Duryea v. Vosburgh

The counsel for the plaintiffs contends that this court has the power, in a case like the present, to review the determination of the general term in affirming the order denying the motion for a new trial, made upon the judge’s minutes, which' motion was made upon the ground that the verdict was -against the evidence. He claims that the motion on such ground raised a question of law, and that if it should have been granted the courts below have made an error in the decision of a question of law which this court should correct. He cites as an authority for. his proposition Walker v. Spencer, 86 N. Y., 162 , and certain sections of the Code of Civil Procedure. This question has as we think been already decided by this court and against the views now urged by the counsel for the appellants. But inasmuch as appeals from this kind of an order are still frequently taken in connection with an appeal from the judgment, and there seems to be some uncertainty prevailing in the profession as to the practice which should be followed in such case, we have deemed it proper to restate our views at this time.

The deniál of a motion for a new trial, made on the ground stated, is not the subject of an exception, and if it be competent for this court to review the decision of that question by the gen-. eral term, _it follows of course that it reviews a question of law without any exception having been taken, which is contrary to its uniform practice, and the power to do which has been denied. See Standard Oil Co. v. Amazon Ins. Co., 79 N. Y., 506 . In one instance provision is made for a review by this court of the determination of the lower court without an exception having been, taken, and that is where a verdict has been ordered subject to the opinion of the court at general term. By virtue of § 1339 of the

In the case cited from 86 3ST. Y.„ the appeal by the defendant was from the order of the general term denying his motion for a new trial made under § 1001 of the Code. That section permits such a motion to be made at general term upon exceptions taken to rulings of law made upon the trial, and this court reviews the decision of the general term upon such motion by virtue of § 190, subd. 2.

But by the very language of the Code providing for the making of a motion for a new trial at the general term in cases where an interlocutory judgment has been entered, such motion must be founded upon exceptions, and, of course, if none were taken, no such motion could be entertained at the general term and no review could be had here.

Section 1350 does not confer the jurisdiction claimed. That section makes provision for an appeal to this court from a final judgment in cases where an interlocutory judgment had already been entered and affirmed at general term, or after it had refused a new trial applied for to it in the first instance, or upon appeal from special term. If an appeal is taken to this court from the final determination of the general term, the determination of that court affirming the interlocutory judgment, or refusing the new trial, may be reviewed at the election of either party. But the review in this court thus provided for must be confined to exceptions taken, and without them no questions of law reviewable here can arise. The plaintiffs have no exception to reach this question. There has been no interlocutory judgment, and hence provisions for a review of such a judgment upon appeal from a final one do not apply.

ISTor does § 1337 lend any aid to the plaintiff’s contention. That section simply states the questions which may be brought up for review by an appeal to this court from a final judgment, or from an order granting or refusing a new trial in an action, or from an order affecting a substantial right, made in a special proceeding or upon- a summary application after judgment. We do not think that section enlarges the jurisdiction of this court so as to permit us to review upon appeal from its judgment the decision of the general term upon appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial on the judge’s minutes in an action tried by a jury. The meaning of § 1337 must be that this court can review every question affecting a substantial-right and not resting in discretion, which was determined by the general term, provided the exceptions rendered necessary by other sections of the Code have been duly taken. An order such as is under

The case of Derleth v. De Graff, 104 N. Y., 661 ; 5 N. Y. State Rep., 619, while not exactly similar (because the appeal to this court from the order was taken before the entry of the judgment of affirmance), is still an authority for the view now taken. We there held that the unsuccessful party at the general term could not appeal directly to this court from the order of the general term affirming the order of the special term denying the motion for a new trial on the minutes, even though such appeal should have been taken before the entry of any judgment of affirmance. And it was stated that on such an appeal, even if we could entertain it, we could review only questions of law raised upon the trial, such as would be involved upon an appeal from the judgment to be entered upon the order of affirmance. And it was held that this was not such an appeal from an order which grants or refuses a new trial as is contemplated by § 190 of the Code. This case was reaffirmed in D., L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Burkard, 109 N. Y., 648 ; 15 N. Y. State Rep., 517, and must be regarded as entirely settled.

We see no distinction in principle between the cases, and we hold that this court has no power to review the affirmance of an order denying a motion for a new trial on the judge’s minutes in cases of this description, even though an appeal from the order of affirmance by the general term and an intention to review such order' is contained and stated in the notice of appeal from the judgment.

