← Cases

Wahlig v. Standard Pump Co.

30 N.Y. St. Rep. 390 Court N.Y. City Ct. Decision date 1890-04-02 English

Delivered by Mo Ad am, Gh. J.

Contents

Majority

p. 390
Charles F. Wahlig, Pl’ff, v. The Standard Pump Co., Def’t.
(City Court of New York, Trial Term,
Filed April 2, 1890.)

Headnote

Bills abd botes—Corporatiobs.
In the absence of a resolution authorizing the treasurer of a corporation to endorse negotiable paper, or proof of a course of dealing holding him out as having power to do so, or of ratification of his act, his endorsement of a note for the accommodation of the maker is1 not a corporate act and the fact that plaintiff is a bona, fide holder cannot make it a corporate charge.
p. 391
Trial by the court without a jury.
Kaufman & Sanders, for pl’ff; J. A. Grow, for deft.

The note was made by Pearl and endorsed “ Standard Pump Mfg. Co., J. F. Herron, treasurer.” The note did not concern any business of the corporation, and was endorsed by its treasurer for the accommodation of the maker. There was no by-law or resolution of the board of directors authorizing the treasurer to endorse negotiable paper, nor was there any proof of a recognized course of dealing by which the treasurer was held out as possessing such power, or any evidence of ratification on the part of the corporation. The corporation received no benefit from the note, and the proceeds never reached its treasury. Under these circumstances the act of the treasurer was riot a corporate act. Wahlig v. Standard Pump Co., 25 N.Y. St. Rep., 864 ; Mather v. Union L. & T. Co., 26 id., 58; Westfield v. Radde, 7 Daly, 326 ; S. C., 55 How. Pr., 369 . Herron, as treasurer, had no power to lend the credit of the corporation. If the endorsement was not a corporate act, the fact that the plaintiff was a bona fide holder cannot, even under the Mechanics’ B. A. v. N. Y. &. S. W. L. Co., 35 N. Y., 505 , make it a corporate charge. In such- a case the remedy would seem to be against the treasurer who acted without corporate sanction, Green’s Brice’s Ultra Vires, 634, upon the theory that where the act does not bind the principal, it binds the person who, without authority, assumed to act as agent. It follows that there must be judgment for the defendant.