Majority
Headnote
Contract—Sale—Modification of contract.It is not disputed that the rails which were finally tendered to the vendee, and then sold for his account and risk, producing a deficiency below the contract price, which deficiency forms the subject of the action, were not the rails which the vendee bought and the vendors sold. By the original written contracts those rails were to be five hundred tons shipped “from the-other side, January, or February, or March, seller’s option.” It is the settled rule that, in a case like the present, the date of the shipment is a material element in the identification of the property. Hill v. Blake, 97 N. Y., 216 ; Tobias v. Lissberger, 105 id., 404 ; 8 N. Y. State Rep., 43. It was not five hundred tons of rails generally that were the subject of the contract, but a specific quantity shipped from the other side during the three named, months, and unless such were tendered, the contract was not performed. The offer of other rails would impose no obligation upon the purchaser. It is clear, therefore, that the tender finally made was not of the property specified in the contract, and left no liability upon the vendee resulting from his refusal to accept, unless there is something else about the case.
There is something else about the case upon which the vendors rely as entitling them to a recovery; and that is an alleged paroi modification of the original contract which made the final tender
No such order or return was tendered in April, and the facts leave it doubtful whether the sellers in the month of April were in possession of or could have tendered either. But assuming that they could have made delivery in the mode prescribed by the contract, and that they were excused from the formal tender of the papers by the act of Fey, it is yet apparent that one of two things followed dependent upon the construction of the paroi agreement. That is somewhat ambiguous in its terms, but it could have had only one of two meanings. , It must be construed as an agreement, either that the plaintiffs, having set apart and tendered the contract rails which had arrived and payment for which was due, would “ carry them ” for the account and at the risk of Fey for an indefinite but reasonable period; or that the sale of the contract rails should be mutually abandoned, and instead thereof the sellers should be permitted to deliver and the buyer would, accept other and different rails from those specified in the written contract. I do not see how, upon either construction, the plaintiffs could recover.
The other view of the April conversation dispenses with such tender of contract rails and- permits the carrying and offer of any old rails shipped from the other. side irrespective of the date of shipment. But that is a new contract and not a modification of the old one. " It substitutes for the "sale of the contract iron a new. sale of different iron which never before had been the subject of a contract. It .was not' merely a change-of the - date of delivery and the time of payment,- but ‘of the very subject-matter of the contract, of the thing sold on the one hand-and purchased on the other. It 'touched and altered the consideration an'd substance of the agreement' instead of merely modifying the ternis and .manner of performance." The old contract was.not tobe performed at all. The property which-it- stipulated about .was not to-be sold by one party or bought by the other,, but instead thereof and in' place of "the iron -to" which it related1 a .new contract for the sale and purchase of different .iron entirely.’. That new contract, washy paroi andivoid-under the Statute- of Frauds arid so 'neither view of'the new'agreement will enable'the plaintiffs to recover. The old -contract was-rescinded j -the new .one remained -wholly' executory on both sides. : /' r - : - -
We.discover no ground upon which the judgment..can .be. deemed erroneous, audit should be 'affirmed, .with,costs, f. ■
All concur.