In this case nothing but certain exceptions taken in the course of the trial can be reviewed. Of such exceptions, one at least appears to us to be fatal to the judgment herein. The defendant, called a witness and, under the objection and exception of the . plaintiffs, he proved by him that prior to the transaction with the * plaintiffs defendant had applied to the witness to purchase Peck’s, interest in the partnership. The defendant also proved by his own evidence, under like objection and exception, that he made such application at Peck’s request. The decisions sustaining the admissibility of these two pieces of evidence, going to prove one fact, are now claimed to have been correct upon the ground that if it were true that defendant had, at Peck’s request, before the transaction with the plaintiffs, seen several other parties and solicited them to purchase Peck’s interest in the business, it was a circumstance tending strongly to corroborate the evidence of defendant that in the sale of that interest to the plaintiffs he was; acting as Peck’s agent; and also upon the ground that it contradicted Peck’s denial that the defendant was his agent. As to the latter ground the claim is not well founded. Peck denied that defendant was his agent in the transaction in litigation. This evidence of the defendant did not contradict that of Peck on that question, unless it is to be said that the two things are incom ■ patible, and that if defendant acted as Peck’s agent in the other transactions he necessarily acted as his agent in the transaction under discussion. This, of course, cannot be contended. It

If the evidence of the witness Ogden, that the defendant had applied to him to purchase the Peck interest, be taken alone, it may be said to be immaterial, for it does not show that the application was made in behalf of Peck, nor could such fact be inferred therefrom other than as a mere guess, not based upon any evidence. This evidence can only become material when it is taken in connection with that of the defendant, in which he says that in making the application to Ogden and the others, he did it at Peck’s request. From proof of an agency to sell Peck’s interest in the property at a former time and with respect to other parties, is the inference a legitimate or proper one that defendant acted as agent for Peck in the transactions in question, when such agency is denied ? Is it one so natural that it would be proper to leave it to a jury to draw it or not as they should think fit, or is it so purely speculative, so entirely a matter of guess work, that it would be improper to permit the jury to draw the inference from the facts stated?

To me it seems the latter. If the agency in the transaction in question would not by this evidence be sufficiently proved, can it be said that it does legitimately corroborate other evidence of agency, sufficient in itself, if believed, to prove the fact ? I should still think not. I cannot see in the latter case that it is still anything but speculation pure and simple. He acted as agent for Peck upon some past occasion, and therefore we are asked to say that the inference is legitimate that he acted as his agent in the present transaction. Unless it can be said that this evidence naturally tends in some appreciable degree to prove the fact of the defendant’s acting for Peck in the particular transaction in litigation, I cannot see that it is admissible at all. If it does not thus naturally tend to prove such fact, of course it does not tend to corroborate the evidence of defendant upon that subject. Yet it is entirely credible that defendant may have acted as such agent in the former applications to other parties, and still may not have so acted in this particular case. The two positions are not in the slightest degree inconsistent, and there is no intrinsic improbability of the truth of both.

Assuming that on former occasions the defendant had been Peck’s agent, still any one of an almost infinite variety of circumstances may have occurred to change the views of Peck in regard to the defendant, and hence to cause him to withdraw the authority theretofore given defendant to negotiate a sale of Peck’s interest. It must be obvious that it can be nothing more than a

Reduced to its real merits, the proposition is solely founded upon a possibility, or in other words, upon a mere guess or speculation, too shadowy entirely to support the inferences of defendant's agency in this particular transaction. It is also evidence upon a fact not at issue in the case, for whether the defendant acted as agent for Peck once or twenty times before this would be wholly beside the issue, unless this inference which the defend-. ant seeks to draw is a natural and usual one. It rests with the defendant to show that it is, as otherwise the evidence is as I have said, outside the issue. I do not think that the defendant sustains this burden, and, therefore, the evidence is inadmissible. I think such of the authorities as touch upon the general subject of the admissibility of this class of evidence are to the effect that in such a case as this this kind of evidence is incompetent. In Murray v. Smith, 1 Duer, 412 , the question was whether a certain purchase of real estate had been made by plaintiff on joint account of himself and defendant, and whether the deed from plaintiff to defendant was made on defendant’s promise to pay one-half of the mortgage on the premises as part consideration therefor. Evidence was given that the plaintiff had purchased other land in his name, but on joint account of himself and defendant The evidence was held to have been erroneously admitted.

It is true the case is somewhat different from the one at bar, but I think the same principle applies. The evidence was claimed -to be proper on the ground that it tended to corroborate the evidence for the plaintiff, for the reason that it would be more natural to infer the main fact in issue in favor of the plaintiff, because of proof that in a prior transaction such actually was the fact, thus showing that the transaction in question was not one entirely between strangers and persons who, up to that time, never-had business transactions of such a nature together. But the court held the evidence too speculative and uncertain to base any legal inference upon it, or to permit a jury to draw any inference of fact therefrom.

In Hollingham v. Head, 4 C. B., N. S., 388-93, Eng. Com. L., the plaintiff sued defendant for the price of a quantity of artificial manure, and the defense was that it was purchased upon condition that it was not to be paid for unless it proved equal to Peruvian guano. The defendant desired to prove in his defense that the plaintiff had made other contracts to sell precisely this same kind of manure, upon the condition that it was not to be paid for unless it was equal to the Peruvian. ■ The evidence, under objection, was rejected, and the court, upon a review of the case, held

The case at bar was hotly contested upon this single question of agency, as to whether in what defendant did he acted as plaintiff’s or Peck’s agent It seems to us exceedingly probable that, the evidence in question may have had some considerable weight, with the jury; how much we cannot say. In order to affirm this judgment we should be able to say it had none. Braque v. Lord, 67 N. Y., 495 -499.

Its admission was error, for which the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.

All concur, except Huger, Ch. J., not voting.