Majority
Headnote
1. Master and servant—Negligence—Construction of elevated railroad.The immediate'cause of the giving way of the-girders and the fall of the structure was the subject of some contention upon the evidence..
The plaintiff’s counsel contends that it was the result of the negligent failure of the defendants to perform their duty to their employees, in that they did not use the care imposed upon them to provide a reasonably safe structure for the men to work upon or proper means for its support or movement for the purposes of the service required. If that proposition in its application to the cause of the calamity in question had the support of evidence the charge of negligence on the part of the defendants was sustained.. Ryan v. Fowler, 24 N. Y., 410 ; Pantzar v. Tilly Foster Mining Co., 99 id., 368; Kranz v. Long Island Ry. Co., 123 id., 1; 33 St. Rep., 46 .
There is no question about the competency of the mep to perform the duties devolved upon them in the service. The charge of negligence against the defendants has relation mainly to the system provided for the performance of the work of construction in which the plaintiff was engaged, and is, that there was a want of reasonable care in furnishing precautionary means for the safety of the employees upon it. The structure called the traveler, containing the engine, boiler and other appliances, was moved on the girders from one cross beam to another having the weight of ten -to twelve tons, and required a substantial support. In this instance for some cause, it is said, the girders swayed as the traveler was moving along upon them, and they, with it, fell to the ground. There was no lateral bracing placed between the girders before this weighty structure called the traveler was moved over them. Hor were the ends at the bottom bolted. The upper portion of each end of the girders extended beyond the loxver portion and when it projected on to the cross beam, where it rested on a seat plate and was held by two bolts, the lower portion set up against the beam and its bottom rested upon a bracket,, where provision was made for bolting it. also, but the bolting there was omitted until'after the passage of the traveler over the-girders. This was the method of going along with the work up-to the time in question.
There was evidence tending to prove that the bracing would
On the part of the plaintiff evidence was also given tending to prove that the rope or cable to which .the • power was applied to draw the traveler over the girders was not in line with its motion or movement; that the. clamp employed not being such as could be fastened to the cross beam in direct line from the place it was attached for that purpose to the moving platform, was fastened a distance in advance of it to one of the longitudinal girders. This was the subject of considerable evidence, and it is by no means clear that the divergence of this rope from the direct line of motion was such as to be seriously prejudicial to the safe movement of the structure, although the evidence may have presented a question in that respect for the jury in connection with the condition in which the girders were when required to support the transmission of the platform over them. But the main question seems to have had relation to the defective manner in which the girders were stayed to their places.
It was plain to be seen that there was no lateral bracing between the girders. This the plaintiff knew. He may also have-observed that the ends were bolted only at the top. As they were-resting upon the cross beams, it may be that no apprehension of danger in the passage of this loaded platform over them was apparent to ordinary observation. And the importance of such bracing and bolting for the purpose of safely taking and moving that weight upon them by the means applied and in the manner it was, may have required some skill or judgment not available-to an ordinary observer or to the plaintiff. The knowledge of what appearecl to him to be the situation may not necessarily have advised the plaintiff of the consequences which might result from it. The place of the plaintiff’s service was on the platform, where was located the power applied to raise the girders, and when that was being done it was sixty feet or more in the rear from the place where the girders as they were hoisted were placed and bolted. The inference was permitted from the evidence that, the defective condition occasioned by the want of bracing and bolting for the purposes of bearing the moving weight upon the girders and the consequences to be apprehended from such omission, so far as they were attributable to such causes, were not within the hazards of the service assumed by the plaintiff, nor was he as matter of law chargeable with contributory negligence. And therefore the motion for nonsuit was properly denied.
For the purpose of proving the character and extent of the injury the plaintiff had sustained, a medical witness was called and.
The defendants objected to the witness stating what the plaintiff said to him. And on the doctor proceeding to state something further that the plaintiff had said, the defendants’ counsel moved that it be stricken out; the court, in denying the motion, remarked that the evidence was taken with the understanding that it would be stricken out unless the fact should be proved by him. The defendants’ counsel excepted. The witness further testified that he asked the plaintiff about his power of sexual intercourse. The doctor was then asked the following question, objection to which was overruled, and exception taken:
“ Q. What question did you ask him, and what reply did he make, concerning sexual intercourse ? A. T asked him whether or not he had sexual intercourse, and he said he had not; I said to him, have you since the injury? A Never. I said to him, have you had any intercourse with your wife since then ? He said, I have never been able to.”
And the witness gave some further evidence of the declaration of the plaintiff on the subject of his sexual disability during that time. In overruling the objection the court said that he would receive the evidence under the “same ruling and limitations” already indicated. The question arises whether or not the reception of this evidence was error. As a general rule declarations made out of court by a party are not admissible as evidence in his behalf. But his statements to his attending physician of the nature of the symptoms of his malady or suffering have quite uniformly been held admissible. And from necessity they were formerly deemed competent when made to persons other than medical attendants under some circumstances. Caldwell v. Murphy, 11 N. Y., 416 ; Werely v. Persons, 28 id., 844; Matteson v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 35 id., 491. But since the Code permits ■parties to make their statements under oath as witnesses, that necessity in this state has ceased to exist, and as a rule declarations made to persons other than the medical attendant of the party are not admissible as evidence. Reed v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y., 574 ; Roche v. Brooklyn City, etc., R. R. Co., 105 id., 294; 7 St. Rep., 361 .
It was, however, held in Hagenlocher v.C. I. & B. R. R. Co., 99 N. Y., 136 , that the evidence of a non-medical witness that the plaintiff (who had received an injury) manifested pain by screaming, was competent because it was apparently involuntary and
. In the present case the declarations in question of the plaintiff were not instructive, nor were they made to the physician with a. view to medical treatment. They consisted not of examination of present pain or suffering, but were the plaintiff’s statements, so-far as called for by the doctor, of the effect upon him of the injury and the consequences which had followed in such respects-from the time it occurred; a period of nearly fifteen months. This was hearsay, and is very different from that of a medical witness-■as to the expressions by a patient or person suffering from injury or disease, indicating pain or distress or expressive of the present, state of his feelings in that respect. We. think the reception of the evidence was error. And although the plaintiff testified to* the truth of the statements made to the doctor, his evidence did not cure the error.
The character of his injury was an important fact as beai’ingupon the question of damages. And although his evidence may have constituted the basis in part at least of a hypothetical question for the opinion of the doctor, it cannot be said that the evidence given by the latter of the plaintiff’s declarations was not prejudicial to the defendants. The plaintiff’s interest as a party-presented the question of his credibility for the jury, and his evidence could not properly be corroborated by proving that the facts to which he testified corresponded with the declarations-made by him to the doctor. This, for the support to the plaintiff’s evidence, was not admissible. Robb v. Hackey, 23 Wend., 50 ; Reed v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y., 574 .
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs; .to abide the event.
All concur.