Appeal from judgment ordered for plaintiffs on a trial by the court without a jury.
Action upon an alleged recognizance.
On the 28th day of October, 1889, one Frank Cava was duly committed to the custody of the sheriff of Dutchess county to await the action of the grand jury upon a charge of assault in the second degree. On the 26th day of November, 1889, the said Frank Cava was admitted to bail by Judge Guernsey, county judge of said county, upon an undertaking signed by the said Cava and Frederick Gilman, the defendant and appellant herein.
A printed form of undertaking was used and the blank space for designating the crime for which the said Cava was held to answer was not filled in.
Cava was released from the Dutchess county jail by the sheriff, bjr virtue of the #said undertaking. An indictment against the said Frank Cava for ‘ assault in the second degree,’ was found, presented and filed by the grand jury on the 4th day of December, 1889.- The clerk of the court thereupon called the said Frank Cava, in open court, and upon his failure to appear an order was entered upon the minutes of the court, by direction of the presiding justice, declaring his undertaking forfeited and directing the district attorney to prosecute the same. The action was tried before Mr. Justice Barnard, without a jury, on the 21st day of May, 1890, and judgment ordered for plaintiffs.
Herman Frank, for app’lt; Martin Heermance, for resp’ts.
We think the bail bond in question in this action is void, as it does not specify any charge which the principal is to answer. The authorities are uniform upon this subject. Although it is not necessary to state the charge with great particularity, it must indicate the offense with which the principal is charged and which the bail undertakes he will appear and' answer. People v. Rundle, 6 Hill, 506 ; People v. Blankman, 17 Wend., 252 ; People v. Graham, 1 Parker, 141.
No charge having been stated in the bond, we think it was error to allow the defect to be supplied by further proof. Such testimony may be given to explain contracts, but not to enforce the undertaking of -the surety after its alleged breach, and the court is simply called upon to determine what, if any, liability exists. As the surety did not undertake that his principal would appear to answer any charge, there has been no breach. Thé judgment must, therefore, be reversed.
Dykman, J., concurs; Barnard, P. J., not sitting.