McLaughlin v. Armfield — 34 N.Y. St. Rep. 886

Majority

p. 886

Catharine McLaughlin, Resp’t, v. William W. Armfield, App’lt.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,

Filed December 8, 1890.)

Headnote

1. Negligence—Owner of factory building—Liability for absence of fire escapes—Laws 1888, chap. 583, tit. 14, § 16; Laws 1887, chap. 462, § 4.

Where the owner of a building used as a factory has collected rents therefor for five years he cannot evade responsibility for injuries caused by the absence of fire escapes by alleging he had no personal knowledge that they had not been erected as required by law.

2. Same.

The initial duty of erecting fire escapes rests on the owner of the building and he should bring the subject before the commissioner and seek his direction.

Appeal from judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered on verdict, and from order denying motion for a new trial.

Plaintiff was employed in a factory building four stories high, owned by defendant. A fire broke out which spread rapidly, shutting off the stairway, and there being no fire escapes, plaintiff leaped from the third-story window to an adjoining roof and was injured.

Defendant resided at Penn Yan and had leased the ground to one Wooster, who was to erect a building thereon, and defendant claimed to be ignorant of the character of the building or the use to which it was to be put.

J. H.V. Arnold, for app’lt; Andrew L. Gardiner and Frederic A. Ward, for resp’fc

The appellant for five years before the accident had owned and collected rent from the defective building. If, under those circumstances, he can avoid responsibility by alleging he had no personal knowledge that the fire escapes were not erected as required by law, the statute would be a snare and not a safeguard.

The appellant argues that as the statute does not in express terms declare that fire escapes shall be erected by the owner, the duty cannot be placed upon him by a judicial construction of the law.

The law enacts that any building occupied or built to be occupied as a manufactory shall be provided with such fire escapes as shall be directed by the commissioner. We think the initial duty rests upon the owner, that he should bring the subject before the commissioner and seek his direction.

The statute is intended to protect human life; its intentions are easily discovered and no reason is perceived why the court should strain after so strict a construction of its language as to deprive it of all useful operation.

The appellant argues that had plaintiff not given way to fright and exercised a sound discretion as to the method of escape adopted, she might have found a safe egress by another window.

All those considerations were properly submitted to the jury.

p. 887

Their finding was adverse to defendant and was sustained by the testimony.

It follows that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Barnard, P. J., and Dykman, J., concur.