff in stating his cause of action against a corporation may, and should, state the acts complained of as being the acts of the corporation itself, and it is not necessary nor proper to aver in the complaint that they were done by and through the authorized agent of the corporation. It is a matter of proof upon the trial to establish that the person who did the act was the authorized agent of the defendant, for it can only act through its officers and agents. When a charge is made in a pleading against a corporation by its corporate name, the legal inference is that some person or persons in its employ did the act imputed. 1 Chitty on Pleading, 286; 2 Waits Pr., 376; Stoddard v. Onondaga Conference, 12. Barb., 515.

Judgment affirmed, with costs, with leave to the defendant to withdraw" the demurrer and answer on payment of the costs of the demurrer and of this appeal within twenty days.

All concur.