Majority
Headnote
, Mortgage—Foreclosure—Rights of purchaser—Agreement.—The action was against the defendant, George T. Fish, as maker, and the defendant, E. Louisa Fish, as endorser of two promissory notes, one for $190.93 and one for $108.50,
There was no other allegation of damage sustained by the defendants by reason of the breach of the agreement of Lawton, but the case was tried without objection, upon the theory that a counterclaim in behalf of both defendants had been pleaded, and it was submitted to the jury upon the single question whether
On that question we think the verdict was clearly against the weight of the evidence, and that the motion for a new trial ought to have been granted. The defense was strictly affirmative, and the burden of proof was on the defendants. The strength of their case is in the testimony of the defendant George T. Fish, which is as follows: “ I had a conversation with Arthur W Law-ton ; I think it was on the street, but I am not positive; lie • wanted the endorsement of my wife, and also her mother; I told him I could, not give the endorsement of her mother; that she-was not well, and I would not ask it of her; he said he would do as he talked; He would attend the sale and bid in the property and give us a chance to pay off; and I told him that perhaps Mrs. Fish would endorse it, but I would not ask her mother to, and he said, ‘ very well, let her endorse it,’ and he would do as we had talked.
“ Previous to this time we had talked several times in reference to the sale of this property, which was advertised to take place January 22d. He said he would help us out on that; he said he had some money in the bank, several hundred dollars, and would save some for that purpose; I told him that if he would do that and bid it in, I would include the whole indebtedness to himself and his brother; that his brbther had a claim of about $100,1 thought, a balance on an old note; that he could put that in, and also the second mortgage which was given to another brother, Charles F. Lawton, and he said he would take a second mortgage for the whole indebtedness; he would get the first mortgage for what he could, and would put in some money, if necessary, and take a second mortgage, and give us an opportunity to pay for it That was the conversation to which he referred on this day in question.”
This evidence, at the best, but sparingly supports the allegation of an agreement on the part of Lawton to purchase the property on the foreclosure sale, to raise money sufficient, if possible, to pay the purchase price and the second mortgage held by Charles Lawton, and the amount of the two notes by a loan secured by a new first mortgage on the premises, and then to convey to the defendants upon being reimbursed, or secured by a new second mortgage on the same premises, for the amount by which the sum of those payments to be made by him should exceed the amount of the loan he might obtain on the premises; and all this in consideration, merely, that Fish should procure his wife’s endorsement, on the second of the two notes for $108.50. The testimony of Fish is but partially corroborated by that of his wife, the other-defendant, and it is directly contradicted in all its parts by that of Lawton, which is corroborated by that of his brother, A. L. Law-ton, who testifies that be was present at the time the endorsement of Mrs. Fish to the second note was procured, and to the agreement under which it was done.
But aside from the direct evidence on the question in dispute, and of which it cannot fairly be said that the preponderance is in.
Moreover, the conduct of the defendant Fish, at the sale, was entirely inconsistent with the theory of the defense as to the agreement of Lawton. The uncontradicted evidence is that at the sale, so far from relying upon Lawton to purchase the property, Fish was there attempting to prevent the sale; he read a paper which declared that the sale was irregular, and warned all persons against bidding; and he personally forbade Lawton to bid on the property.
The affirmative defense alleged and relied upon was clearly not established by the evidence on the trial, and the motion for a new trial should have been granted.
Macomber, J., concurs.
Judgment and order appealed from reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.