Brown v. Chubb

veyed to Mrs. Chubb in the sense that it could be sold upon execution. Garfield v. Hatmaker, 15 N. Y., 475 .

The remedy of Townsend’s creditors as to this land was in equity, under the provisions of the statute that the title in such cases shall vest in the grantee named in the conveyance, subject, to a resulting trust in favor of the creditors of the person paying the consideration. 1 R. S., 728, §§ 51, 52.

The trial court held that by virtue of the commencement of this action the plaintiffs acquired a lien upon the property and. the rents thereof in the hands of Mrs. Chubb, and that the same were equitable assets of the debtor. The judgment directed her to convey the property to a receiver appointed by the court, and the receiver to sell the same and apply the proceeds to the payment of the liens thereon, in the order of their priority, that the defendant Mrs. Chubb account to and pay over to the receiver the rents received by her, to be applied to the same purpose. The judgment does not indicate very clearly what is meant by the priority of liens, but it necessarily postpones the Merton judgment in the hands of the person who has the legal title to the. property till after the satisfaction of the plaintiffs’ judgments, which, as we have seen, are subsequent in point of time. The-legal effect of the decision is made clearer by reference to certain requests made by the defendant, Mrs. Chubb, as follows:

1. That if the real estate was subject to be applied to the payment of Townsend’s debts, then it should be first used for the-payment of the Merton judgment.

2. That if the rents were subject to be so applied, they should-fir- >o used to satisfy the .same judgment.

Tim trial court refused to, so hold, and counsel for the defendant, firs. Chubb, excepted. The general term affirmed the judgm - it, with a modification to the effect that she should be credited in the accounting with such sums as she had paid since she went, inr > possession of the property for taxes, interest on incumbrances, repurs and any other necessary expenses for the preservation and. m i -.-iLiiice of the same.

i’li * question is whether, according to the course and practice-of oquitv, the title to this property can be transferred to a receiver-in iinvganl of the rights of Mrs. Chubb as a creditor, for that is, practically, what the judgment does. The defendant’ holds the legal title subject to a resulting trust in favor of the creditors of her father. But she is herself one of them, and the oldest in poi'it of time. There is united in her the legal title to the property m i the ownership of the first of thé judgments for the pavme i- of which the statute declares the trust. She is both trustee an l witiu que trust. Her position as a creditor is not recognized bv i« judgment in this case, for the receiver is directed, from the pr-ie.i -ds. of the sale of the property, to pay to plaintiffs their costs of this action, then the entire amount of their claims with in'- >r >st, and to deposit the balance, if nnv. with the county treasurer, -nbjeet to the o-ler of t.he eon it, Th° nrin^nle nt the bottom of this decision -ust be eith-r th- • M- ■ Chubb, for sorpR reason, is not. entit' -1 : share at all in tim proceeds of the snH

or that the plaintiffs, by reason of the commencement of this action, have acquired, in equity, a right to the proceeds prior and superior to that of the person holding both the title to the property and the older judgment. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs, on the argument, concedes certain rights to the defendant which are not expressed in the findings or judgment under review. He says that the innocence of the trustee personally of fraud simply avoids a disability as creditor to acquire a preference and enables her as holder of the Merton judgment to enter the race on equal terms with other creditors, but that her innocence constitutes no affirmative merit for any purpose. This is a concession that, before this action was commenced, the Merton judgment occupied, at least, as favorable a position, with respect to the equitable assets represented by this property, as any other judgment. While admitting this, he argues that these plaintiffs, by the exercise of that superior diligence in bringing this action, which is sometimes recognized in equity as a ground of prefer ence in the absence of other controlling circumstances, have ac quired the prior right to the assets.

We think that this contention cannot be sustained. The cotv-m have apparently determined the priority of lien in this class oí cases in accordance with the rule that prevails in analogous casas where the title and conveyance of the property sought to be reached in the action comes directly from the fraudulent d.eHor himself. Wood v. Robinson, 22 N. Y., 564 ; Murphy v. Briggs, 89 id., 452. In the case last cited the court, in explaining ike judgment in Wood v. Robinson, said: “It appears that the plaintiff was a prior judgment creditor, and hence he had a prior equity which entitled him to a preference at the time of the conveyance to the wife of real estate paid for by the husband. Iu tbe case of The Ocean National Bank v. Olcott, 46 N. Y., 12 , a judgment creditor sought to reach equitable assets of the debtor of this character, and Church, Ch. J., said: “A trust results, not of the Whole property, but only to satisfy the just claims of creditors; not of one creditor only, but of all creditors. * * * Hence the fifty-second section was adopted which placed the property in the same relation to creditors as it would have; been if the debtor himself had fraudulently transferred it.”

On a bill filed to reach real property fraudulently transferred by the debtor the claims of several creditors are satisfied ;n the order of the priority of the judgments. Chautauqua Co. Bank, v. Risley, 19 N. Y., 369 . But if the qeeetmn was to be determined irrespective of authority and upon the general principles of equity which secure to a vigilant creditor the fruits of his diligence bv recognizing the priority of his lien, that rule was satisfied and such priority secured by the union in Mrs. Chubb of both the title to the assets and the prior judgment with-all legal remedies for its collection exhausted. The argument ior the plaintiffs admits that had she- then brought an action to appropriate the property to the payment oí the judgment she would have obtained the prior lien. Hat as she had the title to the property .$,nd was in possession ami enjoyment of it, and at the same time

the owner of the judgment, such an action, which would be substantially a suit against herself, would seem to be an idle ceremony. On this state of facts she might well have assumed that a court of equity would refuse to disturb her title or possession until all of her just claims were paid, the title having come to her through the act of the person who was bound to pay her judgment, without any fraud on her part.

She had, nearly a year before the plaintiffs recovered their judgments, advanced her money to take up an' existing .judgment against her father and, at least to the extent of the sum advanced, she replaced the money diverted by him from his creditors when he paid the consideration of the conveyance to her. She was at that moment in receipt of the rents and profits as owner, and I am unable to see why every right that she could ever assert as a creditor did not then attach to the land and the rents in her hands, as. completely as if, without any of these advantages, she had brought an action. This court has recognized the principle decided in Lobstein v. Lehn, 120 Ill., 549 , that the grantee of lands under a conveyance constructively but not actually fraudulent, may hold the land as security for a debt honestly due him, Loos v. Wilkinson, 113 N. Y., 491 ; 23 St. Rep., 282 .

We are not aware of any rule that would justify junior judgment creditors in disturbing the title or possession of the defendant, as. to this property, without first paying or offering to pay her judgment. The filing of a bill by her to reach the property could not, in equity, place her in any stronger position. If the property in question had been conveyed by Beals to Merton, by direction of the debtor, under the same circumstances, and with like intent on the part of the debtor, before the assignment of the judgment to Mrs. Chubb, equity would treat his lien as paramount, and his assignee, without fraud, has succeeded to all of his rights at law or in equity.

For these reasons the judgment of the general and special terms should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide event..

All concur.