Hasbrouck v. Young

The learned judge before whom this cause was tried at the special term stated in his opinion, very concisely, both the question involved and the rule of its solution, as follows, viz.: “ The only question to be determined in this case is, whether the plaintiff was at the times of the execution of the deed by which the house and lot described in the complaint was transferred to the defendant and the execution of the bill of sale on July 23, 1888, and of the assignment executed on January 10, 1889, of unsound mind; for it is an elementary principle of the common law, that a gift or contract is invalid unless the mind goes with the act, and this whether the actor is without mind, or of a mind not possessed of itself, as under duress. Riggs v. American Tract Society, 84 N. Y., 336 .”

Both parties have accepted that definition of the matter in contest and each insists that upon the record nothing but issues of fact are raised. The suit was brought originally by Bichard D. Young to set aside certain conveyances of real and personal property made by him to and for the benefit of his wife, upon allegations that they were made and delivered while he was of unsound mind, and that they were procured to be made by undue influence of his wife, the defendant, while he was in that condition. Pending suit, Young made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and the assignee, who was originally the attorney of record for Mr. Young in this action, has been substituted as plaintiff. This substitution operates no change in the issues. "We are not now concerned with creditors, but are merely to ascertain whether inter partes these conveyances are valid.

The learned judge in the court below found on all the material issues in favor of the plaintiff, and we are now called upon to review that decision and to consider, analyze and weigh all the evidence appearing on the record before us ; and having done so, we cannot resist the conclusion that on the facts the judgment must be reversed, for the evidence, as we think, not only fails to show that as to the deed and bill of sale of July, 1888, Mr. Young was incompetent to make them, but, on the contrary, the preponderance of testimony clearly establishes that, at that time, he was compos mentis, and that the instruments assailed, of that date, so far from being the acts of an irresponsible person, were made after due deliberation, inquiiy, consultation with strangers, and with a fixed purpose to do so as the wisest and best course a prudent

“ Fifth. That from the spring of 1888 up to March, 1889, the said plaintiff had been in poor and deficient mental health and condition, and upon the dates mentioned, to wit, the 23d day of July, 1888, and the 10th day of January, 1889, the plaintiff was ■mentally unsound and incapable of appreciating the force, effect and tenor of his acts, or of exercising his own will and judgment and of withstanding the importunities, duress and force or coercion of others.

“ Sixth. That such conveyance and deed * * * were not the proper, free and voluntary acts of the plaintiff, made while he was in full possession of his mental faculties, understanding, will and judgment, but were so made while the plaintiff was in a weak and unsound mental condition, and-as the result of the importunities and influence of the defendant practiced upon him while- the said plaintiff was so mentally unsound and incapable of exercising his own will, judgment and understanding.”

Bearing in mind that the present inquiry is addressed to what took place in July, 1888, and the then mental condition of Mr. Young, and nothing but that, we find almost a complete absence of testimony on the plaintiff’s behalf relating directly and positively to that date, unless we take his own, and he swears he remembers nothing material about it All there is upon which the plaintiff’s case can be founded is the after developments of an admittedly progressive disease, without a single thing to show that by necessary relation his condition in January, 1889, was such that he could not have been compos mentis in July, 1888. The first witness called by the plaintiff was Joseph I. McGrlynn, who acted as notary in taking the acknowledgment of the bill of sale in

The next witness is Hasbrouck, who has filled the triple part of attorney, plaintiff and witness. He swears distinctly he did not see Young in June or July, 1888, and had not seen him from October, 1887, to September, 1888. Then Mr. Birdsall was called, who never saw Young until September or October, 1888, and he candidly says he did not even then make a thorough examination of him, and that it was in the light of subsequent ■events that he made up his judgment as to Young’s condition. Hr. O’Connor, another witness, never saw Mr. Young until January 10, 1889, and this physician very frankly says he could not tell whether the condition in which he then found the patient had ■continued a week or a month. Hr. Phillips never saw Young until the 4th of October, 1888, when the latter went voluntarily to this physician’s sanitarium at Burn Brae, and the witness testifies ■as follows:

