Walsh v. Mutual Life Insurance

—The defendant issued, March 23, 1864, a policy on the life of Veis Traub in favor of Rica Traub, his wife, agreeing to pay the amount to her, “ for her sole use if living, in conformity with the statute; and if not living, to her children, or their guardian, for their use.” There were three children of Veis Traub and Rica Traub, viz. : Bessie Gross, Solomon Traub, Carrie Van Schaick.

Bessie Cross died intestate, April, 1886, leaving surviving her husband and two children.

Rica Traub died April, 1887.

Solomon Traub died intestate June, 1887, leaving his widow, Henrietta (now Heinzel), and two children; and Henrietta (now Heinzel) was appointed his administratrix Veis Traub died intestate July 2, 1890.

Carrie Van Schaick, his daughter, is living.

Henrietta Heinzel, administratrix as aforesaid, and Carrie Van Schaick, have assigned their claims to plaintiff.

One-third part of the amount payable on the policy has already been paid to Carrie Van Schaick, and one-third part to Henrietta Heinzel, administratrix. The plaintiff, as their assignee, now claims the remaining one-third.

The defendant admits on the argument that the two children of Bessie Gross, being grandchildren of Veis Traub and Rica Traub, are not owners of this third; but contends that either the executor of Bessie Gross, if she made a will, or the administrator, if she died intestate, takes their third as part of the estate of Bessie Gross, deceased.

The question arises on a demurrer to the complaint which states all the facts. And the defendant appeals from the judgment and order overruling the demurrer. It will be seen that the question is, under such a policy, what is the interest, if any, of the personal representative of a child who does before the mother. Does that part of the proceeds of the policy which would have gone to the child, if living, go to the representatives of such child; or do the proceeds go entirely to the children surviving the mother?

In U. S. Trust Co. v. Mut Ben. L. I. Co., 115 N.Y., 152 ; 24 N.Y. State Rep., 1, a policy was construed which was closely similar in language to this one now in question. The court said that, when the wife died before the husband, the only persons interested in the policy were her children then surviving, and the whole policy as a chose in action belonged to them. They held vested interests therein as they could in any other chose in action, payable at a

The present policy contains a condition in respect to the wife, that the money is to be paid to her if living. Ro such condition is contained therein in respect to the children. It says that, if she is not living, the money is to be paid to her children ; but it does not.add “if living.” It, therefore, is a promise to pay to them, on the sole condition that the wife is not living at the death of the father. Suppose, then, that all the children had died before the wife, would it be said that there was no one to whom the money should be paid ? It has been decided, as above stated, that- tile money would not in that case be payable to the grandchildren. But would it not belong to the estates of the children, and thus beneficially, in many cases, come to the grandchildren ? Or would it be necessary to hold,.as must result from the plaintiff’s position, that the insurance company must in such a case retain the money for want of a payee ?

The decision that no interest went to the grandchildren was on the very ground that the contract was with the children. And the court expressly held that, if made with the children alone, it went to their representatives.

This is the case of a contract, not of a legacy. The company, for a good consideration, agrees that when A. dies it will pay a certain sum of money to B., if living, and if B. is not living, then that it will pay the money to 0. and D. and E., designating them not by name, but as the children of B. It is not disputed on either side that O., D. and E. take separate portions, and do not take jointly. What is there in such an agreement which makes the right of C., D. or E. dependent on their surviving B ?

A promise to pay a sum of money to a person on a certain contingency does not cease to be binding because the person dies before the contingency happens. The debt on the happening of the contingency is payable to his representatives.

The case of Whitehead v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co., 102 N. Y., 143 ; 1 N. Y. State Rep., 344, was on a question as to the power of the husband to surrender- policies of this kind. The matter of the respective rights of the wife and children was not before the court But the court, in speaking of the policies, says : “ They created a vested interest in the wife and also one in the children by force of the clause providing for payment to them if the wife should die before'the maturity of the policy.” Row, few things are more unsafe in legal discussions than to take up a sentence in an opinion and consider it as a decision, without ref

Some argument has been made from decisions in respect to legacies. But a legacy is a different thing from a contract, such as this policy is. A legacy is the mere gift of the testator. If ineffectual, or if lapsed, the testator’s property goes to others entitled to take under rules of distribution. The whole question is one of dividing up the estate of the deceased.

