Majority
Headnote
1. New trial—Granted after verdict—Code Civ. Pro., g 999—Recon-sideration.—This is an appeal from an order made at circuit, and granting a new trial to the plaintiff after verdict in favor of the defendant, and under the following circumstances. When the verdict was rendered and recorded, the motion was made for a new trial under § 999 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The minutes made by the clerk state, among other things: “ Motion for a new trial denied.”
That was on the 18th of February, 1890. No order of the court was ever signed or filed on this motion. Judgment in favor of the defendant was entered by the clerk, as is usual in common law cases, on the 21st day of February, 1890. On the 25th day of that month the plaintiff asked for a re-argument of the motion, which was had, and on the 27th, being at the same term of the court, and the motion was granted, and an order duly and formally entered.
There was no such final or absolute disposition of the motion as deprived the judge at circuit of jurisdiction to reconsider his ruling. The term of the court had not expired, no final order had been entered, and he was at liberty, in furtherance of justice, to reconsider a mere formal ruling, and on being convinced of his error, to put the parties in a situation that justice might be done The fact that intermediate the trial and the motion for re-argument judgment had been entered, does not affect the question.
In the case of Voisin v. The Commercial Insurance Company, 31 N. Y. State Rep., 88, we held that an appeal to the general term from an order granting or refusing a new trial in an action tried before a jury might be taken, notwithstanding judgment had been entered against the appellant and the time to appeal, therefore, had expired; and our views in that case were sustained by the court of appeals, 123 N. Y., 120 ; 33 N. Y. State Rep., 160. Here, therefore, we have merely a decision announced without an order to make it obligatory or final; and while it was in that condition, the judge, convinced that he had committed an error, and while the matter was still before him, considered it his duty to recall his decision and make an order that would prevent a failure of justice.
Order affirmed, with costs.
Van Brunt, P. J., and Barrett, J'., concur.