People ex rel. John A. Roeblings' Sons Co. v. Wemple — 44 N.Y. St. Rep. 708

Majority

p. 708

The People ex rel. John A. Roeblings’ Sons Company v. Edward Wemple, Comptroller.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department,

Filed April 4, 1892.)

Headnote

'Taxes—Foreign corporation—Manufacturing within the state—Exemption.

In a proceeding by certiorm-i to review the decision of the state comptroller in assessing taxes upon the relator, a New Jersey corporation, under the corporation tax laws, the relator claiming exemption upon the ground that it carried on a manufacturing business within this state, it appeared that relator was organized for the purpose of “manufacturing, buying and selling iron, steel wire, wire rope,” etc., and stated in its affidavit filed with its claim for exemption, that it manufactured wire at its Trenton factory, and shipped the same to its New York factory, and there made said raw material up into ship rigging, endless elevator chains, etc., and then fitted said wire with blocks, pulleys, and other attachments, and thus converted it into useful and complete articles for the market. Reid, that the manufacturing done by the relator in New York was colorable merely, and does not come within the exemption of the statute.

Certiorari to review the decision of the comptroller of the sstate in assessing taxes upon the relator to the amount of $9,403.79, under the corporation tax laws, for the years 1880 to 1889, inclusive.

Charles Haldane Johnson, for relator; S. W. Rosendale, att’y-gen., ■for def’t.

The relator is incorporated under the laws, of the state of New Jersey for the purpose of carrying on a manufacturing business. The certificate of incorporation provides: “That the borough of Chambersburgb, in the county of Mercer .and state of New Jersey, is the place where the principal part of the business of the said company is to be carried on. That the •city of New York, in the county and state of New York, is the ■place where said company may have an office and store for the sale of their manufactured, goods, and for the transaction of other business connected therewith.” There is no dispute but that the relator is doing business within this state, and hence subject to its laws in regard to taxation, but the relator claims that during the years for which the taxes were levied in this case, it was doing a manufacturing business within this state, and hence comes within the excejDtion mentioned in § 3 of chapter 542 of the Laws of 1880, which section provides that “ every corporation * * * incorporated or organized by or under the laws of any other state or country and doing business in this state, except * * * manufacturing corporations carrying on manufacturing within this state * * * shall be subject to and pay a tax,” etc., etc.

The relator alleges that it is carrying on a manufacturing business within the state of New York.

The defendant, in his return to the writ of certiorari herein, .specifically denies that the relator is carrying on a manufacturing business within this state. The relator is incorporated for the purpose of manufacturing, buying and selling iron, steel wire, wire ropes, and all other materials used in connection therewith. And the relator states in the affidavit filed in its claim for exemption “ that the said corporation manufactures wire at the said

p. 709

factory at Trenton, New Jersey;. that wire is shipped in coils to the New York factory ; and that at the said New York factory the .said raw material is made up into ship rigging, endless elevator chains, and other useful articles; that the said wire is fitted with blocks, pulleys and other attachments at the said New York factory, and is thus converted into useful and complete articles ready for the market.”

The defendant, in his return to the writ herein, alleges that the ■premises in the city of New York used and occupied by the relator are not used and occupied as a factory; that they are used for its offices and place of business and for the storage of its goods, .and “ that on each of the storage floors two or three men are employed by the relator in adapting the manufactured articles of ■the company for such purposes as may be required, such as .attaching loops to wire ropes fpr use as switching rods, attaching hooks and loops to wire cables for various purposes, and that no wire, or wire ropes, or any other article is manufactured at its ■place of business.”

This statement of the defendant may be taken as not in conflict with the affidavit of the relator, but as an explanation of what the relator described as the making up of the raw material and •converting it into useful and complete articles ready for the market. The process of treatment is not described by the relator, ¡so that from its statement alone it cannot be determined whether it is in truth a manufacturing business that is being carried on in the ¡state of New York or not; the relator’s affiant says it is, but does not so describe it as to enable the court to determine whether he is correct or not. As explained by the defendant, it does not ¡seem to me that it is manufacturing within the meaning of the .statute; what it did in the city of New York was but an incident of its business, not the business itself; it was not manufacturing but the putting together articles manufactured elsewhere; the -cutting into lengths coils of wire can hardly, it seems to me, be the manufacturing of wire ropes, cables or rigging.

“ The definition of the terms 1 manufacturing corporations ’ and ‘ manufacture ’ as derived from some decisions and statutes to ■which our attention has been called, is of little service in the construction of the language of this act. These terms must be construed in view of the general purposes of the acts in which they are used, and the general phraseology found in connection with' them. To give effect to the legislative intention, their ordinary meaning may be enlarged or restricted.” People v. Horn Silver Mining Co., 105 N. Y., 76 -82; 6 St. Rep., 498 .

But assuming that in a sense, or technically speaking, that the ¡acts or processes described is manufacturing, still I think it is not within the spirit or intent of the statute; it is not a carrying on -manufactures within this state within its meaning.

In determining whether a given case is within a clause in a ¡statute exempting certain property or interests from taxation, the policy of the law in making the exemption must be considered and should have great weight. People ex rel. Brush Electric Ill. Co., 42 St. Rep., 272 -276.

p. 710

The terms used must be construed in view of the general purposes of the act. One of those purposes was to encourage manuiactures within the state, and the facts in this case would seem to-indicate that a ruling that corporations doing business in the manner the relator has been are exempt from taxation would rather discourage than encourage the growth of manufacturing interests in this state. The great proportion of relator’s manufacturing is done outside the state ; the proportion inside,' if it be considered manufacturing, is so small that it would almost appear that it was done here merely for the purpose of relieving the business from taxation.

To secure exemption under this act some substantial portion of the manufacturing business of the corporation should be done-here; it should not be a mere incident of the business, or done in. connection with the main business; it is the manufacturing business that is to be exempted, not the business that any one chooses, to establish in connection with manufacturing, and the manufacturing must be real, not colorable.

Comparing the amount claimed to have been manufactured in the state of New York with either the total amount manufactured, or with the amount sold within the state it seems to me-would bring one to the conclusion that to exempt the business-done in this state because of the manufacturing done within the state would be very far from encouraging the growth of manufacturing industries here, and unless the words of the statute can be construed in no other way the relator should not be relieved. It would be a plain case of the letter of the statute killing its-spirit.

It seems to me that the manufacturing done by the defendant in this state is colorable merely, and does not come within the-exemption of the statute. People ex rel. v. Wemple, 42 St. Rep., 60 ; People v. Horn Silver Mining Co., 105 N. Y., 76 ; 6 St. Rep., 495 .

Being subject to taxation the determination of the comptroller as to the amount, unless clearly shown to be erroneous, will not be disturbed. People ex rel. v. Wemple, 42 St. Rep., 60 ; People ex rel. v. Wemple, id., 400-404, and the determination of the comptroller not being clearly shown tobe erroneous in this case should, not be disturbed.

The determination of the comptroller is affirmed, with fifty dollars costs and printing disbursements.

Putnam, J., concurs.