Majority
Headnote
1. Murder—Examination op witnesses.The defendant was convicted at the oyer and terminer in county, on day ber, 1885, of the murder of her husband, William Druse, in the town of Warren, in that county, on the 18th day of December, 1884. The general term has affirmed the conviction, and the only questions cognizable in this court are those arising upon exceptions taken in the course of the proceedings. People v. Boas, 92 N. Y., 560 ; People v. Guidice, 100 id., 503.
It is not disputed that the deceased came to his death by the act of the defendant. The only defense attempted to "be made on the trial was justifiable homicide. The history of the transactions at the house of Druse on the day of the homicide, as narrated by the witnesses on the part of the people, discloses one of the most remarkable tragedies to be found in the annals of crime. The deceased was .a farmer, and lived with his wife and their two children— Mary, of the age of about nineteen years, and George, of the age of about ten years—on a small farm in the town of Warren. Frank Gates, a nephew of the defendant, about fourteen years of age, was also, at the time of the homicide, a member of the family. The husband and wife had frequent altercations, and their relations for several years prior to the homicide had been very unpleasant. He was a shiftless farmer, a poor provider, often abusive to his family, and the contracting by the wife of small debts at the stores for clothing and supplies for herself and her-children was the occasion of frequent quarrels between them:
The homicide occurred on the morning of the eighteenth of December, in the kitchen of the house. The sole evidence of eye-witnesses of the transaction is that of Frank Gates, and George Druse, and his sister Mary. The two boys were sworn on the part of the people, and Mary Druse, upon whose testimony alone the defense of justifiable homicide was sought to be supported, was sworn in behalf of the defendant.
It will be seen from this resume of the principal facts that there was abundant evidence to justify the conviction. The evidence on the part of the people supplied all the elements necessary to the crime of murder in the first degree. The general term, in a careful opinion, has examined the case upon the facts and the law, and reached the conclusion, that no error was committed on the trial, in which we fully concur.
We shall content ourselves with a reference tó a few of the exceptions, although all of these seem to be unsubstantial, and none of the questions raise any doubt as to the correctness of the rulings.
First. The court, in its discretion, properly permitted the district attorney to call the attention of the witnesses Frank Gates and George Druse to particular facts, after they, without interruption, had gone through the story of the incidents of the eighteenth of December. We think the judge carefully guarded and protected the legal rights of the defendant in their examination.
Second. The court properly excluded the defendant’s offer to show, by the witness Van Evera, that the deceased treated his domestic animals with cruelty. The rule is that, after evidence has been given by a defendant tending to show that the homicide was committed in self-defence, he may follow it by proof of the general reputation of the deceased for quarrelsomeness and violence. But a defendant is confined to proof of general reputation, and evidence of specific acts of violence towards third persons is admissible. People v. Lamb, 2 Keyes, 371; Eggler v. People, 56 N. Y., 643 ; Thomas v. People, 67 id., 218. This principle plainly excludes the evidence offered.
Third. The confession of the defendant to the witness McDonald was properly admitted. It was not made under the influence of fear produced by threats, nor upon any promise of immunity from prosecution, and was therefore admissible, within the general rule prescribed by section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is immaterial that when made the defendant was under arrest. The confession was voluntary, and was not within the rule
Fourth. The court properly excluded evidence to show that the deceased robbed his father, when in his coffin, of his grave clothes, and wore them at his funeral. It was wholly irrelevant and immaterial.
We leave the other exceptions without special notice. Most of them are considered in the opinion below, and are satisfactorily answered. There was no exception to the charge. It fully stated the facts and the law applicable to the case.
We see no reason for disturbing the judgment. It should therefore be affirmed.
All concur.