Lanigan v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America

On the 30th day of June, 1890, the defendant issued a policy on the life of Martin Dooley for $158 on his written application therefor, and on that day Dooley by an instrument in writing in accordance with the forms issued by the defen

The defendant in its answer alleges that the assured in his application made certain representations as to his physical condition which were untrue, and also represented and warranted that he was not insured by the defendant under any other policy of insurance, which warranties the .defendant alleged were false and fraudulent.

On the trial the plaintiff proved the policy, its assignment to the plaintiff and the death of the assured. The defendant put in evidence the application for the policy, and also proved that there was at the date of the application another policy issued by the defendant on the life of the assured.

The defendant also proved that the health of the assured soon after, the issuance of the policy was impaired, and that he suffered from hemorrhage from the lungs, and that he died of consumption in less than one year, but more than six months after the issuance of the policy. At the conclusion of the testimony the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, which motion was denied, and judgment was given for the plaintiff for the amount estimated due upon the policy by its terms.

The county court on appeal affirmed that judgment and the defendant appeals to this court. The defendant urges two principal grounds for the reversal of this judgment.

First. That the application of the assured in relation to his health was untrue.

Second. That his statement in the application that he had no other insurance policy on his life issued by the defendant was false, and that the policy for these reasons was void.

Upon the subject of the assured’s physical condition at the time of making the application, there was clearly such a conflict as to make it a question of fact, and as the justice found with the plaintiff upon that question, we should not disturb his findings on that subject.

On the subject of the time of his cough, and the hemorrhage, some of the witnesses say that he was sick nearly all summer with a cough; others say he did not cough more than three months before his death. Some of the witnesses think the hemorrhage occurred in June; some fix it as late as July or August.

As to the question of another policy on the assured’s life in the defendant’s company, there is no conflict in the evidence. There was another policy on his life at the time of this application. The question propounded in the application and answered by the assured on this subject is as follows: “Is life proposed insured in this company ? If so, state numbers and amounts of policies.” The answer written in the application to this question is “Ho.” This application also contains this provision: “I agree that said answers with this declaration shall form the basis of

“ Fourth. This policy shall be void if the iusured shall, without the written permission of the president or secretary of the company, engage in either of the occupations excepted in "the foregoing section, or while there is in force upon the life of the insured a policy previously issued by this company unless the policy first issued contains an endorsement signed by the president or secretary authorizing this policy to be in force at the same time.”

■But there is no provision in the application or policy which renders the policy void for a breach of any warrantee contained in the application.

It is insisted on the part of the respondent that the defendant waived the condition in the fourth subdivision of the policy above quoted by accepting the premiums and issuing a policy on this application, especially as the defendant presumably had knowledge of the existence of a previous policy issued by it on the life of the assured at the time of the issuance of the policy in suit.

It is true as a general rule that a general warrantee does not protect the one to whom it is given against facts known to and understood by him, and this rule has been applied in certain cases' to insurance policies."

In Short v. Home Ins. Co., 90 N. Y., 19 , the condition in the policy was, that if the premises became vacant or unoccupied to the knowledge of the assured the policy should be void, and the case showed that the premises were at the time of issuing the policy vacant and remained so until destroyed by fire, and the court held that, if the defendant knew that fact at the time of issuing the policy, it was deemed to have waived that condition and was estopped from setting that up as a breach of the assured’s engagement, to defeat the policy.

So in Woodruff v. The Imperial Fire Ins. Co., 83 N. Y., 133 , where the applicant was required to state for what purpose the building was used, and he answered a dwelling and the same was at the time unoccupied, the assured was not held to the statement as a warranty. So in Van Schoick v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 68 N. Y., 434 , the application required that if the building was located on lease land it must be stated, and although that was the case, to the knowledge of the assured and the agent of the company, held that as the defendant had notice of the fact, it did not vitiate the policy.

But all of these cases, and others of the same effect of a kindred character, turned upon the question of knowledge in the company or it¡3 agent.

In the case at bar there is no direct evidence that the company knew at the time of issuing- this policy that there was another outstanding policy of this company on the assured’s life. Is it chargeable with such knowledge from the fact of the existence

That case, however, proceeded upon the theory that the company had knowledge of the fact that the building was unoccupied. In the case at bar we think it may be assumed that the justice found from the fact that the defendant was a party to the prior insurance from .having issued, its policy, and that having such knowledge, and with it accepting the premiums and issuing its policy, it was estopped from insisting upon the forefeiture, especially as there does not seem to be any claim that there • was a fraudulent misrepresentation by the assured. The proof shows that his actual statement to the agent of the defendant at the time of the application was, “ that he was . not insured in defendant’s •company that he knew of,” and there is no positive evidence that he had such knowledge.

The defendant being in a position to have had actual knowledge, the presumption that it did possess the same is quite as strong or stronger than any that can be indulged in as to the assured.

While the case is not free from doubt, we are inclined to •sustain the justice and county court in holding that the defendant must be charged with knowledge of the existence of a former policy issued by it outstanding at the time of issuing the policy in suit, and that that condition was, therefore, waived, and cannot for that reason be urged as a ground for reversal of this judgment.

Judgment of the justice and the county court affirmed, with costs.

Putnam, J., concurs; Herrick, J., not voting.