Majority
Headnote
1. Husband and wife — Settlement between cannot be attacked by ONE NOT A CREDITOR.Plaintiff was not a creditor of Eliphalet Manwarring ; he can derive no aid from the doctrine laid down in Coleman v. Burr, 25 Hun, 240 ; S. C., aff’d 93 N. Y., 17 . It appears in the opinion delivered in that case when before this court that the plaintiff was a judgment creditor of Burr, and that his action was brought to set aside a conveyance made by Burr to his wife, “on the ground that such conveyance was without consideration and was executed with intent to defraud Burr’s creditors.” Whatever may have been the intent on the
It appears in the evidence that Gilbert Manwarring «úd Eliphalet Manwarring, subsequent to the execution of the Lewis mortgage, conveyed the premises, subject to the “ Charles Lewis mortgage of $1,000,” as well as the Pellett mortgage of $3,500, to M. Palmer Newton, and in the conveyance to him is a clause assuming the payment of such mortgages. As between Miles Palmer Newton and the Manwarrings, the land was chargeable with the payment of the Lewis mortgage, and they had the right to compel the payment thereof out of thé land. Marsh v. Pike, 10 Paige, 595. The obligation of the grantee in the deed ennured to the benefit of Lewis, and he was entitled to enforce it, not only against the lands, but against the party thus assuming the payment thereof. Blyer v. Monholland, 2 Sandf. Ch., 478 .
When the plaintiff took his mortgage from Miles Palmer Newton hg was informed by the record of the existence of the Lewis mortgage, and of the fact that the purchase by Miles Palmer Newton was subject to the mortgage given to Lewis, and that the pay-men thereof had been assumed by Miles Palmer Newton; such was the force of the record.
• (2). Even if the _ appellant was only entitled to hold the mortgage as a security for loans and advances of money or property to her husband actually made, she was entitled, as he had voluntarily agreed to pay interest thereon, to hold the same for the amount of the principal and the interest as well. If it were assumed that the plaintiff was in the situation of a creditor challenging the settlement between the appellant and her husband as fraudulent, still, if the debts were valid and the claims honest against the husband, his agreement to pay interest thereon and allowance thereof in the settlement with her would be valid. Spencer v. Ayrault, 10 N. Y., 202 . In delivering the opinion in that case, Edwards, J., said, viz.: “In my judgment it is not absolutely necessary to the bona fides of such'an allowance that the charge should be of such a character that it might be recovered in a suit brought by a creditor against his debtor. Interest is always
It appears quite clearly, from the evidence, as well as the findings of fact made thereon, that the money and property which the husband received from the wife was upon an agreement that the husband should pay for the same to the wife; and according to Jaycox v. Caldwell, 51 N. Y., 395 , “ Tjie agreement is for a good consideration, and imposes an equitable obligation upon the husband.” It was in that case further held, where a preference was made in good faith without an intent to defraud in an assignment for the benefit of creditors, the preference is valid, and does not vitiate the assignment.
We have recently discussed a kindred question in Ellis v. Myers, 28 N. Y. State Rep., 123, and we there cited the case of Jewett v. Noteware, 17 Weekly Digest, 438, where an indebtedness that had existed eighteen years, was secured by a mortgage, together with interest on it, and the court held in that case that “that as the debt was bona fide, the judgment creditor could not attack the mortgage.”
(3) . We think there is no force in the suggestion made by the respondent in respect to supposed waste committed by the husband of the appellant upon the premises in question; first, there is nothing in the pleadings which charges her with committing any waste; and, secondly, there is no finding that she has committed waste; and, third, there is nothing in the evidence which warrants the inference that she is chargeable with having caused any injury to the real estate covered by the Lewis mortgage after she became the owner thereof.
(4) . The plaintiff had not acquired the legal title to the premises at the time the appellant became the owner of the Lewis mortgage, and he has not, either by his pleadings or by evidence furnished upon the hearing, established facts and circumstances which would charge her with an intentional impairment of the value of the premises upon which the plaintiff’s security rests.
Our attention is called to Yates v. Joyce, 11 Johns., 136 ; that was “ an action on the case” for fraudulently removing the property of a judgment debtor and converting it “with intent to defeat the judgment.” We find nothing in that case which aids the respondent.
(5) . The learned counsel for the respondent insists that the mortgagor “ cannot pay the mortgage and keep it alive for the purpose of securing another debt in lieu of the extinguished liability ;” we see nothing in that position which aids the respondent when applied to the facts before us. It is not found as a fact that Eliphalet Manwarring paid Lewis, the executor, the mortgage; indeed, such fact was not proven; and it is found by the trial
In Spencer v. Ayrault, 10 N. Y., 204 , it was said: “ It is a well settled rule that when a greater and a less estate meet in the same person, equity will preserve them distinct, provided there is an express or implied intent to do so.”
Judgment reversed on the exceptions and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event
Martin and Merwin, JJ., concur.