Majority
Headnote
1. Insurance (Marine)—Construction of policy—New York harbor.The question which meets us at the threshold of this discussion is, was the evidence sufficient to justify the submission of the question, whether the defendant’s agents approved of the application for this insurance ? ' The authority of W. M. Onderdonk & Co. to bind the defendant by endorsing in the book in any form their approval of the risk proposed, is not denied. Six days before the entry in question the insured entered on the same book an application for insurance on the boat “ Delia McKeever” for $2,500 on cement, New York harbor, which was approved by writing the word “ Harbor ” in the column desig
Was the contract of insurance void because the duration of the risk was not fixed by. time nor for a voyage between specified ■places? Ordinarily marine contracts of insurance not specifying the duration of the risk either by time or by the places at which the voyage insured is to begin and end, are void for uncertainty. Molloy, Bk 2, chap. 7, § 14; 2 Par. Mar. L., 311; 1 Phil. Ins., § 918; 1 Arn. Mar. Ins., 6th ed., 236; Manly v. United M. & F. Ins. Co., 9 Mass., 85 .
The undisputed evidence is that during the season of 1887 the assured had been engaged in forwarding cargoes of Portland ■cement to the contractors engaged in extending the Croton water supply, which were delivered at various points in the upper part ■of the harbor of New York, on the Harlem river, and at Tarry-town. It was the custom of the contractors to direct the assured to load five or six thousand barrels on boats and subsequently designate the places at which they should be unloaded. That in such cases the place of destination could not be entered in the book, and that the words “From New York to harbor” indicates such shipments. The assured also testified that all of these cargoes had been insured through these agents by the defendant under the policy put in evidence and by entries on the book made as in this instance. Under such a practice an insurance on a cargo to be delivered at some place in the same port would not be so indefinite and uncertain as to render the contract void, both parties understanding what was meant by the term. Did the loss •occur in that harbor ? It was competent to receive evidence as to the meaning in the business of insurance of the term, “ Harbor of New York.” Nelson v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 71 N. Y., 453 , Upon this issue there wa's evidence that the term “Harbor of New York,” as used in the business of marine insurance, included and other within the New York custom house
It is insisted that the loss was not within the perils insured against. The evidence is that the “Abel” was loaded at the-Anglo-American Stores, Brooklyn, N. Y., October 19, 1887, and left that place at 8 o’clock p. m. of that day in a tow bound for Tarrytown, where it arrived at 1 o’clock the next morning. The; boat was moored alongside of the dock, and when the tide went out it grounded and was so broken or strained that it sank, and. the-cargo was destroyed. It was testified that the boat was seaworthy when laden, which evidence was not disputed. This case, does not fall within the class of cases of which Berwind v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 114 N. Y., 231 ; 23 St. Rep., 93 , is a type. In that, case the boat sprung a leak and sank ‘without any known cause. It was held that this raised a presumption that it was unseaworthy, but that this presumption might have been rebutted by showing that the loss was occasioned by some other cause than the. unseaworthiness of the boat This was precisely what was done, in this case.
Whether the defendant had waived the requirement in the policy, that formal proofs of loss should be furnished within thirty days, and an action brought within twelve months after a loss,, was submitted to the jury and was found for the plaintiff. No point is made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict on these issues.
But two exceptions were taken to the instructions given by the court, and neither of them was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant.
I think the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur.
Footnotes
- 1 Affirming32 St. Rep., 965.