Berg v. Carroll

Joseph Grluckman, plaintiff’s assignor, was employed by defendants as traveling’ salesman under a written contract, pursuant to the terms of which the defendants agreed to employ him from April 22, 1889, to December 31,1889, at the annual salary of $1,500, payable in weekly installments of thirty dollars each; and this action was brought to recover the installments for the five weeks commencing July 6th and ending August 10th.

Upon the trial plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that shortly before July 5,1889, Grluckman was in St Louis upon defendants’ business, and that owing, to their neglect to supply Mm with the necessary money for expenses, he was compelled to return to blew York, and arrived there about July 5 th. It also appeared on the part of plaintiff that on his return, Grluckman at once reported at defendants’ place of business and demanded further instructions in his employment, besides an advance of money for his necessary expenses in their business; but that defendants wholly failed to give such instructions or to supply such money, and that after awaiting such instructions for five weeks, from July 6th to August 10th, without receiving either instructions to proceed or traveling expenses or salary, Grluckman, dn the last mentioned day, elected to terminate his employment He thereupon assigned his claim for salary for the five weeks mentioned to the plaintiff; testified that throughout the period mentioned the former was not only ready and willing to continue his employment, but that he also held himself in readiness to perform such

Defendants, on the other hand, adduced proof tending to show that Gluckman, in violation of instructions to proceed from St. Louis to Chicago upon defendants’ business, returned to New York, and on his return absolutely refused to continue his employment unless they would agree to the payment of a demand not involved in this action, the particulars of which were nowhere sufficiently explained.

It was claimed for the defendants that this refusal on Gluckman’s part constituted a breach of his contract and an abandonment by him of his employment, and that because of such breach and abandonment he was precluded from recovering any salary alleged to have accrued subsequent thereto.

Upon this contradictory evidence the trial justice charged the jury that they must determine whether or not there was a termination of the contract by abandonment of the employment or otherwise on the part of either party prior to the period for which the salary was claimed, and that if they found that there was such termination or abandonment, plaintiff could recover only such salary as had accrued to Gluckman prior thereto; but if they found there was no such termination of the contract or abandonment of the employment, and that Gluckman held himself ready during the period for which salary was claimed, to receive and act upon defendant’s directions touching his employment, plaintiff was entitled to recover the full amount claimed without proof showing that actual services were rendered.

The jury - returned a verdict for plaintiff for the full amount claimed.

Defendants denied any breach of contract or abandonment of employmennt on their part, and alleged that such abandonment was by' Gluckman. Gluckman, however, denied that he abandoned defendants’ service prior to August 10th, and further denied that prior to said last mentioned date he had been discharged or dismissed by defendants. There was evidence upon the trial in support of the contention of each party, presenting sucha conflict concerning the fact of the termination of the contract or the abandonment of the employment thereunder prior to August 10th as to render the submission of that question to the jury imperative upon the court. The jury having found for the plaintiff in the full amount claimed it must he assumed, for the purposes of this appeal, that the contract of employment continued valid and subsisting during the period for which the salary was demanded in this action, and. there being no exceptions to the charge or refusals to charge, the only questions presented for review are those arising" upon the denial of the motions for dismissal, and the exceptions, to the admission and exclusion of evidence.

A motion for dismissal was made by defendants’ counsel when plaintiff closed his direct proof, and again upon the final submission of the case, and as both motions were made upon substantially the same grounds they may he continued together. These grounds-

The period for which defendants had agreed to employ Gluckman was from April 22, 1889, to December 81, 1889. It was admitted by the pleadings that Gluckman entered upon the emploj'"ment and continued therein until July 5th. The relation of employer and employee having been once established under the contract admitted to have been entered into, and the term of employment not appearing to have expired by limitation, it must be presumed to have continued until the contrary appeared. Green-leaf on Evidence, vol. 1, § 41, etc.; Beckwith v. Whalen, 65 N. Y., 322 .

To make out aprima facie case plaintiff then was not required by affirmative proof to establish a continuance of the employment. Its continuance was to be presumed until affirmative proof of its termination was introduced.

There was nothing in plaintiff’s direct proof showing a termination of the contract of employment by either party thereto. Gluckman distinctly denied that he had ever left the defendants’ employment. Defendants introduced proof tending to show an abandonment of the employment,which was met by opposing proof on the part of the plaintiff, and when upon the final submission of the case the motion for dismissal was renewed, there was a conflict of evidence concerning such question which could only have been properly determined by the jury.

Eeither was it incumbent upon plaintiff to show the actual rendition of services by Gluckman. The contract was for continuous employment, and readiness to act upon the direction of the defendants was all that could be required. In the absence of any express provision to the contrary," all that the empkyee engages to do is to hold his time and services subject to the disposal of his employment, as may from time to time be assigned to him. If the employee holds himself in readiness and complies with his employer’s directions in such employment, he has discharged his obligation, and the law will not require him to forfeit his right to the compensation agreed upon because the employer has seen fit to withhold directions from him, and thus ■kept him in idleness. An abandonment of the employment by the defendants cannot, therefore, be predicated upon their neglect to require actual services from Gluckman, unaccompanied by some affirmative act indicating the latter’s discharge or dismissal from service.

There being then nothing upon the close of plaintiff’s direct proof to show a termination of the employment, and there being

Neither of defendants’ exceptions to the rulings of the trial justice on the admission and exclusion of evidence shows sufficient merit to warrant a reversal.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Larremore, Oh. J., concurs.