“ Q. (By the court) When he was brought there, how far had this disease gone; was he at that time irrational ? A. He never ■was irrational; he was always coherent”

Hr. Jones, the next witness for the plaintiff, did not see Mr. Young until he was at Hr. Kirkbride’s asylum January 26, 1889. This witness and Hr. Morrow alone give any color to the idea that Mr. Young was disturbed mentally in July, and they are both very guarded in what they state. Hr. Jones says “ from the history he (Young) gave me there was reason for his taking sulphonal in July. * * * I would say that his condition had existed six months prior to the time he came there, hut only from the fact of his telling me that he had taken sulphonal for six months, and then I think he narrated other symptoms of the trouble.” Hr. Morrow’s testimony is altogether too vague and uncertain as to "time to be of any service. Taking all the facts and circumstances together it is probable he attended Mr. Young in September (and not in June or July) before he went on his vacation, which he isays began the last week in September. Hr. Helleck did not see Mr. Young until November, 1888, and he made up his judgment from what Hr. Birdsall wrote him,'what that was does not appear, and Hr. Birdsall did not see Mr. Young until September or October, 1888. The other witnesses called by the plaintiff may be dismissed without particular notice. They deposed to nothing which would aid us in the precise inquiry now being made.

The foregoing is a general statement of all there is on the plaintiff’s direct case to impeach the instruments of July, 1888, sought to be set aside. It is meagre, inconclusive, vague and altogether insufficient to reach the standard of judgment which the learned judge below very properly made the test of the rights of the parties ; but when the testimony on behalf of the defendant, some of it coming from disinterested persons (that of the defendant and the children being discarded), and the letters in evidence written

-The transfer of the house, etc., was made through an intermediary, Miss Helitt. She gives a very clear and inherently probable .account of the transaction. Mrs. Young (the defendant) had written her that Mr. Young desired to put the house in the name-of a third party and aslced her to meet the writer of that letter and her. husband at a lawyer’s office on a day named. She came-to New York and met Mr. and Mrs. Young and Mr. Young took them to the office of Mr. Bright, a lawyer, and the deeds were executed. She was thanked for her kindness and went away. It.is perfectly clear that this young lady had nothing to do with the matter, except to carry out the wishes of her friends. There was neither previous consultation nor pre-arrangement nor anything that could associate her with an attempt on the part of Mrs. Young to get possession of the property.

Her testimony-seems to have -been given in a frank, clear and impartial way, and so far as we can judge from a printed record it is quite evident the part she played in the transaction was that,of an inexperienced and complaisant jmung woman who was glad to oblige her friends. How, then, did she come to render this service and what induced it? The letter from Mrs. Young notified her of the desire to have her act, but Mr. Bright’s testimony illuminates the whole transaction and shows that the scheme and the method of its accomplishment was the work of Mr. Young and no one else. This witness is connected with the Title Guaranty & Trust Company. About the middle of July, 1888, Mr. Young applied-to him for a loan upon the real property in question. He-stated all the particulars, the previous incumbrances and that he thought of putting the house in the name of his wife and asked what would be the best way of doing it. The witness told him the best thing he could do would be to get an unmarried woman to take the title and have her re-convey it to Mrs. Young. This, is clearly the advice after consultation on which Mr. Young acted.. He sought it of his own motion and said he would see Mrs. Young about getting a suitable person and afterwards he told the witness that they had agreed upon Miss Helitt, and that is doubtless the way she came into the business. Mr. Young was unaccompanied when he had these conversations with Bright; his wife-was not present and had nothing to do with them; he acted independently and was informed of the whole relation of the company to a transaction of that kind; he was even told the views the

The testimony as it stands is quite convincing, that the judgment so far as the instruments of July, 1888, are concerned is wrong. The case was determined on the theory that there is no distinction to be made between the transaction of January, 1889, and that of July, 1888. We think there is and that a reading of the record discloses it unmistakably and therefore the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the -event

I concur. I am entirely satisfied, however, that the evidence sustains the findings as to the bill of sale of the business, which was executed on the 10th day of January, 1889. But I think it insufficient with regard to the transactions on the 23d day of July, 1888.

Van Brunt, P. J., concurs.