People ex rel. Soer v. Crane

currence were stated in the summons, which was served by mail There were no other or formal charges or specifications ever made out or served upon the relator, who claims that no one could be tried before a court martial unless a copy of the charges were served upon the accused in advance of the hearing, and he refers to chap. 382, § 18, of the Laws of 1888, amending the Military Code, as his authority for the claim. That amendment provides that no person shall be brought to trial before a court martial unless a copy of the order convening the court and of the charges and specifications shall be delivered to him a certain time in advance of his arrest, etc.

We think the court before which the relator was summoned to appear was not a court martial within the meaning of the Military Coda That Code was passed in 1883, and is known as chap. 299, of the laws of that year. By that act (Section 100) it was provided that the military courts of the state should be:

1. Courts of inquiry.

2. General courts-martial.

3. Delinquency courts, which are of two kinds:

1. For officers.

2. For enlisted men.

By § 104 it is provided that a commander of a regiment or battalion might at any time appoint a delinquency court for the trial of enlisted men, and that the order for such court, stating the time and place of meeting thereof, should be served * * * at least five days before the time of meeting. This section said nothing about the service of a copy of the charges, as is stated by the learned judge in his opinion in this proceeding at general term.

It was the order for the court which was to be served.

Section 113 provided for the president of a delinquency court, directing a non-commissioned officer * * * to summon delinquents to appear at a time and place to be by him appointed.

Section 114 provided that no person should be brought to trial before a general court-martial unless a copy of the charges were delivered to him in advance.

In 1886 (chap. 412), the Military Code was amended, and the provision in § 104, as to serving the order for a delinquency court upon the delinquent enlisted man was omitted, and the matter of notice was thus left to § 113, which provided, as already stated for the service of a summons.

In 1888 (by chap. 332), the Code was again amended, and § 100 was so amended as to provide for garrison, as well as for general courts-martial. Section 114 was also amended by striking out the word “ general ” before “ court-martial,” thus leaving the section to read: “ No person shall be brought to trial before a court-martial unless a copy of the order convening the court, and of the charges and specifications shall be delivered,” etc. It is claimed that by dropping out the word “ general,” and providing that no one should be brought to trial before a court-martial without service of a copy of the charges, a court of delinquency is included.

I think not. The word “ general ” was omitted from § 114 by the amendment of 1888, and the same act amends § 100 by creating a garrison court-martial, and the amendment of § 114 was necessary in order to make the section apply to the garrison court-martial, then for the first time created, as well as to the general court martial which had existed prior thereto. It did not by the term “ court-martial ” include a delinquency court The Code recognizes a distinction between the different courts, and by § 100 calls them all military courts, but subdivides them into four different kinds, as mentioned in the section. The Code frequently speaks of courts martial and delinquency courts, and evidently it was not supposed that the mention of the former kind of court included the latter. By § 126 it is provided that “ the president of any court-martial or any delinquency court,” etc. Section 127 says: For the purpose of collecting any fines or penalties imposed by any courts-martial or delinquency courts * * *. Section 129 : Any officer or enlisted man fined by a general court-martial or delinquency court. Section 115 and 116 provide for the proceedings after sentence by a court-martial, while § 117 provides for such proceedings after sentence by “any delinquency court”

The phrasing of § 73, referred, to by the relator, is not such as to alter our view of the clear distinction made throughout the Code between courts-martial and delinquency courts. It was used in § 73 with reference to the character and effect to be given to a return of the non-commissioned officer upon the trial of any person returned as delinquent, and the distinction between courts-martial and delinquency courts was there quite unimportant, and regarding the whole section in connection with those preceding it, the fact that a delinquency court is included there in the expression “ court-martial ” may readily be conceded.

We think, therefore, that the question of notice for the enlisted m an to appear before a delinquency court is still provided for by § 113. It is true the section does not provide for any stated length of the notice, but it is clear that it must be reasonable, considering all the facts and circumstances in regard to the individual case.

(2) It is also said that it does not appear that the notice was properly served, in that it is not stated that the postage was prepaid on such notice. The defendant returns that the notice was duly served on the relator and states that it was duly directed to him at 300 Hicks street, Brooklyn, or P. O., Brooklyn, which is his place of residence and usual place of business as appears by the roster.

The sergeant’s report of service is that he duly summoned the delinquents (the relator among them), and that he served him by mail.

By the statute of the United States pre-payment of postage is necessary. A service could not be duly made by mail without its pre-payment. The statute which provides for the service of the summons on the enlisted man by mail does not in so many words provide that the postage shall be prepaid, but it must be assumed that such prepayment is a necessary act to render the service by mail a valid one. I think where the return to the writ states that

the service was duly made, and where the sergeant reports that he has duly summoned the delinquent by serving by mail, we may assume a prepayment of postage, which is necessary in order to render it due service by mail. To a limited extent perhaps it may be said that it is a question of law whether it was duly served, but upon the question of the prepayment of postage the rule is so plain and is so universally known that we may regard if as a statement of fact that postage was' prepaid, where the person asserting the service of a notice by mail says that it was duly served. We are'the less inclined to assert its invalidity where the relator does not pretend that in fact he did not receive the notice.

