Majority
Headnote
1. Taxes — Redemption by mortgagee — Laws 1880, chap. 91, does not REPEAL PROVISIONS OP GENERAL STATUTES.This is an appeal from an order directing that a peremptory writ of mandajnus issue to the appellant, as treasurer of Oneida county, commanding him forthwith to receive the money tendered him by the relator, as assignee of a mortgage, which was a lien upon certain premises situated in the town of Florence, in that county, which had been sold for the taxes levied thereon for the year 1886, and to deliver to the relator a receipt or certificate for such payment, certifying that the same was in full redemption of the premises, and the lien of said taxes, and from the sale thereunder.
The premises sold consisted of about twenty-two acres of land. The state and county taxes levied thereon for the year 1886 were returned unpaid. By virtue of the provisions of chap. 91¡ Laws 1880, as amended by chap. 8, Laws 1881, the treasurer of Oneida
On February 8, 1889, Woodruff, as assignee of such mortgage, •caused to be served upon the appellant a notice similar to that re-squired to be served on the comptroller by § 82 of chapl 427, Laws 1855, and tendered the appellant the sum of twenty dollars, which was more than the sum for which said premises were sold with twelve per cent, interest and the treasurer’s fee for the deed given by him added, and demanded a certificate of such payment and redemption. The appellant refused to receive the money so tendered, or to give such certificate. On the 23d day of May, 1889, .and after the transfer of said mortgage to the relator, he served upon the appellant a similar notice, made a similar tender and -demand, and the appellant again refused to receive the money tendered or to give the certificate demanded.
The motion for mandamus was opposed by the appellant for the reason, as he states in his brief, “ that defendant had no right to receive the moneys tendered him by the assignees of ■such mortgage, or to cancel said certificate.” Therefore, the ■ question presented is, whether the county treasurer had power .and could have rightfully received the money tendered, and delivered to the relator a receipt or certificate showing that said money was paid in redemption of the premises from such sale. A solution of this question is dependent upon the general ¡statutes in relation to the sale of lands for unpaid taxes, unless those statutes have been repealed or modified by a subsequent one relating to the collection of taxes in the county of Oneida. To determine this question, it becomes necessary to examine the general statutes so far as they relate to the rights of a mortgagee by virtue of his lien upon real estate which has been sold for unpaid taxes, his right as such to redeem, and the method ■of effecting such redemption, and also to examine the special act relating to the collection of taxes in the county of Oneida.
Chapter 427, Laws 1855, as amended by subsequent acts, which constitutes the general law of the state in relation to the ■collection of taxes on land of non-residents and in relation to the sale of such lands for unpaid taxes, provides among other things, as follows: “No sale of real estate hereafter made for the non-payment of any tax or assessment shall destroy, or in any manner affect the lien of any mortgage thereon, duly recorded or registered at the time of such sale, except as herein.after provided.” Sec. 76. “It shall be the duty of the purchaser at such sale to give to the mortgagee a written notice of
The statute of 1855 was further amended by chap. 280, Laws 1870, by providing as follows: “A mortgagee whose mortgage is ■duly recorded, or the assignee of any mortgage whose assignment
This examination of the general statutes, which were in force when the act for the collection of taxes in Oneida county was passed, discloses that under those statutes, as they then existed and still exist, a mortgagee’s lien upon land sold for unpaid taxes was not only preserved, but also that a distinct and independent system for the redemption of such lands by the mortgagee was thereby established. Indeed, it seems to be'admitted by all, that if the sale in question had been made by the comptroller,under theprovisions of the statute of 1855, the relator’s right of redemption would not have been barred when the notices and tenders made by the relator and his assignor were served and made. But the appellant claims that, the sale in this case was made under a special statute relating to the collection of taxes in Oneida county, and hence, that the foregoing provisions of the general law have no application, and the relator’s right to redeem was barred by the limitation of one year contained in the Oneida act. That the sale in question was made in pursuance of such special act is admitted, but that the statute of 1855 is not applicable to the relator’s right to redeem is. denied.
