Majority
Headnote
Health laws—Quarantine—Lien by warehousemen for disinfection. .The question of -the liability of the defendants ■other than Smith, as presented at the trial, was by the parties treated as one of law only, so far as related to the claim for the money paid by the plaintiffs to obtain the possession of the goods, and to which amount the modification of the judgment by the general term reduced the recovery. And if there was any evidence to support it to that extent, the direction of a verdict for that sum was without error, unless the exceptions having relation to the nature of 'the action or the efficiency of the verdict were well taken. Winchell v. Hicks, 18 N. Y., 558 ; Dillon v. Crockcroft, 90 id., 649 .
The plaintiffs were the owners of the rags, and they were unconditionally entitled to possession of them and without payment of the charges asserted against them unless by force of some rule of law, regulation or authority the goods were lawfully taken and detained for the alleged purposes and subjected to the lien of charges for carriage, disinfection and storage, or for some portion of them. The defendants contend that the rags were taken and treated pursuant to legal authority, and that the amount of the charges so claimed was a lien upon the property, by which was justified the refusal of Bartlett & Co., until payment was made, to deliver it to plaintiffs.
Sanitary regulations are properly and necessarily provided for and applied at ports of entry for vessels and cargoes from foreign countries. And the health officer of the port of Hew York is clothed with power to use means to protect the public against contagion from infected vessels and cargoes arriving there from elsewhere, pursuant to the provisions of the statute “ establishing a quarantine, and defining the qualifications, duties and powers of the health officer for the harbor of Hew York.” Laws 1863, chap. 358; Laws 1865, chap. 592. And it is provided by the statutes of the United States that the quarantine and other restraints established by the health laws of any state respecting any vessels arriving in any port thereof shall be observed by the officers of customs, etc., and all such officers of the United States shall faithfully aid in the execution of such quarantine and health laws, and as they shall be directed from time to time by the secretary of the treasury. U. S. R S., § 4792. And whenever by the health laws of any state, or by the regulations made pursuant thereto, any vessel arriving within the collection district of such state is prohibited from coming to the port of entry or delivery, and such health laws require or permit the cargo of the vessel to be unladen at some other place within or near the dis
By reference to orders and circulars from the treasury department to the collector, and through the latter, as well as by regulations of the health officer, it appears that provision was made with, a view to such protection.
In the quarantine regulations promulgated by the health officer in August, 1884, was the provision that vessels with cargo wholly or in part rags from an infected port or district would not be given pratique; “vessels with rags from healthy ports-would be required to furnish satisfactory evidence that they had: been gathered in districts where no suspicion of cholera existed,, in default of which the cargo would be subject to the regulation which related to such a cargo from an infected port.” And that the evidence “must consist of an affidavit made by the original shipper before the U. S. consul at the port of shipment that the rags have not been gathered in cholera infected districts and the certificate of such consul that the person making the affidavit' is a man of good character and entitled to credit.” In the consular certificate annexed to the affidavit of .the shipper of the rags on the Vigilant the requirement relating to the character and credit., of the affiant was not observed. '
By circular issued by the secretary of the treasury in November, 1884, the unlading of rags from infected ports, amongst, which were classed France, Italy and all Mediterranean and French ports, was prohibited, and it was directed that no old rags should be landed at any port of the. United States except, on a certificate of the U. S. consular officer at the port of departure that they were not gathered or baled at, or shipped from,, any infected place or any region contiguous thereto, and that the-order would not be construed to allow the unlading of any old rags except upon the usual permit of the local quarantine or health officers. This circular, directed to officers of customs and others, was in harmony with the regulations of the health office and in aid of their enforcement.
In December following, another circular of the secretary of the treasury, in like manner issued to the collector of customs, directed" that no old rags, except those afloat before January 1, 1885, on vessels bound directly to the United States, should he landed" there from any vessel, except upon disinfection at the expense of the importers. And on January 12, 1885, in a circular of the-secretary of the treasury to the collector of the port of New York, and in which was approved the selection of the Baltic stores as aplace for storage and disinfection of rags, it was provided that:
On June .10 the health officer made a certificate to the effect that the rags “ per ship Vigilant from Hiogo (Japan), to be disinfected are not from a cholera infected port.” But by it he treats the rags subject to disinfection in accordance with his letter of the •6th of June to the collector. The secretary of the treasury relived his department from further responsibility on the subject of -disinfection of rags by his circular of June 10th, by which it was ■ordered that all circulars of the department concerning the disin
The rags imported in the Battaglia were on or about the 19th of June taken by lighters to Robbins Reef, a place in quarantine designated by the health officer for disinfection. The specific reference made to the regulations, orders and directions of the health officer and treasury department and the execution of them directed by the collector sufficiently show the manner the authority was given, assumed and exercised in taking the possession of the rags-for the purposes there indicated. And whatever the secretary of the treasury and through him the collector was lawfully permitted to do in that respect, was in aid of the health officer and in observance of the health laws of the state.
