People ex rel. Oakley v. Bleckwenn

In order to pay the contractors and all expenses of improving a large district of Long Island City, the commissioners, appointed for that purpose, were authorized by chapter 826 of the Laws of 1874 to issue what were known as “ Improvement Certificates in Long Island City.” The act provided that the assessments made thereunder for improvements should become a lien upon the lands affected; but allowed a period of ten years to elapse before proceedings could be taken to enforce collection or payment. The certificates so issued were made “ receivable at all times at par and accrued interest in payment of any assessment,” and, when so received, they were to be retired and cancelled. In the same act it was also provided that after the expiration of the ten years from the filing of the assessment roll the lands upon which the assessments remained unpaid should be sold; and that the proceedings for and upon a sale should be after the manner prescribed by the law at the time for the sale of lands in said city for non-payment of city taxes. Provision was made in the section authorizing such sales that the lands “ may be redeemed, and in default of such redemption title thereto should be given and perfected in the same manner, to the same extent and with the same force and effect ” as in the case of sales for non-payment of city taxes.

By a later act (chapter 501, Laws of 1879), the time for the running of assessments was reduced to eight years; and this provision was also added to the law : namely, that at sales “ it shall be the duty of the officer making such sale to receive the improvement certificates * * * at par and accrued interest in payment of the assessment.” The relator’s lands were sold for non-payment of these assessments, and, within the period of time allowed for redemption, a tender was made on her behalf to the appellant, the city treasurer, of the sum required by law in order to redeem the premises; but it was made in these improvement certificates. The appellant refused to receive them, and demanded payment in

The appellant’s position is that he was not authorized by law to receive anything but cash upon a redemption, and the argument-in his behalf is, or must be substantially, based upon two propositions. In the first place, it is contended that the tax sale and the payment by the purchaser paid and extinguished the assessment for the satisfaction of which the statute authorized these certificates to be received, and the law contained no provision that payment in that mode might be made in redemption of the lands sold. In the second place, the proposition is that the law in force at the time of the sales and which regulated the proceedings for sales of lands for non-payment of city taxes and for redemption therefrom, contained the rules for the conduct of proceedings to enforce collection under the act of 1874, and no redemption under its terms could be made except by a payment in money. The act referred to was chapter 656 of the Laws of 1886 ; which was passed in relation to the collection of unpaid taxes and assessments in Long Island City; and stress is laid, with respect to the owner’s right to redeem, upon certain language of that act, that he can only redeem “ by paying the said treasurer for the use of the purchaser, * * * the sum mentioned in the certificate given to him.” This is construed to import, if not to direct, a payment in cash to the purchaser’s 'use.

I do not think there can be a reasonable doubt as to what is the proper construction to be given to the terms of the act of 1874; but if there be such a doubt, then I think it one which should be resolved in favor of the construction claimed by the respondent. The question relates to the remedy which the legislature has provided for the enforcement of the payment of the assessment, and it concerns the rights of the owner of the lands, as well as those of their purchaser at the sale. It being claimed that the statute is not explicit in its provisions upon' that head, consideration should be given to its general tenor and to the intention and purposes underlying its enactment. If, by so doing, there is anything disclosed, either from the language itself, or by way of a just inference from the language, we should resort to such an aid in the work of construction. The best interpretation of a law is that which harmonizes its structure with the purpose and intention of its enactment.

It is very clear from the act of 1874, authorizing the improvements in Long Island City, and it is the fact in proof, that those improvements were upon an extensive scale and were intended to reclaim low lying, marsh lands; The provisions of the law with respect to the manner of payment of the contractors, who should undertake the work, and the unusual delay allowed to property owners for the discharge of their liability for the assessments levied for the work, seem to evidence an intention of the legislature that the burden of the great cost should rest as lightly as it could be imposed. The contractors were to receive their payment, not in money, but in certificates, issued by the commissioners at par and

But where the way is open for the court to determine what the legislature intended should be the limitation upon the availability of these certificates, the evidence of an intention that the property owner shall be treated with every indulgence should incline us to give that construction which most favors and protects his rights. Judge Dillon, in his work on Municipal Corporations, deduces the principle, § 822: “ The right of the owner to redeem from sales for assessments is favorably regarded by the courts, and the statutes giving or extending this right are liberally construed.”

If we hold that these certificates are a good tender, in redemption of property sold for unpaid assessments, we carry into further effect the indulgent purpose of the legislature, and what do we encounter in so doing ? Is the provision of the act of 1879, which makes it the duty of the selling officer to receive the certificates in payment of the assessments for which the sales are made, as the appellant argues, a legislative construction of the law that no authority exists for the receipt of certificates after the sale has been made ? I cannot think so, and such a conclusion is not compelled. As the law stood, under the act of 1874, it was open to doubt as to whether, upon a sale of property, for arrears of assessments, anything could be paid in by the purchaser e-xcept the currency of the country. The legislature settled that doubt (and thereby further evidenced its benevolence of purpose) by expressly authorizing the use of the improvement certificates in making payments at the sales. If, therefore, the act of 1879 does not limit or control the construction of the provisions in the act of 1874 that these improvement certificates “shall be receivable at all times at par and accrued interest in payment of any assessment, etc.,” do we find any objection to their use, for the purposes of redemption after sales, from the incorporation in the act of 1874 of those pro

.The counsel for the respondents also directs our attention to the remark of Judge Oooley in his work on Taxation, 500, where he says the sale is made by way of enforcing the duty which a person owes to the public. This court in the case of Clementi v. Jack son, 92 N. Y., 591 , and recently in its second division, in the case of McFarlaneY. City of Brooklyn, 122 N. Y., 589 ; 34 N. Y. State Rep., 551, has regarded a sale for unpaid taxes as a mode of enforcement of the city lien for taxes: In the cases of Williams v. Townsend, 31 N. Y., 411 , and of Clementi v. Jackson, supra,

The operation of a law cannot be affected by some imagined or possible result of its workings, in some collateral direction. Besides, the plan of the statute was not to promote a market for the lands, when sold for unpaid assessments, but rather to provide for a substitute for money generally available as a medium of payment to all affected by or interested in the performance of the work; which should he elastic enough to serve in payment of the contractors in the first place and to be receivable at all times in discharge of assessment liens and upon sales in enforcement of such liens.

The order appealed from should be affirmed and the writ of mandamus issue as ordered at the special term of the supreme court, with costs to the respondent of this appeal

All concur, except Andrews, J., not voting, and Earl, J., dis-