Majority
Headnote
1. Indictment—Obscene prints.The indictment was under § 317 of the Penal Code, relating to obscene publications. It was in six counts and the defendant demurred to the indictment as a whole, and separately to each count, on the ground that the facts stated in the indictment, and in each count thereof, do not constitute any crime. By the first count the grand jury of the county of Monroe-.accuse the defendant “ of the crime of selling an obscene newspaper, committed as follows ; The said Maurice F. Danahy at the city of Rochester, in the county of Monroe, on the 27th day of September, in the year 1890, willfully, unlawfully and maliciously did sell to Abram Rosenberg and to divers other persons, whose-names are to this grand jury unknown, an obscene, lewd, lascivious,, filthy and indecent newspaper, commonly called and known 1 Sunday Star,’ which said newspaper and Sunday Star was No. 1 of volume 2 of said paper, bearing date Rochester, N.Y., September
The rule which has always held in actions, of libel, either civil ■or criminal, is applicable to this case. A complaint or indictment which only charged that the written or printed matter complained of was libelous or defamatory would certainly be bad, aiot because of a failure to identify the matter, but because it did not appear on the face of the pleading that it was libelous or defamatory. And so the two classes of actions or prosecutions have •always been classed together for the purposes of this rule, and it has been held with great strictness that in all actions, civil and ■criminal, in which the cause of action or offense consists in the publication of written or printed matter, the words complained of •must be set out in the complaint or indictment The cases of Bradlaugh and Besant v. The Queen, L. R., 3 Q. B. Div., 607; Commonwealth v. Tarbox, 1 Cush., 66 ; United States v. Bennett, 16 Blatch., 338; Commonwealth v. Dejardin, 126 Mass., 46 , are a few of those industriously collected by the learned county judge ■and of which synopses are given in his opinion. They are directly in point, and in effect base the rule on the reasons above ■considered, and not, as the court seems'to have done in the case of The People v. Hallenbeck, 52 How. Pr., 502 , on the ground of the necessity of clearly identifying the publication complained ■of. Identification is, of course, a requirement of the pleading, but in that respect the count in question is not at fault. It describes the newspaper by its name, its volume, number, date and place of publication. Moreover, in its allegation of the manner in which the crime was committed,, it applies to the publication not only the term “ obscene ” but all the other descriptive terms used by the statute, in the alternative, in defining the crime, viz: “lewd, lascivious, filthy, and indecent; ” and, still further, it describes the newspaper as containing articles and stories of an indecent and immoral character. But, after all, these additions are only an amplification of the charge and not demonstration of its truth; a conclusion of fact and not the facts themselves relied upon to establish the charge made against the defendant
On the other hand, the fourth count completely avoids the objection which we have considered and is liable to no other objection so far as we observe. It is framed under the same subdivision of § 317 as the first count, but under another specification. The statute as applicable to it reads: “A person who sells * * *- any * * * printed matter of an indecent character * * * is guilty of misdemeanor.” This count besides specifying the time when, place where, and person to whom the sale is charged to have been made, and a minute description, for the purpose of identification* of the newspaper in which it was printed, sets out in full the “ printed matter of an indecent character ” to which the charge relates. -It is no objection to this count that the printed matter in question is shown to have been printed in a newspaper. It is still “printed matter,” and if of an indecent-character is within the prohibition of the statute as much as if printed in a broadside or handbill. As pointed out by the learned county judge, the language of the specification in the statute is not “ or any other printed matter,” etc. On the contrary it is very plain that the language “ or any printed matter of an indecent character ” is intended to be very general and to include everything coming within the description whether otherwise described in previous specifications or not
The fifth count charges the defendant with having the same printed matter in possession with intent to sell, and it identifies and sets out the .matter intended by a reference to the fourth count,, which is thereby made a part of the fifth. This mode of plead-, ing by reference to a former part of the same indictment, to obviate a useless repetition, is sustained by authority and seems to be-without substantial fault The People v. Graves, 5 Park. Crim., 134.
The.demurrer as to the fourth and fifth counts was properly overruled, and the judgment should be in all respects affirmed.
Judgment of the court of sessions of Monroe county affirmed, and case remitted to that court to proceed on the.fourth and fifth, cou'nts of the indictment.
Macomber and Lewis, JJ., concur.