(3) The relator also claims that the record does not show that he was warned in regard to parades or drills as required by § 72, and that the return or affidavit of warning as required by § 73 is not present in the record.

. It is plain that neither section has the least application to delinquencies in the nature of failures to appear for drills, etc.,,of a regular nature, in the armory or other appointed place, pursuant to the by-laws of the organization. Section -68, of the Military Code, permits drills of this nature in the evening when ordered by a majority of the members of the organization and so prescribed in the by-laws. The by-laws of this organization were returned and -they show a provision for the assembling of the company for drill and instruction every Wednesday evening, and a. provision for paying the expenses of the company. Section 103 of the Code provides only for delinquency courts for the trial by commissioned officers below the rank of brigadier-general, and has no application here.

The return to the writ shows that a delinquency court was appointed by the commander of the Fourteenth Regiment, FT. Gr. S. FT. Y., the regiment including the company of which‘the relator was a member, and that among the returns of the delinquencies forwarded to the court was that against the relator. Section 755 of the regulations for the government of the FT. (x. (which, by § 138 of the Military Code, “ have the same force and effect as the provisions of this act") provides that in delinquency courts the return of delinquents, on which will be noted the date and matter of the delinquency, takes the place of formal charges and specifications. The delinquencies were specified in this return with their nature and the day on which they were alleged to have occurred. By § 757 of the regulations, in the absence of the accused after due notice to appear, the court will consider his delinquency as established and examination waived. The return shows that the notice was served by mail on the 5th of February, for the appearance of the relator in the same city on the 8th of the same month. This was due notice. The relator failed to appear and he was fined by default The record shows that complete jurisdiction over the relator was obtained by the delinquency court.

(4) The relator also claims that the court obtained no jurisdiction over company dues, because it is not shown that the by

law's were approved by the judge advocate general as provided by the law of 1888, chap. 332, § 21. But the by-laws were adopted at a time when the approval of the judge advocate of the division was requisite, instead of the judge advocate general Sec.139 of Military Code of 1883. Such approval it appears was obtained and the by-laws were, therefore, properly adopted and were in force at the time of the delinquencies on the part of the relator, although they occurred subsequently to the passage of the actof 1888. By § 21 of chap. 332, of Laws of 1888, the judge advocate general was substituted as the proper person to approve bylaws in the place of the division judge advocate. All by-laws thereafter adopted were necessarily to be approved by the judge advocate general. The passage of the amendatory act did not, however, invalidate all by-laws theretofore existing, which had been duly adopted and approved by the division judge advocate. They remained as valid as they had been and were not affected by the amendment. As to future by-laws the act would apply.

(5) Provision is made by § 131 of the Military Code for the enforcement of certain fines for offences against the by laws of a company, and the relator contends that the conditions contained in such section before the enforcement can be proceeded with do not appear by the record to have been complied with. We think that section has nothing to do with this case. It provides for the enforcement of fines and dues by a delinquency court, where such fines or dues have already been imposed by or before some other tribunal or in some way not mentioned, provided a certified copy of the proceedings relating to the infliction of such fines, with a copy of the by-laws, rules aud regulations, have been returned to the delinquency court which is to enforce payment of such fines. This has no application to such fines as are imposed by the delinquency court itself. The fine by the delinquency court is provided for by § 123 of the Military Code.

(6) We think that § 139 of the Code authorized the particular by-laws in question. A small fine for non-attendance at drills duly appointed by by-laws has been customary for many years, and we think the company had power under the above section to adopt the by-laws. So long as the moneys to be raised by company dues are devoted to the proper, reasonable and legitimate military purposes of the company, and not to purposes wholly separate therefrom, we think the by-laws providing for the collection and disposition of the dues are good.

(7) It is also said that the return shows no trial. It shows a proper summons, and a failure to appear on the part of the relator. The proceedings show that the court considered the evidence adduced, and fined the relator as stated therein. The testimony need not be recorded under § 756 of the regulations, and we must assume that there was evidence enough of a legal character to enable the court to decide upon the matter, and sentence accordingly.

We have carefully looked through all the proceedings in this case, and are of opinion that no error was committed therein, and that the court proceeded with jurisdiction over the person of the

relator when it sentenced him to pay the fines set out in the case. The order of the general term setting aside the findings and decree of the court should, therefore, be reversed, and the writ of certiorari dismissed, and the proceedings 'of the court affirmed.

All concur.