Majority
Headnote
1. Injunction—Submission on controversy.—The submission in this case discloses that the judgment sought by the plaintiffs is, to restrain the defendant from carrying on business in the manner described in the submission, so far as it is in violation of the provisions of the banking law of the state; to adjudge that the defendant is exercising franchises not conferred upon it by law; and for a penalty of $100 for carrying on business in violation of the provisions of § 283 of chap. 409 of the Laws of 1882. - The only actual relief which the plaintiffs ask is: 1. To restrain the defendant from
continuing business in the manner mentioned; and 2. To recover the penalty provided for by § 283. The former cannot be awarded.. ISTo relief by injunction can be granted in a proceeding like this. Therefore, so far as this proceeding is for an injunction, it should be dismissed. Cunard Steamship Co. v. Voorhis, 104 N. Y., 525 ; 5 St. Rep., 736 ; Paterson v. Mut. L. Association of America, 19 Civ. Pro., 262; 33 St. Rep., 703 .
This leaves for consideration the question whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover a penalty under the statute which provides, “It shall not be lawful for any bank, banking association or individual banker, firm, association, corporation, person or persons, to advertise or put forth a sign as a savings bank, or in any way to solicit or receive deposits as a savings bank; and any bank, banking association or individual banker, firm, association, corporation, person or persons, which shall offend against these provisions, shall forfeit and pay for every such offense the sum of $100 for every day such offense shall be 'continued, to be sued for and recovered in the name of the People of this state, by the district attorneys of the several counties, in any court having cognizance thereof, for- the use of the poor chargeable to said county in which such offense shall be committed.” Laws 1882, chap. 409, § 283. Whether or not such recovery can be had depends upon the construction to be given to this statute.
If the purpose of the statute was to prohibit any person, firm, corporation or association from either soliciting or receiving deposits in the manner in which they are usually solicited and received by savings banks, it would seem that the plaintiffs would be entitled to a judgment for the penalty demanded, for, when we consider the facts stipulated as to the nature of the business transacted by the defendant, the manner in which it was performed, the circulars the defendant distributed and the advertisements it published, it is quite manifest that the defendant solicited and received deposits in substantially the same manner as they are solicited and received by savings banks.
Thus, the question is presented whether the legislature intended to confer upon savings banks a monopoly of the class of business usually transacted by them, or whether the intent and purpose of
If such is the proper construction of the statute under consideration, and we think it is, it follows that the plaintiffs, are not entitled to recover the .penalty sought to be recovered in this action, as the statement of facts is insufficient to justify us in holding that the defendant in any manner held itself out as a savings bank or solicited or received deposits claiming or pretending to be such.
These considerations lead us to the conclusion that this action,, so far as it is for an injunction to restrain the defendant from carrying on its business in the manner mentioned, should be dismissed, and so far as it seeks to recover a penalty, judgment should be entered in favor of the defendant upon the merits, with costs.
Judgment is directed accordingly. The form of judgment, if not agreed upon, to be settled before Martin, J.
Hardin, P. J., and Merwin, J., concur.