McShane v. Pinkham

The plaintiff recovered judgment against defendant for $791, in January last, and issued execution which was returned wholly unsatisfied, whereupon he obtained a third party order against the city chamberlain of New York, and the examination had thereunder disclosed that “ on May 9, 1892, there was paid to the chamberlain in cash, in the case of The People v. Charles H. Pinkham, the sum of $6,500 in lieu of bail bond for said defendant, pursuant to an order of the general sessions made by Recorder Smyth, and dated May 9, 1892,” and that the same is still so held by him. Upon the evidence, and this evidence alone, plaintiff, the judgment creditor, now moves under § 2446 of the Code for an order directing the chamberlain to pay out of the money so held by him such amount as will satisfy the execution. The recorder’s order of May 9th provides that Charles H. Pinkham be admitted to bail in the sum of $6,500, with surety in like amount, or instead thereof he may deposit said sum of money with city chamberlain, and Pinkham, on the same day in a written stipulation which recited that “ having this day caused to be deposited the sum of $6,500,” agreed to abide the above order, etc. The deputy chamberlain deposes that said $6,500 was paid into his office by the Fourth National Bank and the Central National Bank, in lieu of a bail bond for that amount, to secure the appearance of said Pinkham. It appears that at the time of the deposit the chamberlain executed and delivered to these two banks acknowledgments, of which the following is a copy: “Chamberlain’s office, New York, May 9, 1892. The People, etc., v. Charles H. Pinkham. Whereas, heretofore and

The other bank received a similar receipt. And the defendant Pinkham de¡ioses, that he has not, nor has he ever had any interest in such money, but that same was so deposited by these two banks. The contention of plaintiff’s counsel is, that, irrespective of this proof, this $6,500 became the property of the defendant the moment it was so deposited, and he relies upon two causes which he cites, and upon the language of sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provide for such deposits money in lieu of the bail bond, namely, §§ 586, 592, Code of Criminal Procedure. The case of Eagan v. Stevens, 39 Hun, 311 , really has no bearing upon the subject, for there the recorder of Cohoes, before whom a person was brought upon a criminal charge, admitted.him to bail in $200, and instead of giving the requisite bail he deposited with the recorder $200 in cash in lieu thereof. This deposit was not made with the county treasurer as provided in § 586, Code of Criminal Procedure, and hence the court held that “ The recorder, in accepting the deposit of money, instead of taking bail, acted officially, or attempted to so act, without authority of law, hence his action was void in law, and the money remained the property of McClellan, the depositor, in his hands.” And this ruling was under the express provisions of a statute which provides that “ No sheriff or other officer shall take any bond, obligation or security by color of his office in any other case or manner than such as are provided by law, and any such bond, obligation or security taken otherwise than as herein directed shall be void.”. 3 R. S., 7th ed., 2374, § 59. The recorder of Cohoes was not authorized to take the deposit, but only the county treasurer. The other authority cited by plaintiff is People ex rel, Gilbert v. Laidlaw, City Chamberlain, 102 N. Y., 588 ; 2 St. Rep., 537 . In that case the deposit was made by a third party, the plaintiff therein, to whom the chamberlain executed and delivered an acknowledgment or receipt exactly similar to those given to the two banks in the case at bar. This deposit was made by Hilbert, the plaintiff, in lieu of a bail bond of $300 for the appearance of one Nye, who a few days thereafter was tried, convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $250, and the fine was ordered to be paid from the money so deposited.

Then Hilbert applied for alternative mandamus, addressed to City Chamberlain Laidlaw, commanding him, to return him the $300, or show cause, but the trial judge decided that he was not entitled to the writ of mandamus, and gave judgment against him for costs. Upon appeal, the general term reversed this judgment,

These conditions then existed in that case, for the defendant in the criminal action had been convicted and a judgment for the payment out of such deposit of a fine of $250 had been awarded against him, and the money still remained on deposit with the county treasurer, the city chamberlain of New York: But that

case does not hold, nor has any authority been cited or found which holds that cash so deposited by a third person in lieu of bail for a defendant in a criminal action becomes the property of such defendant for the purpose of paying and satisfying his obligations in civil actions entirely disconnected from the criminal action and the subject matter thereof. The establishing of such a rule of liability in reference to these deposits of cash by third persons, in lieu of bail for accused persons, should not be sanctioned except by express provision of statute, and no such statute law has been brought to the attention of the court, either from investigation or by reference of counsel.

This motion to direct the city chamberlain to pay over to the sheriff part of the money so deposited with him is denied, with ten dollars costs, but as counsel for the two banks, the defendant, the city chamberlain and the plaintiff, each requested that a stay be granted in case of an adverse decision, such stay will be granted, provided an appeal is duly taken and argued at the September general term.