Majority
Headnote
Evidence—Parol to explain written contract.The plaintiffs by their complaint alleged:
That by a lease, duly executed under the hands and seals of the parties, the defendant demised to them the six upper lofts (consisting of three in front and three in the rear) of the building" known as No. 2374 Third Avenue in the city of New York, to boused and occupied by the plaintiffs as a first-class lodging-house or . hotel for lodgers of the male sex only, together with the appurtenances, for the term of three years from May 1, 1891, at a certain yearly rent; that in and by the said lease the defendant coven
Upon these and other allegations not necessary to be specifically
The defendant, by his answer, admitted the execution and delivery of the lease as alleged by the plaintiffs, but in all other respects denied the allegations of the complaint.
Upon the trial of these issues the learned judge, after hearing part of the testimony offered by the plaintiffs, refused to hear the remainder and dismissed the complaint upon the ground that the lease'did not give the exclusive use of the hallway to the plaintiffs and did not prohibit the cutting of a door from the hall into the- saloon. This ruling seems to have proceeded upon the theory that the lease constituted the whole contract between the parties and that, inasmuch as the lease did not in terms grant to the plaintiffs the exclusive use and control of the hallway, evidence of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement concerning said hallway was inadmissible and so far as it had been permitted to be given had to be disregarded.
In this I think the learned trial judge erred.
The general rule which excludes conversations, negotiations, and paroi agreements, prior to the execution of a written agreement relating to and springing out off such conversations, negotiations, etc., does not apply,
1. When the original contract, although verbal, yet was entire, and only a part of it was reduced to writing, in which case the part not so reduced can be proved by paroi; and
2. When the consideration, or a consideration further than that expressed in the writing, does not appear in the writing, in which case the consideration, or the further consideration, may be proved by paroi. Hope v. Smith, 35 N. Y. Supr. Ct., 458 ; aff’d, 58 N. Y., 380 .
So paroi evidence is always admissible as to the meaning which the parties themselves attached to a particular word or phrase in the contract Such evidence does not contradict or vary the terms of the written contract, but is explanatory thereof.
In the case at bar the lease was for the six lofts, “ together with the appurtenances.” These words gave to the plaintiffs whatever was attached to or used with the premises, as incident thereto, and convenient or essential to the beneficial use and enjoyment thereof, and the plaintiffs took any easement or servitude used or enjoyed with the demised premises. Doyle v. Lord, 64 N. Y., 432 .
As the appurtenances were not specified, paroi evidence was admissible to show their character and extent, and that being so, paroi evidence was admissible to show that the parties, preparatory to the execution of the lease, met and discussed such character and extent, and agreed that the appurtenances should include all that they appeared to include, and that the defendant would not
Parol evidence to this effect was partly given and partly offered to be given, but rejected. Moreover the plaintiffs did show that before the lease was executed the parties did meet and had a discussion ; that in the course of it the defendant proposed that he should be allowed, in express terms to be inserted in the lease, to reserve the right of cutting a door from the hall into the saloon, and that the plaintiffs so strenuously objected to it, giving reasons for their objections, that the defendant expressly waived the point in plaintiffs’ favor.
Under all the circumstances as they appear at present, it must be assumed that the plaintiffs, if they had been permitted to give all the evidence which was competent under the issues within the rules above stated, would have made out a prima facie case, entitling them, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to some relief against the injurious use of the hall leading to their premises or of the side door cut from said hall into the adjoining saloon.
For the reasons stated the dismissal of the complaint constituted error.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with, costs to the appellants to abide the event.
G-ildersleeve, J., concurs.