Majority
Headnote
Assault—Evidence.—In The People v. Gibbs, 93 N. Y., 470 , it was held, viz: “Upon trial of an indictment for assault with intent to kill, evidence showing the commission by the prisoner of another similar assault, at a different time and place, and upon a different person is not competent.” In the course of the opinion delivered in that case it was said “ The effect of the evidence was to present to the jury testimony relating to another assaült and to an entirely different transaction, which might well tend to prejudice their minds against the defendant in reference to the charge for which he. was on trial.”
In People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y., 467 ; 12 St. Rep., 217 , Peckham, J., said: “ The general rule is that when a man is put upon trial for one offense, he is to be convicted, if at all, by evidence which shows that he is guilty of that offense alone, and that, under ordinary circumstances, proof of his guilt of one or a score of other offenses in his life time is wholly excluded.”
In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 132 Mass., 16 , in the course of the opinion it was said, “Evidence of the commission of other crimes by the defendant may deeply prejudice him with the jury, while it does not legally bear upon his case. It certainly would not be competent in order to show the intent with which one entered a house or took an article of personal property to prove that he had committed a burglary or larceny at another time. * * * Such evidence compels the defendant to meet charges of which the -indictment gives him no information, confuses him in his defense, raises a variety of issues and thus diverts the attention of the jury from the one immediately before it, and, by showing the defendant to have been a knave on other occasions, creates a prejudice which may cause injustice to be done him.”
In People v. Wood, 3 Park. Crim., 684, it was said: “It is quite true that the prosecution cannot prove the commission of another and distinct felony by the prisoner for the purpose of establishing the fact directly that he committed the one for which he is then on trial, or for the purpose of raising any direct inference in the affirmative of the principal issue. * * * The common law, with more humanity and better logic, forbids such evidence in support of the principal issue, and limits its admission to minor issues, such as motive and scienter, and even then confines it to cases where there is some apparent connection or relation between the imputed motive or guilty knowledge and the felony proposed to be proved.”
In People v. Greenwall, 108 N. Y., 296 ; 13 St. Rep., 638 , the defendant was called as a witness in his own behalf; and upon being cross-examined as to his connection with another burglary at the house of one Mohring, and in the cross-examination, as well as in the re-examination, he denied that he had ever entered any
Conviction, order and judgment of the court of sessions of Broome county reversed, and the- clerk directed to enter judgment •and remit certified copy thereof with the return and decision of this court to the court of sessions of Broome county, pursuant to §§ 547 and 548 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Martin and Merwin, JJ., concur.