The direction of the collector that the rags be sent to the placeswhere they were taken from the vessels was pursuant to the regulation or requirement that they should be disinfected, and it may be said to have been given pursuant to direction from the secretary of the treasury, and in aid of the health officer in the execution of his official power by the observance of the regulations made by him in that behalf. And although these rags came within the rule or regulation adopted by him for disinfection, and by his approval and advice were sent to the place where they were taken for that purpose, he testified that he never gave any order for the disinfection of the rags on either of the two vessels. While his regulations provided that it be done, and for that purpose the transfer of the rags from the vessels to the warehouses was necessary, it does not appear that he employed anybody to do it And, so far as appears, the work of disinfection was not conducted under the supervision or control of the health officer, nor pursuant to his employment of the disinfecting company, which owned the machine by which it was done, or of E.
The difficulty with the claim for disinfection is that the company or persons doing it had no direction of the health officer for that purpose, nor was it done by his employees. The statute contemplates that charges of this character shall be incurred only by means of the official action, or in executing the orders of the health officer, and be subject to his control through those whom he may employ to perform the service. His official sanction and responsibility were essential to the creation in invitum of charges upon the property of the plaintiffs. Those for the alleged service of disinfection seem not to have had such support, and therefore were not a lien upon the rags. But this difficulty is not necessarily applicable to the charges for lighterage and storage. The Baltic stores had, under the advice and approval of the health officer of the port of Hew York and the health commissioner of Brooklyn, been selected and designated by the secretary of the treasury as a warehouse for the storage and disinfection of imported rags, and Bobbin’s Beef had also been duly designated as another place for disinfection of like goods. The collector under his authority, in view of the regulation for disinfection of the rags on the two vessels adopted by the health officer, was justified in directing as he did the sending of the rags to those places, and the expenses of such transfer were presumptively a lien upon the property to which they related. Ho specific order or direction of the health officer is essential for that purpose. It is sufficient that it was done pursuant to regulations, within his power, made by him. Of course, if the transfer of the rags to those places for any purpose was caused by collusion or conspiracy between the health officer and Bartlett & Co. no lien in behalf of the latter could result for the charges and storage. But while that was charged in the complaint, it was not supported by the verdict taken against the appellants alone, and is entitled to no consideration in the case as now presented. The question is solely one of power and authority, upon the assumption that the health officer acted in good faith, which has the support of presumption,
In view of what has already been observed, that which was done by way of transfer of the rags from the vessels to the selected and designated warehouses for the purposes contemplated was within the power of the health officer and in aid of the exercise pt which the direction of the collector to make the transfer may[1] have been legitimately given and executed; and as the case is now presented it must be so treated. It follows that the charges for lighterage paid by Bartlett & Co. according to the custom in such cases, and for the storage in their Baltic stores for the time the goods properly remained there, were a lien upon the rags. But so far .as the defendants required the payment of the further claim for disinfection as a condition of the delivery, they were chargeable with duress of property. The right to recover back those two items of the bill and each of them is challenged by exceptions taken. It is unnecessary to consider the question whether or not the defendants were entitled to the full amount charged for storage as there is ho basis furnished by the evidence to sever it
It is urged that there was no verdict effectual to support the judgment because it was found only against the defendants other than Smith and none as to him was rendered by the jury.
The action was in tort. The charge of conspiracy in the complaint was not necessarily the controlling element of its nature, and it did not require a verdict for or against all of the defendants jointly upon the cause of action there alleged. The defendant Smith was not chargeable with the act of refusal to deliver the property to the plaintiffs, nor did he receive any of the money paid by them to obtain the possession of the rags. His alleged liability was founded upon the charge of conspiracy and collusion with the other defendants for the purpose of enabling them to create the charges and assert the lien to the prejudice of the plaintiffs. And as the plaintiffs consented to and did accept the verdict against those defendants, it is difficult to see any further support for the action against the defendant Smith while the recovery on the verdict remains effectual.
In Porter v. Mount, 45 Barb., 422 , the cause of action as alleged in the complaint was upon a joint contract of the defendants, which denies to that case any necessary application to the present case. The money was paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants upon bills in favor of E. B. Bartlett & Co. who refused to deliver the possession of the rags to the plaintiffs until payment was made. All the members of that firm were for the purposes of the relief equally chargeable to the plaintiffs. These views lead to the conclusion that the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event, unless the plaintiffs stipulate to reduce the recovery of damages to $8,182.50, and in that event the judgment be so modified and as modified affirmed, without costs in this court to either party.
All concur, except Potter and Vann, JJ., not voting.