In re the Probate of the Will of White

The questions which this record .brings more prominently before us are, whether the decedent’s mind was so affected, in relation to his testamentary dispositions, by undue influences ■exerted on the part of his wife and daughter, or by an insane delusion respecting his son, as to render his will invalid. By its terms he gave a legacy of $150 to his only son by a former wife, and of the residué he gave one-half to his widow for her life, and the other half to his only daughter by the second wife, during the life of his widow. After his widow’s death he gave all of the residuary estate to his daughter. The estate amounted to only about $7,000.

The son objected to the admission to probate of the will, on the grounds stated of fraud and undue influence, and of the mental incapacity in the testator to make a will. The contestant was unsuccessful before the surrogate and the general term, and he has appealed to this court from their decisions. As to the first ground of objection to the probate, I am unable to find in the record any facts warranting the inference that either wife or daughter unduly influenced the testamentary disposition. I can find no proof of the interference by or influence of either. As I read the evidence, the strength of will and the determined character of the decedent were such, up to his last days, as to render him not only very self dependent in matters of opinion and judgment, but even arbitrary. Besides these characteristics, the schemes of the several wills, which were made at various times between June, 1884, and the one last made and now before us, tend, when examined, to negative the idea of any undue influence on the part of the wife; .and, as to the daughter, there is no proof at all of her influencing her father’s will. The present will is on the same plan as one

But the case of the appellant really turns upon his proposition that, at the time this will was made, the decedent was laboring under an insane delusion that his son was engaged in a conspiracy to injure and defraud him, and that the will was the offspring of such a delusion, and, therefore, was invalid. The delusion alleged is that his son, being a member of the masonic order, had leagued with other masons to cheat him out of his land. There is no doubt but that the decedent was bitterly opposed to the order of masons, and habitually expressed himself in the strongest terms in condemnation of their honesty and practices. At the time of his death, in 1886, the testator was about eighty-eight years of age, and was a farmer by occupation. Up to the time of his death he retained, to an extraordinary degree, both vigor of mind and body, and continued to manage his own affairs. The testimony of those who lived in his neighborhood, and who had dealings with him, exhibits him as in possession of the reasoning and reflective faculties; but positive and independent in his opinions and unyielding in them when opposed. These features in his character are conceded, in fact, by the appellant’s counsel, and, also, that he possessed in a high degree estimable personal qualities, and that his domestic and social life caused him to be loved and respected. But the son founds his claim a men

This idea of the leaguing together of his son and others became a settled conviction of his mind, and undoubtedly influenced his feelings towards his son. From his youth the deceased had entertained this bitter dislike of the masonic order, and it most materially affected his feelings towards its members. When he discovered that his son was a mason, while these disputes were pending, it aroused all his prejudices and so embittered his nature as to cause him to involve him in his common dislike and distrust. It may have made him believe in the possibility of his son’s being capable of unfair conduct in the matters in dispute. From the time of their occurrence, in August, 1884, to the year of his death, the breach in the relations of father and son was kept open as the result of the farmer’s feelings.

But, conceding what the appellant alleges, that the deceased believed what he said of his son’s purpose to cheat him, through the aid of brother masons, and that a mason was incapable of honest conduct, I do not think that entertaining such a belief is conclusive evidence of an unsound mind. There is no pretense that in any other respects the deceased was lacking in mental capacity, either before these disputes occurred in 1884, or up to-the time of his death in 1886. As it was said by Judge Denio in the case of Seamen’s Friend Society v. Hopper, 33 N. Y., 624 , “ on questions of testamentary capacity courts should be careful not to confound perverse opinions and unreasonable prejudices with mental alienation. These qualities of mind may exist in a high degree and yet, as far as regards the view which the law takes of the case, -the subject may be sane and competent to perform a legal act and be held responsible for crime.” Wo have here a case where the possession of general vigor and intellectual capacity is conceded ; but it is insisted that in respect to his son, as the natural object of testamentary bounty, the deceased was under such an insane delusion that he could not act sensibly in disposing of his property after his death. Is that quite true, taken with reference to what had been done in previous wills,

As to the evidence relating to the various testamentary dispositions of his property, the testator is not shown to have made any such appreciable difference in the distribution of his final will from that in wills made previous to the occurrence of the quarrels, as to warrant us in supposing that his mind had become affected. As to the testator’s belief that there was collusion between neighbors, surveyor and his son to defraud him, we cannot say that there was absolutely no basis for any such reasoning by testator. There were the facts that the testator and his neighbors disputed •on questions of boundary lines and fences; that his son disagreed with his views of his rights in the matters ; and that one of the neighbors, his son and the surveyor recommended by his son, were masons. Can we say that because he could not believe anything good of the masonic fraternity, and because he supposed them bound to stand by each other as against an outsider, that he was influenced by an insane delusion ? Delusion is insanity where one persistently believes supposed facts which have no real existence except in his perverted imagination, and against all evidence and probability, and conducts himself, however logically, upon the assumption of their existence. That was so held in Seamen's Society v. Hopper, supra. But, if there are facts, however insufficient they may in reality be, from which a prejudiced or a narrow oT a bigoted mind might derive a particular idea or belief, it cannot be said that the mind is diseased in that respect. The belief may be illogical, or preposterous, but it is not, therefore, evidence of insanity in the person. Persons do not always reason logically or correctly from facts, and that may be because of their prejudice, or of the perversity or peculiar construction of their minds. Wills, however, do not depend for their validity upon the testator’s ability to reason logically, or upon his freedom from preju dice. Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y., 190 .

If we should hold that this will was invalid because the views -entertained by testator respecting his son’s affiliation with freemasonry, and its influence upon him, were exaggerated and mistaken, and the product of an unsound mental condition, we might establish a dangerous precedent for the many cases which must frequently arise, where the testator can be easily shown to have been headstrong and unreasonable in his prejudices and dislikes towards those who are the natural objects of his testamentary bounty.

The decedent here seems to have been unreasonable in his ■opinions concerning the motives and conduct of free masons; but I cannot perceive, conceding all the appellant presents in the way •of facts, that the particular scheme of distribution of this estate must be solely attributed to the domination of these opinions. It was natural that, being possessed of but a small property, the testator should prefer to leave it to the wife and daughter rather than to the son, who was a man of mature years and a practicing lawyer, and presumably better able to support himself than would

The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

All concur.