The special act referred to, Laws 1880, chap. 91, as amended by
“ When any lot or piece of land sold for taxes by the treasurer shall, after the expiration of six months from the last day of the annual sale therefor, be in the actual occupation of any person as a residence, the purchaser, or the person claiming under him, shall serve a written or printed notice on such occupant, or by leaving such notice at the dwelling thereof with some person of suitable age, or by affixing such notice upon the outer door of such dwelling, or if such land shall not be occupied as aforesaid, such notice shall be published in one of the newspapers published in the city of Eome, or the city of Utica, once each week for three weeks, stating in substance the sale of such lands, the person to whom made, and the amount for which the same was sold, and stating the time when the purchaser thereof will be entitled to receive a deed, and stating also that unless the said amount and the interest thereon is paid to the county treasurer within one year from the last day of such annual sale, the same will become absolute, and the owner or other persons interested in said lands will be forever barred from all right or title thereto, and no other notice, either by the county treasurer, or by the holder of the certificate of any sale, or by any other person, shall be necessary or required. In case any of the lands so sold shall be redeemed therefrom subsequent to service of notice, the expenses of advertising and service of the notice herein provided, and any taxes upon lands so sold which may be assessed upon and paid by the purchasers, or assignees of such purchasers, between the time of the sale and redemption thereof, shall, with the interest thereon at the rate provided by this act, be added to the amount otherwise required to be paid for such redemption. This section shall apply to the sales made by the treasurer of said county in the year eighteen hundred and eighty.” Section 15, chap. 91, Laws 1880, as amended by chap. 8, Laws 1881.
This act contains no express provision in relation to mortgage liens on land sold for taxes under it, nor is there any express provision in relation to the mode of procedure to be pursued to
Section 14 of said act is as follows: “ All acts and parts of acts-inconsistent or in conflict with this act, so far as the same do conflict, and relating to the county of Oneida, are hereby repealed.”
The first inquiry presented arises as to the effect of the repealing act contained in the special statute relating to the collection of taxes in Oneida county. Did it effect a repeal of the provisions of the general statutes in relation to mortgage liens and redemption by the holders of mortgages on the land sold for taxes, so far as it was applicable to that county? We think not. It will be observed that the repeal provided for was limited to such acts or parts of acts as were inconsistent or in conflict with the special act relating to Oneida county, and that such acts and parts of acts were repealed only so far as they were in actual conflict with it. We think that the repealing act quoted indicates an intention upon the part of the legislature not to repeal, but to ¿preserve, as applicable to Oneida county, all acts or parts of acts relating to the sale of lands for the collection of taxes that were not actually inconsistent with the provisions of such special act or in real conflict with it. The general law contained definite and full provisions in relation to mortgage liens on lands sold for taxes, and as to the right and manner of redemption by a mortgagee or assignee of a mortgage thereon. The special act contained no provision on the subject, except as expressed in § 12. There was, therefore, no inconsistency or conflict between the provisions of the general law on that subject apd the special act, and the special act did not effect their repeal as to Oneida county.
Moreover, the provisions of § 12 of the special act seem to indicate quite clearly that the legislature did not intend to repeal these provisions of the general law, as that section seems to recognize the provisions contained in the general statutes in relation to the “ effect of any such sale of lands for taxes upon a lien of any mortgage thereon, the right of a mortgagee to redeem, the consequences of neglect to do so after notice, and the-lien of the mortgagee for the amount paid on such redemption,” as unrepealed and a part of this act.
If correct in our conclusion as to the effect of that statute, it follows not only that the period for redemption by the relator was not barred by the expiration of one year, but also, that the appellant-had the power and could have rightfully received the money tendered by the relator of his assignor and have delivered to him a receipt or certificate showing that such money was paid in redemption from the sale of such premises.
That a notice was given to the treasurer, as provided for by § 82, chap. 427, Laws 1855, by the assignee of the mortgage in question within the time therein limited, and that the whole amount of the purchase money, interest and expenses was tendered to him is not denied. It is said, however, that the tender was not for the use of the purchasers, as required by § 8 of the special act, and, therefore, insufficient. It was not in'that language. It was tendered “ for and in full redemption of said premises from sale for delinquent taxes, in August, 1887, to Davis & Johnson,” which, we think, was sufficient.
Hor do we think that it was invalid because a receipt or certificate therefor, in redemption of said premises from the sale for unpaid taxes, was demanded. There is nothing to show that the tender was on condition that a receipt or certificate should bo given. The tender was rejected by the appellant upon the sole ground that he had no right or power to receive such money and give such certificate, and not upon the ground that such certificate was demanded. If the appellant had received the sum tendered, we think it would have effected a redemption of the premises, and it would 'then have been proper for him to have given a certificate as provided by § 71 of the Laws of 1855. These considerations lead us to the conclusion that the order appealed from was proper and should be affirmed.
Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.
Hardin, P. J., and Merwin, J., concur.