during all the time he was there occupied the office and went through the building generally; used the building in connection with a straw hat factory which defendant was conducting. Henry Crum, a watchman, was hired by Mr. Howell at the direction of defendant. Crum stayed in the building day and night, and had all the keys; looked after the goods, turned them over, stirred up the hats in the machines to keep them from spoiling.
On August 1, 1883, plaintiff wrote defendant a letter stating that taxes amounting to $169.47 and also insurance were due upon the property, and requesting payment of $250 on account of rent. On August 13 plaintiff wrote again, stating that he had drawn on defendant for $500 for two months’ rent, and requesting him to honor draft Defendant answered the second letter, and without disclaiming liability stated that the demand for rent was excessive, but continued to occupy the premises. Defendant afterwards, November, 1883, wrote plaintiff to come to New York with relation to the matter, and plaintiff went there and saw the defendant; the latter stated that plaintiff’s claim was “ excessive,” and that he ought not to charge so much. Plaintiff afterwards saw defendant in New York in October, 1887, on which occasion defendant said: “I am free to admit right here that I expected to pay you something, but the amount you charged was too much. If I had known you would have asked me so much I would have moved the goods to a cheaper place.”
Preston & Chipp (Howard Chipp, Jr., of counsel), for app’lt; George Wilcox (F. L. Westbrook, of counsel), for resp’t.
The evidence in the case appears to be not substantially different from that given on the former trial and passed upon by the general term. 39 St. Rep., 721 . There was some additional testimony given on the last trial, but none materially changing the facts as they appeared in the case submitted to the general term, as such facts are stated in the prevailing opinion.
That the man who watched the store had a key, as shown on the last trial, does not sufficiently change the facts as to justify a reversal of the judgment. There is no evidence that plaintiff was excluded from the premises. We think that Justice Fursman at circuit was correct in deeming that he was bound by the holding of the general term to grant the motion for a nonsuit, and that there should be an affirmance of the judgment, with costs.
Mayham, P. J., Putnam and Herrick, JJ., concur.