Majority
Headnote
•1. Taxes — Villages—Powers op trustees op Little Falls as to assessments.The property of the relator, that was within the village of Little Falls, was partly in the town of Little Falls, and partly in the town of Danube. The assessment against relator in 1885, in the town of Little Falls was $40,000, and in the town of Danube was $60,000. The assessment roll in Little Falls for that year also stated that the valuation of that portion of the property that was in school district Uo. 1, was $15,000. The roll for Danube, for that year, was not in evidence, but it was shown by one of the assessors that the valuation of that portion within school
These school district valuations were apparently made in pursuance of chapter 694 of the Laws of 1867, as amended in 1884, ■entitled “An act in relation to the valuation of the property of railroad companies in school districts, for the purpose of taxation.” Under this act, it was the duty of town assessors, “within fifteen days after the completion of their annual assessment-list, to apportion the valuation of the property of each railroad company as appears on such assessment list among the several school districts in their town, in which any portion of said property is situated, giving to each of said districts their proper portion according to the proportion that the value of said property in each of such districts bears to the value of the whole thereof in said town.” This apportionment was to be in writing, and signed by the assessors, and filed with the town clerk, and “ the amount so apportioned to each district shall be the valuation of the property of each of said companies, on which all taxes against said companies in and for said districts shall be levied and assessed, until the next annual assessment and apportionment.” If the assessors neglected to make this apportionment, then the supervisor must do it upon request of the trustees of the school district.
Very clearly'this act had reference only to school district taxation. The apportionment was not a part of the assesment-roll. The defendants were not bound by any action of the town assessors on this subject. They were only required to adopt, as far as practicable, the valuation properly appearing upon the assessment-roll. Besides under the charter, § 39, as aménded in 1873, they were expressly given the power to “reduce or add to the valuation.” This power was inserted in 1873, and although inartificially expressed, is broad enough to cover a case like the presen!:.
It seems, therefore, reasonably clear that the defendants were not bound to adopt the apportionment made by the town assessors but had power to make the assessment in question upon valuation of their own. That being so, it is incumbent on the relator to show it to be excessive.
In People ex rel. Westchester F. Ins. Co. v. Davenport, 91 N. Y., 574 , it is said that a party assailing an assessment as excessive must make it appear conclusively that the method by which the assessors arrived at the result complained of was incorrect, and that the assessment does not represent the fair value of the property assessed.
In the present case, there is no satisfactory evidence as to the real value of the relator’s property. The main elements on the question of value do not appear. The contest was not over that subject. Some of the defendants, called by the relator as witnesses, testified that the valuation as fixed by them was a full and fair valuation as compared with other property, while others said
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the relator failed to furnish a sufficient basis for relief as to the amount of the assessment.
But it is said that the assessment was void because not verified by the trustees in the form prescribed for town assessors. Concededly there was no such verification. The statute, however, under which the trustees acted, did not require it. It did provide (Sec. 41), that upon completion of the roll it should “be adopted by a resolution of the trustees,, and shall be certified by the president and deposited in the office of the clerk of the village.” No other verification was required.
It is further claimed that the assessment is erroneous by reason of misstatements as to quantity of land. The assessment is for 45 57-100 acres, while in fact there is only about twenty. This is not specified in the petition as one of the grounds of illegality. It was evidently a mistake» in copying from the town roll. The valuation was not by acre. The quantity named was immaterial so far as the rights of any of the parties are concerned. The error on this subject is not a sufficient basis for relief.
It follows that the order reducing the assessment should be reversed and the prayer of the petitioner denied. •
Order entered July 3, 1889, reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and prayer of petitioner denied with costs against the petitioner as upon the trial of an issue of fact in the supreme court.
Appeal from order entered November 8, 1889, dismissed, without costs.
Section 39 of the charter of the village of Little Falls was amended by chap. 158 of the Laws of 1873; and it confers upon the trustees, as a board of assessment, powers with respect to assessments of property in the village liable to taxation. By the section it is made the duty of the trustees as a “ board of assessment,” to “ cause to be copied from the last assessment-roll of the several towns, parts of which comprise the territory of said village, the names and valuations of all persons and corporations taxable within the village, as made by the town assessors.”
(2). It is made the duty of the board after such copy has been made to deposit it with the clerk of the board, or one of the trustees, subject to inspection by any person interested,
It is quite apparent from the language just quoted that the trustees are not required to adopt the exact state of facts found xipon the assessment rolls of the towns of Danube, Manheim and Little Falls, so far as they relate to the property within the corporate limits of the village; it is impossible to do so because in the assessment found in the three towns against either of the railroads passing through the village, property lying beyond the corporate limits of the village is embraced; hence it becomes the duty of the trustees to exercise a discretion conferred upon them by the words “ as far as practicable,” found in the section. Such discretion seems to have been exercised by the board of assessment in each of the cases brought in review in respect to the valuation of the relator’s property in the years 1886 and 1887. Such boai’d had jurisdiction of the subject matter, and was called upon to exercise the power conferred upon the board in respect to the property of the relator. It is not apparent that the board was given power to increase the valuation of the relator’s property, or of any other taxpayer’s property beyond the limits mentioned in the section. The first general limitation found in the section is the sum at which the property has been assessed by the several town officers. The second limitation or restriction is to property that has an “ increased value by reason of improvements ; ” the power to reduce seems to be limited to such property as has a “diminished value by l’eason of fire or damages by flood." A fui’ther qualified power has been given to the trustees as a board
In reaching such a valuation they had the right to make an actual inspection of the property of the relator; to exercise their judgment in respect to its value, and to form a conclusion upon all the data accessible to them as to the proper amount which it should be assessed. Presumptively their action was ih accordance with the facts and circumstances surrounding the property; indeed such seems to be very apparent from some of the evidence found in the appeal book. In seeking to overturn such an assessment thus made by the trustees, it was within the power of the relator to furnish clear, persuasive and satisfactory evidence that the action of the board of assessors was improper and unjust. Some evidence was given tending to such a conclusion. No evidence, however, was given of “ the cost of creating ” of the relator’s property through the corporate limits of the village. Such evidence was held proper in People ex rel. Albany & G. B. Co. v. Weaver, 34 Hun, 321 . Nor was any evidence given “of the earning capacity of the railroadsuch evidence was held to be proper in the People ex rel. Walkill Valley Railway Co. v. Keator, 36 Hun, 592 . The relator seems to have relied largely upon the circumstance that two or three pieces of property singled out from a list of over 1,400 found upon the assessment roll were assessed at sums less than their value, as expressed by witnesses produced upon the hearing. That evidence, under the role which has been adopted in regard to the proceedings under chapter 369 of the Laws of 1880, is not sufficient to overturn the judgment of the trustees acting as a board of assessment.
In People v. Carter, 109 N. Y., 582 ; 16 N. Y. State Rep., 367, Andrews, J., said: “The object of the statute was to afford a remedy to a party injured by unequal valuations, not to enable him, on mere proof of a mistake or misjudgment of the assessors, as to the relative valuation of his property and that of another, to have his assessment reduced, although his own property was not over-valued, and it does not appear, taking into view the aggregate assessment and valuation of the taxable property on the roll, that he will be compelled to pay more than his just share of the tax.” That case was approved in People ex rel. Eckerson v. Christie, 115 N.Y., 162 ; 23 N.Y. State Rep., 975. In the latter case it was assumed “ That the properties selected out from the roll by mutual agreement, and used without objection as the basis of comparison, did fairly represent the proportionate rate of assessment of the property of the town, and so serve as a correct basis for comparison.”
Martin, J., concurs.