p. 65Minnie O’Neil, by Guardian, Resp’t, v. Fred. G. Battie, Trustee, App’lt.(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department,Filed September 25, 1891.)Headnote
Schools—Trustee de facto—Hiring of teacher.At a school district meeting one M. was chosen chairman, and a motion being made that he be trustee, he put and declared the motion carried. A dispute arising, a ballot was taken and defendant declared elected. On appeal to the state superintendent, M.’s election was declared void. Previous thereto M. engaged plaintiff as teacher, and .gave her a written contract after she had taught a week, and she continued teaching until prevented by defendant. Held, that M. was a trustee de facto, and his written contract with plaintiff binding, and she was entitled to recover for the services performed by her and damages sustained by her by being prevented from performing.
Appeal from judgment directed for plaintiff.
Action to recover on a contract to teach school in school district No. 2 of the town of Easton, Washington county.
On August 6, 1889, the school meeting of the district was held. One Moran was made chairman, and the record of the meeting shows that a motion was made and seconded that he be the trustee, which was put and pronounced carried by the chairman. A dispute then arising a new chairman was chosen and a ballot taken, which resulted in the election of the defendant. Moran then engaged plaintiff to teach the school, and a week after she commenced gave her a written certificate of hiring. On an appeal taken to the state superintendent Moran’s election was declared void, and defendant was again elected trustee at a special meeting called for that purpose, and the following day dismissed the plaintiff and put a new teacher in charga
Gibson & Van Kirk, for resp’t; Edgar Hull, for app’lt.
We are satisfied that Moran was trustee defacto. This is shown by the record of the meeting, by the appeal taken by the present defendant for the purpose of setting aside Moran’s election and by the decision of the superintendent ordering a new election. As such his written contract with the plaintiff was binding.
That writing, accepted by her, constituted the contract, what
p. 66ever prior verbal agreement there may have been. It is hardly possible in any case that a written contract should be made, unless the parties have previously arranged the matter verbally. The writing supersedes all the verbal arrangements.
The plaintiff performed her part of the contract so far as she was permitted. She was therefore entitled to recover for what she had performed and damages for what she lost by being prevented from performing. The complaint contained only one count; but no objection was taken to this form of pleading.
The plaintiff’s inability to obtain other work after she was discharged by the defendant was proved.
We see no error in the trial.
Judgment affirmed, with costs against defendant personally.
Landon and Mayham, JJ., concur.