But here we are to construe a contract. The claimants must take by virtue of the contract or not at all. And if, under any construction, there is no one to take, then the company keeps the money. The plaintiff insists that no one can take, unless he be living at the death of Veis Traub. This construction, as above suggested, results in holding that, if Rica Traub and the three daughters should have all been dead at the death of Veis Traub, then the company would not be required to pay anyone. A construction which leads to this result is certainly incorrect

It is true that in the opinion in U. S. Trust Co. v. Mut. Ben. L. I. Co., ut supra, the court, after giving a construction to the policy, says: “ If, however, we assume that we are wrong in this construction, then on the death of Mrs.' Finn the policy was payable to her children as a class,” etc. We do not, however, feel at liberty to assume that the construction given by the court was wrong. FTor do we think that the court intended to assert that the policy was payable only to those children who survived Mrs. Finn. The remark was intended to show that, even if the plaintiff in that case should urge such a view, still, “in no event could grandchildren be intended in that class.” Such was the view taken of that decision by Mr. Justice Patterson in Finn v. Mut. Ben. L. I. Co., M. S., Nov., 1890.

We do not think that the court intended to say that even a legacy to a class, where there are no words of survivorship, is always payable to those only who are living at the time of payment. Without discussing that question we refer to 2 Jarman on Wills, m. p. 76; Thebald on Wills, 383; Everitt v. Everitt, 29 N. Y., at 75, where Judge Denio says: “If futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift the vesting is suspended, but if it appear to relate to the time of payment only, the legacy vests instanter.” See Goebel v. Wolf, 113 N. Y., 405 ; 23 N. Y. State Rep., 176.

And even if we endeavor to apply that language of Judge Denio to such a contract as the present, we shall see that futurity

The right of the wife to payment of the amount secured is quite as contingent as that of the children. She certainly gets nothing if she does not survive the husband. Yet the courts speak of her rights as vested before his death. And there is no harm in the word, if it be properly understood. Certainly it is not inconsistent with a contingency as to payment. That is the case also as to the children.

The plaintiff cites the case of Lane v. De Mets, 13 N. Y. Supp., 347 ; 36 N. Y. State Rep., 798. But in that case there was a clause.that “if there be no such children surviving” the money should be paid to the personal representatives of the person whose life was insured. And the decision of the court was ■on this clause, holding that this indicated that the avails should go only to surviving children, and should form a part of the estate of the person whose life was insured, in case neither wife nor children survived. Ho such clause is in the present policy, and that case does not apply here.

And from that case we may readily see that if the parties to " this contract had desired to make the right of each child dependent on its surviving the father they would have said in the policy “to her children then surviving,” or would have used similar language.

In Hull v. Hull, 62 How., 100 , the special term held that if a child died before the mother, the children of that child would take under such a policy in case the mother did not survive the father. Such seems to be the doctrine in Connecticut Continental Life Lns. Co. v. Palmer, 42 Conn., 60 . How in the case of the U. S. Trust Co. v. Mut. Ben. L. I. Co., above cited, it was held that this was incorrect; and that as the grandchildren were not named in the policy, their names could not be put in. But in that case the court explains that the insurance could be made to a child, “ in which case, upon the death of the father, it would be payable to the personal representatives of the child, if dead.” And it was also said in that case that on the death of the wife the policy might be construed, and is payable precisely as if the children alone were mentioned therein. Therefore we may now construe this policy as if the children alone were mentioned in it Hence, as the court said, if this insurance were made to these children alone, it would be payable to their personal representatives, if they were dead. And if made to these three children it cannot be held that the death of one before the father would deprive the representatives of that child of its share. To hold that would be to ignore the object of such insurance.

In Anderson v. Goldsmidt, 103 N. Y., 617 ; 4 N. Y. State Rep., 286, it was held that under chap. 248, Laws of 1879, a wife, with the consent of her husband, might assign such a pqlicy as the present. And the plaintiff argues that this shows that the interest of the children is merely contingent. But that decision was only a construction of the statute as it then existed. And the court remarked that the wife, in fact, survived the time when the policy matured, and therefore the contingency did not arise on which the money would be payable to the children. But the court recognized that the children would have had rights if the wife had not survived the time when the policy matured.

The case does not decide whether such rights belong to all the children, or to those only who survive the father. That question could not have been before the court. Whether, even under that statute, the wife can, by assignment, take away the rights of the children, we need not inquire. It is probably sufficient to say that she may assign her own rights, whatever they may prove to be.

Considering, then, the language of this contract, and also the object of such insurance, we are of opinion that Bessie Gross had, in her lifetime, an interest in the contract to the extent of one-third (subject, probably, to be diminished in extent by the birth of other children) ; that such interest would pass to personal representatives ; that such interest was, of course, subject to be defeated if Rica Traub survived Veis Traub, and that the plaintiff, as assignee of Carrie Van Schaick and Henrietta Heinzel, administratrix, is not the holder of the said one-third interest.

Judgment reversed, with costs, and judgment for defendant rendered, with costs.

—I am not without doubt as to the conclusion reached by the presiding justice. The propositions that when the wife died her children were, by the terms of the policy, substituted in her place; that no substitution could precede that event; that no right to substitution attached until the wife died, and, therefore, the dead child could not be substituted, nor her children or representatives, since neither were named in the policy, strike my mind with force.

Mayham, J., not acting.