Gilpin v. Daly

This action is brought by the plaintiff, as'assignee of the Glamorgan Iron Company, an incorporation organized and having its place of business in the state of Pennsylvania,, to recover money alleged to have been embezzled by one Charles-B. Wigton, the treasurer of the company, and lost by him at the-gambling houses or rooms of the defendants at play. The defendant, in his answer, denied each and every allegation of the complaint and set up, as affirmative defenses, that no equitable relief was necessary to the plaintiff, and that the action was not commenced and is not carried on for the benefit of the Glamorgan Iron Co., or for the plaintiff as its assignee, but for the benefit of Charles B. Wigton and parties who have espoused his cause, who became and are interested in him to screen him from the consequences of various crimes, forgeries or the like, under some agreement or compromise with the persons who have suffered from these crimes, and so avert from him, criminal punishment. The defendant, Daly, made a motion for a commission to' take the testimony of various persons resident in the state of Pennsylvania, which motion was granted. Thereupon, direct interrogatories were proposed,.

It is urged that the action of the justice in disallowing the interrogatories is in conflict with the order of the justice allowing the commission. This objection is not well taken. There are certain subjects upon which these witnesses may be interrogated, and there are certain interrogatories which have been allowed. The mere fact of allowing a commission to issue does not authorize the propounding of interrogatories which are clearly immaterial to any possible issue which can arise during the progress of the trial.

Heither is it any objection to the order made that the question as to the relevancy or materiality of the testimony might be reserved until the trial, because, although such is the fact, clearly improper interrogatories should never be allowed to be propounded.

It is urged upon the part of the appellant that as Ohas. B. Wig-ton will be the only witness against the defendants, they have a right to impeach him and to show “ from the whole of his making up and getting up he is not to be believed under oath; that he is vicious in himself, so by nature, and that he is made more vicious by these stockholders ” (referring to the witnesses who are to be examined).

It is clear that if Ohas. B. Wigton is to be impeached as a witness by the defendants, it cannot be by evidence of this character. The only method by which a witness can be impeached is by general testimony as to his character or by direct evidence showing his testimony to be untrue. Proof of the fact that he has been guilty of crimes which ought to have been sufficient to make him an inmate of a state prison cannot be gone into for the purpose of testing the credibility of a witness. It of course would be competent to show in impeachment of Wigton’s testimony a plan or agreement by which his crimes were to be held in terrorem over his head, so that he might be compelled to testify in a certain manner, and that it had been arranged that in case he so testified he should not be punished for his misdeeds. Such a combination would be a conspiracy against the defendant which he undoubtedly would have a right to prove. But the difficulty with the interrogatories which have been propounded is that few of them tend to support any such proposition. They seem mainly to be directed to the establishment of the utter unreliability of Chas. B. Wigton as a witness because of specific offenses committed by him. The interrogatories tending to show such a conspiracy have not been objected to and consequently are allowed.

There is one interrogatory, however, a portion of which does not seem to fall within any of these categories, and which has been excluded, and which we think the defendant had a right to put; and that is the thirteenth interrogatory, in regard to the authority of Charles B. Wigton as treasurer of the company. This

So far as it asked the witness for his knowledge of the subjects embraced within the interrogatory, it was competent The interrogatory ends with the words: “ Speak from your knowledge and information.” So far as it called for information, it was clearly incompetent. The same interrogatory was propounded to the other witnesses, and is the seventh interrogatory. To this the same remarks apply.

It is to be observed that most of the interrogatories call upon the witness to speak from his knowledge, information and belief, which is clearly objectionable, and ” renders their exclusion absolutely necessary.

Upon the whole, we see no reason for disturbing the order appealed from, except as to the thirteenth interrogatory, administered to Wigton, and the seventh, administered to the other witness, in case the words" and information” are stricken therefrom, in which, case those interrogatories should be allowed.

The order as so modified should be affirmed, without costs.

Brady, J., concurs.

I concur with this qualification, that if Charles B. Wigton shall be examined as a witness upon the trial, or by commission, the defendant’s counsel will also be at liberty to impeach or discredit him by his own cross-examination. And for that object may interrogate him as to any facts of misconduct on his part which would be attended, wholly or partially, with that result.