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Camp v. Redmond

36 N.Y. St. Rep. 546 Court N.Y. Gen. Term Decision date 1891-01-16 English

Decision Dissent — Daniels, J. (dissenting) · Concurring — Van Brunt, P. J.

Contents

Dissent

p. 546
Hugh N. Camp, Resp’t, v. Michael Redmond, App’lt.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,
Filed January 16, 1891.)

Headnote

Pleading—Counterclaim—Vendor and purchaser.
In an action for breach of a contract for purchase of land, at a sale by-auction which was to be completed at a specified time, the answer alleged, by way of set off and counterclaim, that plaintiff, a month after the specified time, sold the premises to another person, and still retained defendant’s deposit on his purchase, and asked that said sum be offset against any-recovery, if any, and for judgment for such sum if plaintiff failed to recover. Held, on demurrer, that in the absence of an allegation that he was ready and willing to perform at the time specified defendant could not succeed in his affirmative cause of action, and that the demurrer was properly sustained.
(Daniels, J., dissents.)
Appeal from an interlocutory judgment sustaining a demurrer to the defendant’s answer.
Harry A. Foster, for app’lt; James C. De La Mare, for resp’t.

The action is for damages for the non-performance of a contract made for the sale and purchase of land. The sale was made by auction, and it was to be completed on the 11th of November, 1889. It is alleged in the complaint that the defendant in that respect failed to fulfill the terms of his agreement to accept the deed and otherwise perform on his part. But the ability and readiness of the plaintiff to convey the property has been put in issue by the answer of the defendant.

The defendant then, by way of a set-off, partial defense, and counterclaim, further answered that the ten lots described in the complaint were knocked down to him at public auction, by the plaintiff’s agent. And the answer then proceeded to state:

That plaintiff in selling such lots agreed to convey them to-the purchaser at such auction sale on receiving the purchase money less sixty per cent, thereof, which could remain on bond and mortgage, at the option of the purchaser.

That the defendant paid to the plaintiff $300 on account of the purchase money.

On information and belief, that on December 10, 1889, plaintiff sold the property at public auction to a third person, and thus put it out of his power to perform his contract and convey the property in fee to the defendant, and that plaintiff retained and still retains $300 paid to him by the defendant on account of the purchase money.

That the defendant is entitled to have the $300 offset against any recovery that the plaintiff may obtain in this action, if any, and if plaintiff should fail to recover, defendant is entitled to recover said $300 from the plaintiff.

Wherefore, the defendant demands judgment against the

Concurrence

p. 547
plaintiff for the dismissal of the complaint, and the sum of $300, besides the costs of the action.

The plaintiff demurred to this answer, on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action, and the demurrer was sustained by the special term.

No failure to perform the contract has been in any form admitted by the defendant, nor does it appear otherwise than by the allegations of the complaint, upon which issue has been taken by the answer, how the contract was carried along to the month of December, 1889. It cannot be inferred from what has been set forth in this part of the answer, that the defendant was at any time'in default on his part For no such default has been admitted either expressly, or by implication. But it is apparent from this part of the answfer that the lots continued to be owned by the plaintiff up to the 10th of December, 1889, and that he then sold them to another person. This put it out of his power to perform the contract he had made for their sale to the defendant. And dispensed with an offer, or the averment of readiness' to perform on his part. Weeks v. Little, 89 N. Y., 566 ; Woolner v. Hill, 93 id., 576 . It placed the plaintiff himself in default as the case has in this manner been stated and entitled the defendant to rescind, and recover back the $300 paid by him on the purchase price of the lots. And he had the right to interpose that as a counterclaim in this action. The demurrer, therefore, .should not have been sustained. And the judgment should be reversed and the demurrer overruled, with costs, but with leave to the plaintiff to withdraw it, and reply m twenty days on the payment of the costs of the demurrer and the appeal.

I cannot concur with the conclusion .arrived at by Mr. Justice Daniels that under the facts alleged in the answer the defendant would be, if they were true, entitled to recover the amount of his deposit The facts seem to be that the plaintiff contracted to convey to the defendant certain real estate and the defendant contracted to pay for the same on the 11th day of November, 1889, and paid $300 down. There is no allegation in the answer setting up counterclaim or set-off that the defendant ever was ready to take the property or that the plaintiff failed in any respect in reference to his part of the contract

It is urged by Mr. Justice Daniels that the defendant has not admitted that he was in default. This is true, but in his affirmative cause of action he has not alleged that he was ready and willing to perform at the time appointed. It is necessary for him to allege and prove this to succeed in his affirmative cause of action.

All that is alleged is that the plaintiff sold the property to somebody else on the 10th of December. Where a seller makes default the purchaser is not bound to wait forever to dispose of the property to another without giving the purchaser a cause of action.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Brady, J., concurs.